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This research explores the role of fake news delivered during the 2019 Canadian 
Federal election. The aim of this study is to understand what impact exposure to fake 
news may have had on voter’s political ideologies and to examine whether criminal 
interference was involved. This study employs a survey which was delivered through 
social media platforms to Canadian voters in hopes to understand whether they were 
exposed to fake news, if it affected their ultimate voting decision, if they were the 
recipient of an election-related robocall, and what the nature of the robocall was. The 
results of four binary logistic regressions using survey data (N = 190) are used to explain 
how fake news can impact voter’s decisions. Further, this study also employs a 
qualitative content analysis of known fake news headlines (N = 596) during the time of 
the election to determine the aim, scope, target, and nature of each news piece. A final 
qualitative content analysis is conducted to determine the nature of robocalls through 
survey respondents who were the recipient of an election-related robocall (N = 46). The 
findings of these studies allow for an in-depth examination into whether Canadian voters 
were influenced by fake news, if the influence that had an impact on their voting 
decision, and if criminal interference was involved during the time of the election. 
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Comment In the context of social media engagement, this relates to the 
action of providing a comment on a post 
Like  In the context of social media engagement, this relates to 
clicking the ‘like’ icon which expresses the user’s interest in the 
post 
Meme An amusing or interesting item (such as a captioned picture or 
video) or genre of items that is spread widely online especially 
through social media. 
Newsfeed In opening a social media platform, the first page of the 
program’s interface provides the user with a current selection of 
content which is updated frequently. 
Share In the context of social media engagement, this involves a user 
re-posting a social media post, image, or video to their personal 
page 
Sub-Reddit On Reddit, the users have the option to subscribe to various sub-
Reddits. These are best described as sub-groups on Reddit 
where the content posted within them is related to a specific 
theme. 
Tweet On Twitter, tweets are posts which are created by a person and 
posted to their Twitter page. Re-Tweeting involves sharing the 
post from another person’s Twitter page to the user’s own page. 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
Social media platforms have become an increasingly embedded and useful tools 
utilized by many individuals, groups, businesses, agencies and political parties to 
circulate information delivery. Through social media, we are able to connect with friends 
and family, stay up to date on the latest products and gadgets, engage in conversation 
with others, and maintain an updated knowledge on local, national, and global events. 
This evolving technology has the ability to connect people through rapid dissemination of 
information. Previous communication tools are still commonly used, but they cannot 
compete with the streamlined capabilities that social media platforms possess in the 
distribution of information. Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Instagram, and Tumblr are a few of 
the many platforms utilized to share and distribute news, photos, and videos. These 
platforms can be beneficial to bridge the geographical gaps that can hinder social 
cohesion; yet, it is the very same technology that can be accessory to social 
divisiveness. The nature of the content that is being shared and circulated can have 
significant consequences for the people who consume the material.  
The main focus of this research is to understand what impact exposure to fake 
news during the 2019 Canadian Federal election may have had on voter’s political 
ideologies and to examine whether criminal interference was involved. Following the 
election, there were a variety of reports surfacing about automated phone calls 
(robocalls) being delivered to Canadian voters informing them to vote the day after polls 
have closed. Through employing an exploratory design, this research also seeks to 
understand the nature of these calls and whether evidence can be found to support the 
existence of voter suppression strategies during the pre-election period. Significant 
research was developed following the 2016 U.S Presidential election. Findings of these 
research endeavors examining the false information dispersed during the pre-election 
period in the U.S found that false information was deliberately circulated to serve an 
intended purpose (Berghel, 2017). As evidence has provided insight into the interference 
of falsified information during the U.S election, it is worthwhile to understand whether 
Canada has too fallen victim to informational violence.  
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To collect information that may useful in answering the main research questions, 
this thesis employs three separate studies. Study 1 quantitatively examines the data 
derived from the survey which was created for the research to understand the 
experiences of Canadians who have come across fake news items during the pre-
election period. Study 2 qualitatively assesses the content authored and posted by two 
main sources, The Buffalo Chronicle and the Canada Proud Facebook group, to 
determine whether the sources hold any responsibility in the production or dispersion of 
fake news content. Study 3 examines the qualitative data collected from survey 
participants who share their experiences with answering election-related automated 
telephone calls (robocalls). Through analyzing their responses, this thesis aims to 
understand the nature of the robocalls received by Canadian citizens and whether 
political interference was a factor. 
Through conducting three studies and analyzing their results, this thesis hopes 
that the findings of each study can be used in collaboration to explain the nature and 
scope of fake news, the techniques and mechanisms used to create and deploy false 
information pieces, to understand how disinformation may influence a reader, and 
whether any of the actions involved in the distribution of false information crosses the 
border into criminal activity. This research further examines information warfare and 
whether the false information delivered during the 2019 Canadian Federal election was 
impacted by an information attack on the Canadian democratic process. 
3 




As media consumers engage with an endless stream of information, the ability to 
infer the accuracy, quality, and legitimacy of the messages delivered to them can 
become more burdensome. Social media platforms occupy a unique role due the 
constant presentation of social engagement materials delivered to the user. As the users 
become overloaded with information, the risk of accepting false information as real 
becomes higher. There is a level of dangerousness posed when false information is 
accepted as factual by the consumer and is then used to guide their political decisions. 
Social media has become a tool used by many to find and access important information 
related to democratic elections. The evolving reliance on social networks has led to the 
conception of ‘cyber-ghettos’ which are conceived in a realm of social media where fake 
news content fills the void when reliable news content is inaccessible or unavailable 
(Kumar & Krishna, 2014). Cyber-ghettos exist when sectors of cyber space serve as an 
echo chamber where information, views, and opinions are propagated amongst those 
who hold similar ideologies. This results in limited access and exposure to alternative 
perspectives (Kumar & Krishna, 2014).  
To better situate this research, it is important to engage with relevant literature 
that examines the implications of misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda and 
how fake news fits within this discourse. This thesis next examines fake news through 
the lens of social constructionism. Social construction theory proves valuable as a 
framework to interpret the role of claims makers in the production of fictitious knowledge. 
Claims makers are entities or individuals who hold significant authority through their 
ability to generate social knowledge. Through the construction and injection of 
information into the public domain, their role is to provide information to the masses; 
however, when the information established by claims makers is inherently flawed, the 
consequences for information consumers can be catastrophic. This review also 
considers the ability of false fact claims makers to facilitate information warfare (Libicki, 
2007). To appraise the criminality associated with intentionally disseminating false 
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information related to election issues, this thesis will explore relevant Canadian cases 
and legislation to interpret the Canadian legal perspective on election-focused fake 
news. 
2.2. Misinformation and Disinformation: Propaganda and 
Fake News 
While they are not synonymous terms, misinformation, disinformation, 
propaganda, and fake news. all share very similar attributes; however, it is their 
differences that distinctly define them. Misinformation is considered to be information 
that is introduced as accurate information, but it is later discovered as being inaccurate; 
disinformation is deceptive and untrue information which is purposefully distributed as 
propaganda (Lewandowsky, Stritzke, Freund, Oberauer, & Krueger, 2013). Propaganda 
can be best understood as politically motivated information materials which are typically 
biased or misleading (Kumar & Krishna, 2014). Disinformation, like misinformation, can 
later be recognize as false, but the propensity for harm caused by the dissemination of 
disinformation before it is deciphered as false can be significant.  
Fake news has become a signifier that is associated with the rising concerns 
over the erosion of journalistic integrity, the amplification of biased voices, and the role 
social media plays in information dissemination (Carlson, 2018). It is typically 
propagandist in nature; but not exclusively so. One conclusive definition for fake news is 
that it is conceptualized as “distorted signals uncorrelated with the truth” (Allcott & 
Gentzkow, 2017, p. 212). This definition can be applied to all types of information pieces. 
Memes, GIFs, news articles (printed and online), videos, shared posts, tweets, forum 
posts, editorial pieces, and so forth can all potentially propagate signals which are at 
odds with authentic reality. Allcott and Gentzkow’s (2017) definition serves a valuable 
framework to analyze the concept of fake news. The distorted signals imply that the 
information relayed through the signal have become misreported, misrepresented, 
skewed, and/or twisted. This signifies that fake news can fall within or between the 
distinction of misinformation and disinformation. Fake news can be classified 
misinformation when it is unintentionally inaccurate (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). A piece 
could be published that may not have any malicious intent to deceive the reader, but the 
information presented is still inherently false. Fake news can also be classified as 
disinformation when it is purposefully circulated to mislead the intended audience 
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(Lewandowsky et al., 2013). While both types of fake news can present significantly 
negative consequence, disinformation is likely to be the more dangerous sub-type.  
Fake news is created and disseminated for many reasons. Allcott and Gentzkow 
(2017) discuss three rationales that seek to explain the spread of fake news. A 
considerable factor in the creation and publication of fake news media is that it is 
significantly cheaper to generate and deploy in comparison to more ethically bound 
information sources. Further, many consumers may not have the means or devotion to 
deduce the accuracy of each piece of news-related information they are exposed to. 
This can allow falsified information to flourish in an environment where readers may be 
less inclined to scrutinize the facts presented. Next, many consumers may simply 
appreciate partisan information. Social media platforms can generate an echo chamber 
around an individual where information, views, opinions, and ideologies are reiterated 
and rebounded within the user’s informational space which limits their exposure to other 
possible ideas (Kumar & Krishna, 2014). Users become impoverished to other 
perspectives which further perpetuates their current view as being the superlative 
outlook where other possible ideas are inferior. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) and Kumar 
and Krishna (2014) both discuss why fake news has rooted itself in the news media 
landscape; the consequences of its foothold in the dissemination of false and biased 
information is that it can hinder a reader’s ability to receive and consider supplementary 
counter-perspectives. 
Bakir and McStay (2018) discuss the dangers of echo chambers. The authors 
note that a key tenant of functional democracy is that the citizens must be well-informed 
in order to make democratic decisions. An ill-informed citizen who is guided by fake 
news may vote differently in elections as their inspiration is directed by unreliable facts. 
Citizens form their decisions about key social and democratic issues through the 
information they interact with. Far-reaching deceptive facts delivered through fake news 
can significantly impact democratic outcomes. Echo chambers then serve as a silo 
where incorrect information is further propagated and circulated, but not corrected. This 
causes the ill-informed citizen to remain in the dark as their view based on dubious facts 
remain unrevised. A key tool necessary in the creation of echo chambers, as noted by 
Bakir and McStay (2018), are the algorithms applied to online networks. Algorithms are 
applied to newsfeeds and they selectively determine, based on the data inputted into the 
algorithm, what kind of content a user is likely inclined to appreciate viewing. Algorithms 
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consider the information that is available about the user which can include their friends 
and followers, their browsing history, purchases that they have made, and the types of 
content they typically post and engage with. Algorithms can increase the possibility of 
confirmation bias as they further re-circulate the same views that the user appears to 
favour without providing other potential perspectives or counter information (Bakir & 
McStay, 2018). 
Fake news often contains highly affective material which is intentionally crafted to 
inspire an emotional reaction from the reader (Bakir & McStay, 2018). The use of 
emotionally charged words within the fictious news item are typically strategically placed 
to enable the story to linger within the minds of the readers long after they are exposed 
to it. Even if they are aware that the information is false, the affective response can still 
affect their emotions about a certain topic. Bakir and McStay (2018) further note that 
through manipulating people’s emotions in targeted material which intends to diminish 
the appeal of political candidates, this can encourage increased dislike for specific 
figures of authority. This may have a considerable result in reducing the public’s 
confidence in the legitimacy of the government and can ultimately lead to 
disproportionate democratic decisions. It is clear through the examined literature that 
fake news can be detrimental to democracy through the creation of echo chambers 
which promote confirmation bias that ultimately can lead to a flawed understanding of an 
influential issue. Another danger is that while fake news is intended to imply 
‘misinformation’ or ‘disinformation’, an emerging socially accepted definition of fake news 
is that it is information which conflicts with an already held set of beliefs; suggesting that 
while the information may in fact be true, it conflicts with the ideologies the consumer 
holds as their primary philosophy by which they see the world and therefore reject 
alternative discourse as ‘fake news’ (Berghel, 2017). 
During the 2016 U.S Presidential election, a common concern among many was 
the possibility of fake news interference. Berghel (2017) suggested that Russian trolling, 
through misinformation campaigns, could have had a significant impact on the election. 
The author notes that psychological strategies were commonly used by a Russian 
Internet Research Agency (IRA) to encourage an emotional reaction. The affective 
response is then compounded with the Streisand effect. The Streisand effect occurs 
when members of the public become more intrigued by information which has been the 
subject of an attempted cover-up. The attempt to bury fake news can unintentionally 
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promote the false information to have a greater impact on readers with partisan interests 
as these discourses are commonly “weaponized by ideologues”; this can cause 
consumers with strong partisan beliefs to accept the inaccurate information even in the 
face of significant contrary evidence (Berghel, 2017, p. 90).  
2.3. The Construction of Knowledge and the Role of Claims 
Makers in Fake News 
2.3.1. Social Construction Theory 
Social constructionism is focused on the processes of social interactions that 
construct notions of social reality; what we perceive as knowledge is subject to an 
elaborate network of social interaction which influences how we understand the social 
and natural world (Lindgren, 2005). Further, these products are conceived through the 
understanding that power is exercised via social structures. Power is exercised through 
these social institutions and represent the constructed outcome of knowledge that 
becomes a segment of social reality. Power is then an integral aspect in the social 
construction process and is inherent to our ideas on knowledge and realities (Lindgren, 
2005). Fake news construction fits within this paradigm as it is created by a claim maker 
who engineers the information product to be disseminated within society. It then exists 
as a segment of social reality as people interact with the fake news piece and interpret 
its derived meanings. Fake news constructionists exercise considerable power through 
their role in establishing knowledge (although inherently flawed) facilitated among 
various social structures. For example, during the 2016 U.S Presidential election, there 
was considerable concern regarding Russian interference authored by the Russian IRA 
(Berghel, 2017). The Russian IRA can be considered as a social structure which 
exercises its power to create information material. The organization had developed a 
strong hold among U.S social media consumers and provided targeted and 
manufactured information across their social media platforms. Through the deception on 
behalf of the IRA, social media users accepted the legitimacy of these groups and 
welcomed the constructed information materials created by the IRA to penetrate into 
their newsfeeds. As the IRA created social media groups and pages became socially 
accepted by social media users, they further evolved to become a legitimized social 
structure with the influential capability to create social fact. In exercising their power to 
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project counterfeited knowledge to the masses, they were able to inject their constructed 
narratives to encourage a pre-determined outcome. 
2.3.2. Information Trolls and Information Warfare 
Social media is the platform used by most creators of fake news to circulate their 
material. A key characteristic of social media is that it facilitates the exchange of images 
and communication in an efficient and casual manner. This feature makes trust relatively 
easy to establish (Waschke, 2017). While many people find social media an attractive 
platform to stay connected and to have a diverse body of information at their finger-tips, 
these qualities attract, what Waschke (2017) refers to as, the ‘cybervillian’. The term 
cybervillian is broad. It can largely encompass any person who has any malicious intent 
who commits their villainous deeds within the cyberworld. While creators of fake news 
can be argued to fit within the definition of a cybervillian, the definition isn’t specific in 
focus to those who intentionally manipulate the minds of consumers with falsified 
information. 
Another potential term which can be used to refer to the perpetrators of fake 
news is ‘moral entrepreneur’ (Carlson, 2018). Based from Cohen’s (1972) concept of 
moral panics, Carlson (2018) further applies the classic concept to fake news and the 
creation of public anxiety. The author approaches the topic by equating fake news to be 
an informational moral panic. An important element in the relation between Cohen’s 
moral panics, and the creation and spread of fake news, is that moral panics heighten 
public anxiety about a specific social threat. People perceive this threat to be a 
considerable issue that could lead to crime and disorder. The construction of these 
social threats become greatly exaggerated and can dominate social discourse which 
may result in an over-reaction. Carlson’s (2018) examination of fake news through 
Cohen’s moral panic framework illustrates the potential social destruction that 
disinformation campaigns can manifest. Through the induction of moral panics, fake 
news can threaten the democratic process and promote social unrest towards issues 
that may not require immediate social reaction (Carlson, 2018). This further illustrates 
how fake news is not only the product of social construction but can also be 
consequential in an over-reaction to socially constructed threats. 
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Libicki (2007) discusses the concept of information warfare. Information warfare 
is defined by the author as “the use of information to attack information” (p. 20). This 
definition is based on the premise that decisions are made as a result of the information 
that has been received by the decision maker; if the information received by the decision 
maker is inaccurate, or incomplete, the decision maker’s output may not align with the 
decision that would have been made based on the reception of accurate aggregated 
data. The motivation for an information attack is to manipulate the outcome decision 
located on the other end of the information exchange. Typically, this will be 
advantageous to the attacker as they can assist in influencing poorly guided decisions or 
late decisions. Libicki (2007) also notes that false information can promote the receiver 
to make a wrong decision, but so too can adding contradicting and obscured information 
to the already dysfunctional information. Another method of attack mentioned is that one 
does not need to alter already existing information, they can instead wage war by 
modifying the credibility of the information that has been delivered and received. The 
author refers to those who engage in information war as ‘information warriors’. 
Cybervillians (Waschke, 2017), moral entrepreneurs (Cohen 1972; Carlson, 
2018), and information warriors (Libicki, 2007) are all accurate language to describe 
those who create fake news. This paper proposes another term to denote disinformation 
creators; the term recommended is ‘information trolls’. Internet trolling refers to someone 
who makes “inflammatory, rude, or upsetting statements to elicit strong emotional 
responses in people” (Vicente, 2020, Jan 21, para. 2). Trolls may have many motivations 
for their actions. They may be creating chaos in a forum for their own entertainment, or 
they may have a very specific agenda that can be attained by eliciting a desired 
emotional response among their audience (Vicente, 2020, Jan 21). Fake news writers 
use various techniques to push a specific agenda and can have a major impact on the 
views of media consumers (Guo & Vargo, 2018). The main commodity in their agenda-
setting ventures is the dispersion of information. Information is a useful weapon when 
striving to achieve a desired outcome within the public domain. Thus, information trolls is 
a conclusive term to specifically address the perpetrators of fake news. 
2.3.3. Media as an Information System 
A computer’s information system draws many parallels to the news media 
information system. Libicki (2007) notes that a computer’s network is under the control of 
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its owner. If malicious messages infiltrate the system, this is due to there being a 
doorway which allowed that message entrance. Most computer network infiltrations 
involve deception to enable the malicious message to penetrate the system. An 
interesting parallel can be drawn between the computer’s information system and the 
injection of fake news into the media ecosystem. Much like a computer’s information 
system, weaknesses in the media’s information system allow malicious fake news 
messages to permeate into social discourse; this attack also often requires deception to 
persuade the reader about the credibility of the information. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) 
discuss that fake news is a consequence of being a cheaper alternative to legitimate 
information media and of the reader’s ability to critically assess psychologically crafted 
material intended to deceive readers. These are inherent weaknesses in the media 
information system through which fake news authors capitalize on as pathways to inject 
wrong information into the system. Deception may be used by information trolls to 
appear to have more credibility as a claims maker which can increase their ability to 
mislead a greater number of readers. Utilizing communication channels under the cloak 
of deception is advantageous in the propagation of false information (Kumar & Krishna, 
2014). Strategic deception is then a common feature within information warfare in the 
context of both the computer and media’s information systems (Libicki, 2007). 
Another thought-provoking parallel can be drawn between Libicki’s (2007) 
discussion on information warfare, in the context of computer systems, and matched 
with the media information system. According to the author, within information warfare, 
noise can be a detriment to the capacity for a computer system to make the correct 
decision. When signals are sent within a network, the ability of the system to infer 
effective decision-making falls on the quality and accuracy of the signals sent. With more 
noise, comes reduced signal. When signals become diluted, the data flow within the 
system decelerates and the capacity to determine the substantive information pertinent 
in making the required determination is hindered. This can be compared to the 
communication systems within information media. Fake news communicators often use 
noise to distract their audience or to draw further attention to an already sensationalized 
information environment (Guo and Vargo, 2018). With more noise, the ability to infer 
what is accurate and what is false can become more difficult. As social media grows to 
play a more significant role in information distribution, fake news dispersed through 
these communication channels are becoming more active and capable of injecting 
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deceiving information and significant noise into the minds of a democratic population 
(Carlson, 2018). Weaponizing information is seen as informational violence which is a 
form of non-material cyber attack that holds the potential to threaten an entire 
democratic system (Haataja, 2019). Much like a computer system, when data is rapidly 
ejected to the operator, the ability to make appropriate decisions decreases. Noise in the 
context of the media ecosystem can impact public policy and democratic elections by 
intentionally impeding the consumer’s capacity to be fully-informed on relevant matters. 
2.4. The Legality of Fake News 
2.4.1. Pierre Poutine: 2011 Robocall Voter Suppression Scandal 
Following the 2011 Canadian Federal election, Elections Canada and the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were prompted to investigate a series of fraudulent 
phone calls that were targeted towards non-Conservative voters. These pre-recorded 
calls provided the recipient with inaccurate information which was seemingly intended to 
dissuade them from casting their ballots (Maher and McGregor, 2012, Feb 23a). In 
Guelph, Ontario, on the day of the Federal election, approximately 6,000 voters received 
automated phone calls (robocalls) which were falsely depicted as coming from Elections 
Canada informing the recipient that their riding location had changed (Maher and 
McGregor, 2012, Aug 10). There were 17 other ridings across Canada which received 
harassing or deceitful robocalls in an “apparent effort to discourage Liberal supporters 
from voting” (Maher and McGregor, 2012, Feb 23a, para. 3). 
During their investigation, Elections Canada traced the number which appeared 
on the call display of one of the robocalls in question to Joliette, Quebec. Elections 
Canada then subpoenaed the cell-phone provider of that number to provide a list of all 
outgoing calls made by that phone number. The cell-phone in question was a burner 
phone that was registered to “Pierre Poutine” which had been paid for by using pre-paid 
credit cards (Payton, 2012, May 16). One specific call of interest made by Pierre 
Poutine’s burner phone was to RackNine. This specific number was used by customers 
of the company to dial in and record their outgoing robocalls (Maher and McGregor, 
2012, Feb 23b). RackNine Inc. is a company based out of Edmonton, Alberta which 
provides web-hosting, web-design and development, and marketing and productivity 
services (RackNine, 2018). The investigation into the fraudulent robocalls were traced to 
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the RackNine call centre. The Conservative Party of Canada had previously employed 
this company to work on their national campaign and also were contracted to at least 
nine other Conservative party candidates (Maher and McGregor, 2012, Feb 23a). 
Al Mathews, the Elections Canada investigator in this case, traced the Internet 
Protocol (IP) address which was used to access the RackNine account in question that 
sent out the deceitful robocall on the day of the election. Mathews then received a court 
order for Rogers Communications Inc. to disclose the customer’s information that is 
linked to the discovered IP address (Payton, 2012, May 16). Pierre Poutine’s IP address 
was the same IP address that had been used by Andrew Prescott. Prescott at the time 
was the deputy campaign manager for Conservative candidate Marty Burke. Prescott’s 
account with RackNine was used to make legitimate automated-calls on behalf of the 
Conservative Party of Canada. Mathews was not convinced Prescott was solely 
responsible for the fraudulent robocalls (Payton, 2012, May 4). Prescott later was 
granted a written guarantee of immunity in that the Crown had no intention of charging 
him in connection to the voter suppression scandal; they were solely interested in his 
witness account (Payton, 2014, Jan 15). According to a court filling, it was disclosed that 
a campaign worker named Michael Sona had spoken to two other Conservative workers 
and suggested that they create a disinformation campaign that would mislead the public 
about their polling location (Payton, 2012, May 4). 
Michael Sona was later convicted in August 2014 for preventing, or attempting to 
prevent, Canadian voters from voting in the 2011 Federal election in Guelph, Ontario (R. 
v. Sona, 2014). Justice G. F. Hearn, during the ruling in Superior Court in Guelph, 
Ontario, was not convinced that Sona acted alone as there was evidence to suggest that 
multiple people were involved in the misleading robocalls. However, Justice Hearn noted 
that it was Sona’s “arrogance and self-importance” which endorsed his disclosure of the 
plan to suppress votes to the witnesses in this case (R. v. Sona, 2014, para 178.7). 
More than 6,700 Guelph homes were targeted in this attack which directed voters to the 
wrong polling stations during the Canadian Federal election on May 2, 2011 (Rogers, 
2014, Aug 14). On November 19, 2014 Justice Hearn sentenced Sona to a 9-month 
term of imprisonment and a 12-month period of probation (R. v. Sona, 2014). 
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2.4.2. Voter Suppression Robocalls: Federal Election 2019 
During the 2019 Canadian Federal Election, Elections Canada received reports 
of robocalls which directed the call recipient to vote on October 22, 2019, one day after 
the election. These robocalls were reported in Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova 
Scotia. Upon further investigation, CBC News traced the calls to the “Canada Strong and 
Proud” group (Bellemare & Rogers, 2019, Oct 21). Canada Strong and Proud was 
officially registered as a third-party in the federal election in July 2019. In June 2019, the 
group sent out a series of robocalls asking for information about how the call recipient 
intended to vote in the upcoming election and whether they supported the controversial 
pipelines. Canada Strong and Proud has a history of employing automated messaging 
tactics in both federal and provincial campaigns (Paas-Lang, 2019, July 25). Ontario 
Proud, which is a localized affiliation of the Canada Strong and Proud group, reportedly 
received nearly $460,000 in corporate donations to fund their campaign to vote the 
Liberals out of office in the 2019 election. Common tactics used by this group involved 
sharing viral memes and social media content to attract a large audience and generate 
support for their campaign (Rogers, 2019, Aug 6). The Canada Proud and Strong group 
who were responsible for the misleading robocalls stated that these calls were 
accidental. The organization responded by stating that the calls informing people to vote 
“tomorrow” were to be sent out on October 20, 2019 (the day before the election), but a 
small percentage were accidentally sent out on election day. However, many call 
recipients reported the call to explicitly state that voting was to occur on October 22, 
2019 which is the day after the election when polls are no longer open (Bellemare & 
Rogers, 2019, Oct 21). 
There currently is no public information about an investigation into the 2019 
misleading robocalls. Given the circumstances detailed, it does appear to be suspicious 
and resembles the voter suppression activity which occurred in 2011. While Canada 
Proud and Strong is not directly affiliated with an electoral party, this does not mean that 
they are immune to the laws and regulations governing Canadian elections. In 
accordance with the Canada Elections Act (2000), S. 282.6 states that, “no person shall 
prevent or attempt to prevent an elector from voting at an election”. Regardless of third-
party election status, Canada Proud and Strong is not exempt from this section. If it were 
to be determined that any member of this group orchestrated the robocalls to be sent out 
to recipients in attempts to prevent their vote from being cast, they would be prosecuted 
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similar to the precedent set by the R. v. Sona (2014) decision. However, claiming 
accidental negligence may be a less concrete prosecution. The difference between “vote 
tomorrow” and “vote on October 22nd” could have very different trial outcomes. 
Considering the evidence that this same group had previously sent out wide-spread text 
messages asking for information from recipients on how they intended to vote, it is 
plausible that this generated a list of voters whose votes they aimed to suppress. 
Further, in examining the funding of the Ontario Proud splinter group, the means and 
infrastructure to enact voter suppression tactics are readily available. 
2.4.3. Misinformation Campaigns by Foreign Entities 
Russian Trolling During the 2016 U.S Presidential Election 
There is plenty of evidence to support Russian interference and manipulation in 
the 2016 U.S Presidential election (Haataja, 2019). One method of cyber attack which 
occurred during the time of the election involved obtaining unauthorized access to 
computers and networks. This resulted in classified data being leaked from those 
sources which were then utilized to orchestrate further manipulation and disruption of the 
electoral process. Haataja (2019) notes that with the leaked data, Russian entities were 
able to successfully coordinate more directed attacks on specific targets. This provided 
the attackers with more sensitive information as users who were successfully mislead by 
the spear-phishing emails downloaded malicious software that facilitated data to be 
transferred to the foreign entities. The data collected in this attack was exploited to 
inform various strategies used by Russian hackers to weaken the Democratic Party’s 
electoral appeal (Haataja, 2019). 
Weaponizing information to attack a nation’s democratic process is a form of 
informational violence (Haataja, 2019). One significant information-based attack used 
during the 2016 U.S Presidential election was the dispersion of misinformation 
campaigns (Berghel, 2017). Through propagating divisive dialogue via fake news 
outlets, manipulation of voter’s values and beliefs became possible. Russian information 
trolls used information to influence political ideology (Berghel, 2017; Haataja, 2019). 
While there currently is no evidence or reason to suggest that Russian interference was 
involved in the 2019 Canadian Federal election, based on what occurred within the 
context of the 2016 Presidential Election, it is not outside the realm of possibility. If 
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Canada were to have experienced similar intervention from foreign entities in the 
democratic process of the election, there are criminal sanctions which apply. If an 
attacker were to infiltrate a given computer or network without administrator permissions 
to withdraw data or to install malicious software, this would be in direct violation of 
section 342.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985). Section 342.1 discusses offences 
related to unauthorized use of a computer. Within this section, anyone who accesses a 
computer service or network without authorization can be punished under summary 
conviction. If the person who accessed the computer without authorization has used the 
information to commit another crime, section 430 of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985) 
will be applied; however, within the framework of information attacks to manipulate 
democratic decisions, the application of this section becomes less concrete. Section 
430(1.1) discusses mischief in relation to computer data and states that, 
Everyone commits mischief who willfully (a)destroys or alters computer 
data; (b) renders computer data meaningless, useless or ineffective; 
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use of computer data; 
or (d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with a person in the lawful use of 
computer data or denies access to computer data to a person who is 
entitled to access to it 
Any person who is guilty of mischief in relation to a computer who causes danger 
to life will be charged under indictment and may be liable for life imprisonment (Criminal 
Code, 1985, s. 430(2)). Any person whose mischief in relation to a computer causes 
monetary loss to a person’s property that exceeds $5000 is punishable under indictable 
offence with a maximum prison term of ten years (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 430(3)). Any 
person who does commit mischief in relation to a computer but does not endanger a life 
or cause monetary loss over $5000 can be found guilty of an indictable offence and be 
sentence to a prison term not exceeding two years (Criminal Code, 1985, s. 430(4)). In 
understanding the punishment of section 430, the consequences of inciting an 
information war through use of a computer become a little blurry. While the person 
responsible for the information attack may destroy or alter data, they might interfere with 
the use of the computer, they may even deny access to the computer’s authorized 
owner, it is unlikely that they will threaten the life of a person. Further, as monetary gain 
is not the motive of this crime, they are not looking to benefit from the computer user’s 
financial well-being. Their intent is to obtain data that will assist them in political 
interference; it becomes extremely difficult to assign monetary value in this 
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circumstance. In application of section 430 of the Criminal Code (1985), engaging in 
information warfare through use of computer is likely to illicit a punishment of no more 
than two year in prison. 
Section 282.4 of the Canada Elections Act (2000) is more straightforward in its 
application to the interference of foreign entities in democratic elections. This section 
states that no person who is not a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada 
can influence an elector to vote or not vote, or to unduly influence them to vote or not 
vote for a particular candidate or party. This includes foreign governments, political 
parties, and corporations that do not hold any business in Canada. However, with the 
advanced and covert psychologically manipulative techniques that are often utilized in 
the creation and dispersion of fake news, it would be difficult to prove that the exposure 
to the propagandistic materials had an unduly influence on the voter to vote for the 
intended party.  
Information Trolls During the 2019 Canadian Federal Election 
Within the context of the 2019 Canadian Federal election, there is current 
evidence to suggest that, much like the influence of the Russian IRA in the 2016 U.S 
Presidential election, there was a misinformation campaign at play in targeting Canadian 
democracy during Canada’s 2019 Federal election. During the time leading up to the 
election, The Buffalo Chronicle became a significant concern to the legitimate Canadian 
news media and the Canadian government due to viral stories being published on their 
website which contained material depicting information that had minimal or zero factual 
basis (Oved, Lytvynenko, & Silverman, 2019, Oct 18). In an investigation completed by 
investigative reporter, Marco Oved, and two Buzzfeed journalists, Jane Lytvynenko and 
Craig Silverman (2019), it was confirmed that the person behind the website, Matthew 
Ricchiazzi 1had previously offered his services to individuals and businesses to publish 
positive or negative coverage of political candidates for a price. In their investigation of 
election records, they discovered that in 2018 Ricchiazzi received $2000 (USD) and The 
Buffalo Chronicle received $1000 (USD) from a political committee which was formed to 
advocate for the election of Joel Giambra as Governor of New York. Regardless of being 
debunked by a variety of fact-checking sources, The Buffalo Chronicle’s stories were 
 
1 While Ricchiazzi has been determined to be the person behind the Buffalo Chronicle’s website, 
no link can be made that he is the owner of The Buffalo Chronicle Media Group. 
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liked, commented, and shared by Facebook users over 200,000 times and they had 
accumulated 4.4 million Facebook fans2. Of further interest, while the website is said to 
cover both U.S and Canadian political content and is based in Buffalo, New York, 8 out 
of the 10 the Buffalo Chronicle’s most popular articles on Facebook were related to 
Canadian politics and were published on their website within the 8 months prior to the 
Canadian election (Oved, Lytvynenko, & Silverman, 2019, Oct 18). Many of the stories 
are published anonymously without mention of the article’s author and include 
unsubstantiated stories with anonymous sources cited (News Guard Tech, 2020).  
Another considerable red-flag in relation to The Buffalo Chronicle is that while the 
website appears to be owned by Ricchiazzi, the copyright statement identifies ‘The 
Buffalo Chronicle Media Group’. However, according to News Guard Tech (2020), there 
are no companies registered under that name in New York, any where else in the U.S, 
or in Canada. The Buffalo Chronicle’s website domain is registered with a service which 
provides the owner with anonymity over their location and identity. To increase further 
suspicion, the website’s contact address provides a location in Buffalo, New York; 
however, the address associated belongs to an abandoned building (News Guard Tech, 
2020). Due to minimal transparency in both company ownership and journalist identity, a 
history of publishing false stories, previous transactions with political advocation 
committees, and the use of a service to keep the domain owner’s identity anonymous, it 
is possible that a significant foreign entity played a role in influencing the 2019 Canadian 
election. It is clear that Canada was a victim of an active disinformation campaign; 
however, the person, company, or group responsible for waging an information attack on 
Canadian democracy is unclear. 
2.4.4. Difficulties in Investigating and Prosecuting Information Trolls 
While Canada does have legislation in place which can be applied in the 
response to information warfare, there are many obstacles faced by the justice system in 
investigating and prosecuting these cyber crimes. Cyber crime is complex. It provides 
the legal system with many barriers and hurdles to overcome when it is tasked to 
respond to it. Internet Protocol (IP) addresses may be obtained that can assist in the 
 
2 At present day, The Buffalo Chronicle’s Facebook page only observes 2,412 followers (Sept 21st, 
2020). This may suggest a sufficient number of fake accounts supported the page to increase the 
appearance of legitimacy 
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identification of the suspect involved in the related cyber crime offence. However, the IP 
address alone is not sufficient evidence as a user with technological know-how can 
simply circumvent detection through manipulating their IP details. This makes identifying 
the suspect behind the computer increasingly more difficult without an expert 
understanding of cyber investigative methods (Kao & Wang, 2009). As seen in the 
previous section, using technology as a tool to infiltrate the minds of voters to engineer a 
desired political result can have legal consequences. Unfortunately, the capacity for 
police to conduct complex investigations within the intricate bounds of technology may 
be limited by tools and technological expertise; as crime progresses away from physical 
reality and becomes more heavily entrenched in the digital domain, the demand for 
investigators and prosecutors who maintain an expert understanding of the digital 
environment becomes increasingly necessary (Brown, 2015). 
As investigations into technology facilitated political crimes become difficult to 
undertake for many reasons, so does the prosecution of the offence. Perpetrators of the 
crime may not even reside in the country where the crime has occurred. Within the 
example of Russian trolling during the 2016 U.S presidential election, the people 
responsible for the politically motivated crimes, committed the crime within the 
boundaries of the U.S, but were outside influencers. If the person or people responsible 
for an international cyber offence were to be successfully investigated and identified, an 
extradition treaty may not exist between the two countries involved. This is the case 
between the U.S and the Russian Federation which causes a great difficulty in 
prosecuting the offence(s) (Smith, Grabosky, & Urbas, 2004). Further, as noted by Smith 
et al. (2004), even in the cases where an extradition treaty exists, to successfully 
extradite the accused requires the support of the relevant police organization. Some 
police organizations, depending on the type of offence committed, may not want to 
allocate their resources to assist in the facilitation of justice in another country. Under 
Canadian law, section 3.7 of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985), determines Canadian 
legal jurisdiction. This section states that any person outside of Canada who commits an 
act (that would constitute a criminal offence if it were to be committed within Canada) 
against a Canadian citizen, they are deemed to have committed that act within Canada 
and are subject to legal punishment within the Canadian justice system. However, 
investigating the person(s) responsible for the offence relies on numerous factors and 
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barriers with considerable weight placed on the level of international cooperation and the 
existence of an extradition treaty. 
2.4.5. Fake News and Freedom of Expression 
A blurred line exists when discussing the legitimacy of fake news on social media 
platforms and the ambiguity of its protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (1982). Section 2 of the Charter sets out the protection for freedom of speech 
in Canada. Freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom guaranteed under the 
Charter; however, there are reasonable limits to this freedom. Hate speech, obscenity, 
and defamation are exclusions to the rule and are enforced under “reasonable limits”. 
The question within the context of disinformation campaigns then becomes, to what 
extent is the dissemination of inaccurate or false information deemed to be protected 
under section 2 of the Charter? In R. v. Elliot (2016), section 2 of the Charter came into 
question when the accused, Gregory Elliot, used Twitter as a platform to engage in 
debate with Stephanie Guthrie, a feminist activist. Elliot posted tweets criticizing Guthrie 
on both her online activism and her activities offline. Elliot was later charged with 
criminal harassment, but his charges were dismissed as there was no evidence of threat 
to Guthrie which would be required for a successful conviction of criminal harassment. 
Further, Elliot’s opinions being publicized on social media platforms are protected as 
they do not fall under any of the exclusionary rules set out under section 2 of the 
Charter. This case has many implications for social media information dissemination. 
Groups who are unaffiliated with the news media, and are therefore not bound by 
journalistic integrity, have the legitimized ability to use social media platforms as a 
means to propagate intentionally misleading information provided that it does not fall 
under hate speech, obscenity, or defamation. The freedom to express this information is 
protected under their guaranteed protection to express themselves freely. 
When misleading information reaches a consumer, they ultimately decide 
whether they fully or partially believe or disbelieve the content. The sharing of fake news 
on social media platforms further expands the ability to reach more readers and bolsters 
the propagation of the message conveyed; this has the potential for catastrophic 
repercussions. Through exploring the relevant literature, it becomes apparent that 
disinformation campaigns are akin to warfare. Information becomes a highly 
commodified tool to engage in information war. While the creation and dissemination of 
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fake news is not necessarily legal, the ability to investigate and prosecute the 
information trolls who create the misleading content is impeded by many obstacles. As 
misleading robocalls have been reported in relation to the 2019 Canadian Federal 
election and they appear to be motivated by voter suppression, it becomes relevant and 
critical to further explore the potential interference in the democratic process. 
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Chapter 3.  
 
Study 1 – Quantitative Analysis 
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This research aims to answer two main research questions: 
Research Question 1: Was fake news delivered during the election and if 
so, could it have had an effect the outcome of the 2019 Canadian Federal 
election results? 
Research Question 2: Was there any criminal interference involved during 
the time of the 2019 Canadian Federal election in relation to delivering false 
information through social media, news outlets, or robocalls? 
To answer the two main research questions, a mixed-methods approach was 
developed. This research will first begin by quantitatively analyzing survey data collected 
for the purposes of this research. Due to the complexity of the larger research questions, 
4 sub-research questions were created for quantitative exploration. The 4 sub questions 
that will be the focus of this chapter’s analysis are: 
Sub-Research Question 1: Do the use social media platforms effect 
whether a participant will decide to change their vote? 
Hypothesis 1: It is predicted that the use of social media will influence 
political decisions. As social media becomes more readily available and 
enables users to engage with news and informational content with 
increased speed and efficiency, it is hypothesized that exposure to social 
media will contribute to a participant’s change of mind about the original 
party they intended to vote for. 
Sub-Research Question 2: Does real news have an effect on whether a 
participant will change their vote? 
Hypothesis 2: It is predicted that exposure to real news will increase the 
probability that a participant will change their mind about their election 
decision. Articles that depict accurate information are likely to provide 
information regarding the election that consumers rely on to remain 
informed regarding election issues of interest. It is likely that reading 
reliable new articles will affect their voting decision. 
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Sub-Research Question 3: Does reading fake news have an effect on 
whether a participant will change their vote? 
Hypothesis 3: It is hypothesized that exposure to fake news will influence 
change voter’s political decisions. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) note that 
fake news articles are becoming increasingly wide-spread. Fake news 
items are a cheaper alternative to reliable information media. As more 
people become exposed to misinformation and disinformation, this may 
influence their decision. 
Sub-Research Question 4: Does believing fake news have an effect on 
whether a participant will change their vote? 
Hypothesis 4: It is hypothesized that those who believe fake news articles 
to be true are more likely to be influenced politically. Consumers are 
exposed to an increased number of fake news articles which makes it more 
difficult to infer what information is accurate and what is misleading or 
untrue (Carlson, 2018). It is predicted that those who believe the truth of 
deceptive media are likely to be persuaded to vote differently. 
3.1.2. Survey Data: Sampling and Recruitment 
  The quantitative dataset analyzed in this research was created through the use 
of a post-election survey. The survey (see Appendix A) was delivered online through 
various social media outlets from February 6th, 2020 to June 26th, 2020. The online 
survey was created through Qualtrics survey software. The inclusion criteria for this 
research required that participants be over the age of 18, be a Canadian citizen, and that 
they voted in the 2019 Canadian Federal election. A criterion sampling method was 
utilized as it was necessary for this research to include participants who fit the specific 
study criterion outlined (Palys & Atchinson, 2014). As this research requires Canadian 
citizens who have voted in the election, and are active on social media, it was necessary 
to reach out to potential respondents through posting advertisements containing the 
survey URL on various social media platforms where these specific participants would 
be likely to frequent. Further, a snowball sampling technique was also utilized. 
Advertisements of the study were shared on Facebook. As each Facebook user shared 
the survey invitation on their own page, the exposure of the survey increased its 
exposure to be included in new networks of potential participants. 
 
  The survey was distributed across Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit. When 
advertising the survey on Facebook, a link to the survey was shared publicly to the 
researcher’s personal page. This method received 27 responses. The survey link was 
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posted a total of four times during the 141-day data collection period and 11 people 
shared the survey link on their own personal Facebook page. Twitter attracted 19 
responses. The survey link was posted on the researcher’s twitter page. To increase the 
reach of the survey, the researcher included the hashtags, ‘#cdnpoli’ and 
‘#canadianpolitics’. Hashtags are labels that are used to categorize information. Once a 
hashtag is created and used, this enables social media users to have more simplified 
access to information which is related to the hashtag used (Taylor, 2015). The overall 
theme of this study relates to Canadian politics. Using a hashtag that symbolizes the 
study theme enables the survey to reach users who have an interest in politics in 
Canada and increase survey exposure to suitable participants. Reddit generated 87.7% 
of all responses (n = 270). Reddit is a large social media network that is divided into 
millions of ‘sub-Reddits’ (Widman, 2020). Much like hashtags, sub-Reddits symbolize 
information about a given topic or theme. When users subscribe to a subreddit, they 
have access to information that is relevant to the scope of the subreddit of interest. 
During the data collection, the survey was posted onto 24 different sub-Reddits (see 
Table 3.1) through the researcher’s Reddit account. 
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Table 3.1.  Reddit Survey Participant Recruitment 






Number of Times Posted 
to Subreddit 
r/onguardforthee 15 0 2 
r/ryerson 1 0 1 
r/uAlberta 4 2 1 
r/usask 1 0 1 
r/fredericton 6 1 1 
r/richmondbc 6 2 1 
r/canadaleft 5 1 1 
r/academiccanada 5 1 2 
r/BCpolitics 7 4 2 
r/simonfraser 16 2 2 
r/CanadianPolitics 20 0 2 
r/ndp 13 5 2 
r/LPC 13 0 2 
r/ManitobaPolitics 1 1 1 
r/Albertapolitics 4 0 1 
r/OntarioPolitics 10 1 1 
r/NovaScotia 4 2 1 
r/PeoplesPartyofCanada 0 0 1 
r/newbrunswickcanada 0 0 1 
r/metacanada 0 8 1 
r/GreenPartyOfCanada 4 0 1 
r/SampleSize 3 0 1 
r/CanadaPolitics 1 0 1 
r/Vancouver 1 0 1 
 
The number of upvotes the survey post received on each subreddit may have 
some indication as to which posting attracted the highest number of survey respondents. 
Upvotes are user driven. If a post receives a high number of upvotes, this will increase 
the post’s visibility on that specific subreddit. Likewise, if the post receives few upvotes, 
or many downvotes, the post’s visibility will decrease on the subreddit and the post will 
be brought down to the bottom of the subreddit feed (Widman, 2020). Based on the 
number of upvotes received, reddit users from r/CanadianPolitics, r/simonfraser, 
r/onguardforthee, r/ndp, r/LPC, and r/OntarioPolitics are likely to be the sub-Reddits 
where the majority of the survey respondents were recruited from on Reddit. The 
number of comments could also be used as an indicator to determine which sub-Reddit 
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attracted more participants; however, upvotes are likely a stronger indicator as Reddit 
upvotes manipulate the exposure of each post, comments do not (Widman, 2020). 
The survey was modelled after Allcott and Gentzkow’s (2017) post-election 
survey which examined fake news during the 2016 Presidential election. The survey in 
the current study was adapted to generate similar data surrounding fake news delivered 
during the 2019 Canadian Federal election. Questions were asked regarding their 
demographics, political affiliation, and media usage habits. Further, the survey 
respondents were exposed to 9 headline-related questions (see Table 3.2). Each 
respondent was presented with four headlines that consisted of real news articles which 
had been distributed by reputable journalistic new sources in the month leading up to the 
election. Additionally, four fake news headlines were included in the survey. The news 
stories corresponding to these headlines were fictious and contained unverified facts, 
speculation without merit, and/or extreme exaggeration of real facts; further, they were 
delivered through unreputable sources. Finally, one headline was included as a placebo 
to control for false recall on survey responses (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). The placebo 
headline was created by the researcher. In crafting this headline, the researcher aimed 
to ensure that it was a headline which depicted a story that did not happen but was not 
so far outside out the realm of possibility. To prevent bias, the headlines were chosen to 
be inclusive of the all parties involved in the election. However, all fake headlines that 
were uncovered were found to be targeting the Liberal Party of Canada. In searching for 
fake headlines, there appeared to be zero fake news headlines which focused on a 
political party other than the Liberals. 
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Table 3.2.  Real News and Fake News Headlines 
Headline Source Date News Type Variable Name 
“Singh says NDP would form 
coalition with the Liberals to stop 
Tories” 
CTV News 13-Oct-19 Real Real News 1 
"NDP Brampton-Centre 
candidate apologizes for 
offensive tweet from 2012” 
Global News 17-Oct-19 Real Real News 2 
“Scheer won't say if 
Conservatives hired consultant to 
'destroy' People's Party” 
CTV News 19-Oct-19 Real Real News 3 
“Edmonton Strathcona Green 
Party candidate drops out, asks 
supporters to vote NDP” The National Post 16-Oct-19 Real Real News 4 
“Justin Trudeau is trying to rig the 
election through controlling the 
Canadian news media” Canada Proud 12-Oct-19 Fake Fake News 1 
“RCMP plans to charge Trudeau 
with obstruction in SNC Lavalin 
affair, following federal elections”  
The Buffalo 
Chronicle 
17-Oct-19 Fake Fake News 2 
“RCMP source says ‘security risk’ 
against Trudeau was contrived 
by PMO staffers” 
The Buffalo 
Chronicle 
15-Oct-19 Fake Fake News 3 
“Elections Canada attempts to 
combat huge number of non-
Canadians on voting register” 
The Post 
Millennial 
06-Oct-19 Fake Fake News 4 
“Trudeau’s visit to Cuba – PM 
promises to provide financial aid 
to the country as US embargo 
discussions persist” 
  Placebo Placebo 
 
3.2. Variables 
A total of 308 responses were received during the approximate 141-day data 
collection period. From the original 308 survey responses, a total of 118 cases were 
removed from the analysis for various reasons (N = 190). Of the 118 removed cases, 70 
cases were incomplete. To ensure that results would be analyzable, if less than 70% of 
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the survey questions were filled in, they were omitted from further analysis. Typically, the 
majority of incomplete cases were left completely blank. This is likely to occur when a 
user opens the survey link, agrees to participate, and then closes their browser. After 
removing 70 incomplete responses, another 25 cases were removed because they did 
not experience the dependent variable in this data, they left the survey question relating 
to the main dependent variable blank, or they preferred not to discuss their exposure to 
the dependent variable. Next, 1 additional case was removed due to the survey 
responses being too outlandish and clearly fictitious. Finally, 22 more cases were 
removed from the survey data as they answered “yes” to the placebo question. The total 
remaining number of cases included for analysis in Study 1 is 190. 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable: Change of Vote 
The main dependent variable in this study is derived from the survey question 
which asks, “based on what you observed in the media regarding the election, did it 
change your decision to switch from one party to another for your vote?”. From this 
question, the Change of Vote variable was created. All cases where the survey 
respondent answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’ remained unchanged. Those who selected, “I did not 
observe any media related to the election”, when asked about whether they had 
changed their vote due to something they observed in media, are the 25 cases which 
were previously mentioned that were removed because they did not experience the 
dependent variable in this data . If survey respondents have not observed or been 
exposed to media regarding the election, they would likely not be impacted by the effects 
of election-related stories. Further, survey respondents who chose to select “prefer not 
to say” or left the answer blank were removed as they do not want to discuss their 
experiences on this question. This variable was treated as a dichotomous variable. 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
Headline Variables 
The headline variables as shown in Table 2 include a combination of real and 
fake news, as well as a placebo headline. Respondents were first asked if they 
remember seeing the headline during the time of the election. In 22 cases, respondents 
believed that they had seen the placebo headline during the time of the election; those 
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cases were removed from further analysis. The placebo headline was created to serve 
as an attention check (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). If participants thought they came 
across the made-up headline, their other survey responses may lack reliability due to 
false recall. In recoding these variables, all ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers remained unchanged. 
All ‘not sure’ and ‘prefer not to say’ responses were recoded as ‘no’3. If the participant 
has doubts about whether they read the headline or not, it is more likely that they have 
not. For those who say they have seen the news piece, they have clear memory of 
coming across it and their inclination to respond with ‘yes’ is more definitive. All headline 
variables were treated as dichotomous variables. 
Perceived Truth Variables 
Once participants responded to the headline questions asking whether they have 
seen the highlighted news articles, they were then asked, “at the time of the election, 
would your best guess have been that this statement was true?”. This study refers to 
these variables as the Perceived Truth Variables. Each headline has a relative perceived 
truth variable. In recoding these variables, all ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers remained 
unchanged. All ‘not sure’ and ‘prefer not to say’ responses were recoded as ‘no’. If the 
participant has doubts about the truth of the headline, it is likely that they do not fully 
believe it. Those who believe the truth of the headline are likely to answer with more 
certainty. As many people did not see these headlines, and therefore were not asked 
whether they believed the news piece to be true, all non-answers were recoded into ‘did 
not see’.4 All perceived truth variables were treated as categorical variables. 
Demographic Variables 
Demographic variables in the study include age, gender, education, income, and number 
of languages spoken. 
 
3 Headline variables were recoded as follows: 0 = No, 1 = Yes 




Gender includes 3 categories. These categories include male, female, and 
gender-queer/non-binary5. Gender was treated as a categorical variable. 
Age 
The survey (Appendix A) separated age range into 7 categories. The age 
variables were recoded into 5 categories to condense data due to having a small sample 
size. The age categories include: 18 - 25 years old, 26 - 34 years old, 35 - 43 years old, 
44 - 52 years old, and 53 years and above6. From the raw survey data, groups 53 - 61 
years old, 62 - 70 years old, and 71 and above were recoded into 53 years and above to 
provide a more even distribution. Age was treated as a continuous variable that is not 
normally distributed.7 
Education 
The survey separated education into 7 categories. During recode, the variables 
were simplified into 5 categories which include high school, trade school, undergraduate 
degree, graduate degree, and prefer not to say8. The original survey categorized 
master’s degree and PhD separately. These two categories were recoded together to 
make up the graduate degree category. Education is treated as a categorical variable. 
Income 
Income includes 6 categories. These categories include less than $24,999, 
$25,000 - $49,999, $50,000 - $99,999, $100,000 - $199,999, more than $200,000 and 
prefer not to say9. Income is treated as a continuous variable that follows a non-normal 
distribution10.  
 
5 The gender variable was coded as follows: 0 = Man, 1 = Woman, 2 = Gender-queer/Non-binary 
6 The age variable was recoded as follows: 0 = 18 – 25 years old, 1 = 26 – 34 years old, 2 = 35 – 
43 years old, 3 = 44 – 52 years old, 4 = 53+ 
7 Skewness = .68, Kurtosis = -.53. Visual confirmation of non-normal distribution. 
8 The education was recoded as follows: 0 = High School, 1 = Trade School, 2 = Undergraduate 
Degree, 3 = Graduate Degree, 4 = Prefer Not to Say 
9 The income variable was coded as follows: 0 = less than $24,999, 1 = $25,000 - $49,999, 2 = 
$50,000 - $99,999, 3 = $100,000 - $199,999, 4 = more than $200,000, 5 = prefer not to say 
10 Skewness = .21, Kurtosis = -.69. Visual confirmation of non-normal distribution. 
30 
Number of Languages Spoken 
The number of languages spoken by the participant includes 4 categories. These 
categories include 1 language, 2 languages, 3 or more languages, and prefer not to 
say11. Number of languages spoken is treated as a categorical variable. Although 
categories are linear, only three categories of measurement are included which requires 
this variable to not be considered as continuous. 
Political Affiliation 
The survey asked respondents to describe their political view. While it may be 
difficult for a person to self-assess which political category they believe they fall within, 
as people may occupy a variety of affiliations depending on their stance on a given issue 
(Allen & Vaughn, 2016). The survey designed the options to align with the political 
spectrum. Survey participants had the option to select between one of the following: very 
liberal, slightly liberal, neutral, slightly conservative, very conservative, other, and prefer 
not to say. Respondents who selected ‘other’ were then provided the option to write their 
political alignment in a text box. The researcher examined the ‘other’ category responses 
created by survey participants and determined that it was necessary to create another 
category. Seven respondents reported that their political affiliation falls under socialism. 
The ‘other’ category was recoded into ‘socialist’12. This variable is treated as categorical. 
Media Usage Habits 
To determine social media usage habits and what media platforms people 
commonly use to find information about the election, the survey included questions 
which asked respondents to determine their time spent on Reddit, Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and Tumblr. Participants were also asked to indicate which media platform 
was their primary source for election information. 
Social Media Usage - Time on Reddit, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Tumblr 
Respondents were asked to assess how much time they spent on each platform 
daily. For each social media platform, the participant was given a choice to select one 
 
11 The number of languages spoken variable was coded as follow: 1 = 1 language, 2 = 2 languages, 
3 = 3 or more languages, 4 = prefer not to say 
12 The political affiliation variable was coded as follows: 0 = Socialist, 1 = Very Liberal, 2 = Slightly 
Liberal, 3 = Moderate, 4 = Slightly Conservative, 5 = Very Conservative 
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from the following: none, less then 1 hour, 1 – 2 hours, 2 – 3 hours, 3 – 4 hours, and 
more than 4 hours13. Time spent on Reddit, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr and Instagram 
are all treated as continuous variables that are not normally distributed14. 
Primary Source of Election Information 
The survey asked participants to disclose which form of media was their primary 
source of election information during the 2019 Canadian Federal election. The available 
options to select included: TV, social media, internet (not including social media 
platforms), radio, newspaper (printed), door to door party representatives, telephone 
callers, brochures in mail, emails sent on behalf of the political party, other, and prefer 
not to say. Those who selected ‘other’ were given the option to write what their source of 
primary source of information was that did not fall within the listed options. Six 
respondents mentioned with that they primarily relied on their friends and family for 
election-related information. The researcher created a friends and family category15. The 
remaining ‘other’ answers fell within the options provided in the survey and they were 
assigned to the category they represented. No respondent selected ‘prefer not to say’ 
which resulted in the removal of that category from the variable. This variable was 
treated as categorical. 
3.2.3. Analytic Strategy 
SPSS 24 was used to conduct all statistical analyses. First, the frequency counts 
and percentages of each variable are explored to help situate the data and understand 
the trends that occur within the dataset. In addition, this study begins by cross tabulating 
the dependent variable with each independent variable to determine whether the 
dependent variable is significantly associated with any of the independent variable. For 
all continuous variables tested against the change of vote variable (CV), Spearman’s 
 
13 The social media usage variables were coded as follows: 0 = none, 1 = less than 1 hour, 2 = 1 – 
2 hours, 3 = 2 – 3 hours, 4 = 3 – 4 hours, 5 = more than 4 hours 
14 Reddit – Skewness: -.17, Kurtosis: -.89, Facebook – Skewness: .82, Kurtosis: .32, Twitter – 
Skewness: 1.06, Kurtosis: .84, Tumblr – Skewness: 4.74, Kurtosis: 28.20, Instagram – Skewness: 
1.04, Kurtosis: .47. Visual confirmation of non-normal distribution. 
15 The primary source of election information variable was recoded as follows: 0 = TV, 1 = Social 
Media, 2 = internet (not including social media platforms), 3 = Radio, 4 = Newspaper (printed), 5 = 
Magazine, 6 = Family and Friends, 7  = Brochures in Mail, 8 = Email Sent on Behalf of Political 
Parties, 9 = None, 10 = Telephone Callers 
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rank correlation coefficient is examined. As all continuous variables in this study are not 
normally distributed, non-parametric tests are applied. For cross tabulations between CV 
and all categorical variables, Phi16 or Cramer’s V17 is reported. The cross tabulation 
helps to determine which factors may be relevant in understanding why someone may 
change how they decide to vote, and which variables may have a relationship with that 
decision. The significant values from this cross-tabulation are used as an indicator to 
include those variables for further analysis.  
Next, further relationships are explored through the bivariate correlation matrix 
which cross-tabulates each independent variable against each other. In additional to 
reporting Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient as a non-parametric test of association 
between non-normally distributed continuous variables, and Phi and Cramer’s V for all 
categorical cross tabulations, Kruskal-Wallace H was used as a non-parametric test to 
determine if relationships existed between one continuous variable with another. 
Following this, four separate binary logistic regressions were conducted to 
determine which predictors have a significant impact on the likelihood that a participant 
may have changed their vote due to media influence. These regressions are directed by 
sub-research questions 1 through 4. Binary logistic regression is best suited for an 
adequately sized sample. However, given that this sample is relatively small (N = 190), it 
is important to not overload the regression with predictors. To prevent the model from 
being overfitted, smaller research questions were formulated to reduce the number of 
predictors in each model. Overfitting regression models may cause regression 
coefficients, r-squared values, and significance values to be misleading (Babyak, 2004). 
An attempt was made to reduce the number of predictors through a factor analysis; 
however, this data reduction method was unsuccessful. This research uses smaller 
research questions with less predictors per model to decrease the possibility of having 
an overfitted regression model which would reduce the strength of the research’s ability 
to explain the relationships that occur.  
 
16 Phi is reported for 2 x 2 tables where both the DV and IV are dichotomous 
17 Cramer’s V is reported for categorical variables when tables are larger than 2 x 2  
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3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Descriptive Statistic Analysis 
Demographic Factors and the Influence of Media on Political Decisions 
Table 3.3 illustrates the descriptive demographic information reported by survey 
respondents (N = 190) and their relationship to the dependent variable – change of vote 
(CV). Within CV, 22.1% of all respondents changed their vote based on media influence 
(n = 42).  
Gender (n = 190) is the only demographic variable that shows a significant 
relationship to CV (Phi = .18, p < .05). Of the 124 men in this study, 17.7% of men (n = 
22) ultimately changed their voting decision. Of the 59 women in this study, 32.2% of 
women (n = 19) changed how they voted during the election. There are 5 participants 
who identified as gender-queer/non-binary; none of these participants reported to have 
changed their voting decision. Within the age demographic variable (n = 190, SD = 1.28, 
Mean = 1.43), the largest age group is the 26 – 34 age category (n = 61). 23.6% of 
respondents who are between the ages of 26 to 34 are reported to fall within the CV 
group. Respondents who have completed an undergraduate degree (n = 64) reported 
the highest frequency (n = 18) of CV compared to other education levels and represent 
42.9% of all those who have changed their voting outcome. Within the household 
income variable (n = 190, SD = 1.51, Mean = 2.22), participants whose household 
income falls within the $50,000 - $99,999 range (n = 52) contributed to the highest 
frequency of vote changes (n = 12) and represent 28.6% of the CV group. Those who 
speak one language (n = 119) belong to the largest language category; further, they 
contribute to the highest frequency of votes changed (n = 25) and account for 59.5% of 
the CV group. 
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Table 3.3  Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables 










Gender     .05* .18 
Man 102 (81.6%) 22 (18.4%)     
Woman 40 (67.8%) 19 (32.2%)     
Gender-Queer/Non-
Binary 5 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
Agea   1.43 1.28 .91 .01 
18 - 25 42 (79.2%) 11 (20.8%)     
26 - 34  46 (75.4%) 15 (24.6%)     
35 - 43 29 (74.4%) 10 (25.6%)     
44 - 52 16 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
53+ 15 (71.4%) 6 (28.6%)     
Level of Education     .46 .14 
High School 48 (80.0%) 12 (20.0%)     
Trade School 28 (82.4%) 6 (17.6%)     
Undergraduate 46 (71.9%) 18 (28.1%)     
Graduate 20 (76.9%) 6 (23.1%)     
Prefer Not to Say 6 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
Household Incomea   2.22 1.51 .53 .40 
Less than $24,999 27 (81.8%) 6 (18.2%)     
$25,000 - $49,999 17 (65.4%) 9 (34.6%)     
$50,000 - $99,999 40 (76.9%) 12 (23.1%)     
$100,000 - 
$199,999 38 (82.6%) 8 (17.4%)     
More than $200,000 8 (66.7%) 4 (33.3%)     
Prefer Not to Say 18 (85.7%) 3 (14.3%)     
Number of Languages     .89 .06 
One 94 (79.0%) 25 (21.0%)     
Two 45 (76.3%) 14 (23.7%)     
Three or More 8 (72.7%) 3 (27.3%)     
Prefer Not to Say 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
Note. a Variable with a subscript contains Kruskal Wallace test results 
DV: Change of Vote 
*p < 0.05 
Self-Identified Political Affiliation and the Influence of Media on Political 
Decisions 
Table 3.4 illustrates descriptive statistics for political affiliation. Additionally, this 
table also reveals information between self-identified political alignments and the change 
of vote status per each respondent (n = 190). There is no significant relationship 
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between the political affiliation variable and the dependent variable. Most respondents 
(37.9%) identify as having a very liberal political alignment (n = 72). 83.3% of 
participants within the very liberal category did not change their mind about their voting 
decision (n = 60), 12 participants (16.7%) within this category did change their voting 
outcome. Participants who identified as having a socialist affiliation (n = 14) and those 
who identified as having a moderate affiliation (n = 16) belong to the groups with the 
lowest overall frequency across all political affiliation categories. 
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Political Affiliation  
 Change of Vote Status     
 





Political Affiliation   .32 .18 
Socialist 11 (78.6%) 3 (21.4%)   
Very Liberal 60 (83.3%) 12 (16.7%)     
Slightly Liberal 31 (79.5%) 8 (20.5%)     
Moderate 9 (56.3%) 7 (43.8%)     
Slightly 
Conservative 22 (75.9%) 7 (24.1%)     
Very Conservative 15 (75.0%) 5 (25.0%)     
DV: Change of Vote (n = 42) 
Primary Source of Election Information and the Influence of Media on 
Political Decisions 
Table 3.5 illustrates descriptive statistics for the primary source of information 
variable. This variable demonstrates which sources of information were identified as 
being each respondent’s primary source of information for finding or coming across 
information regarding election issues. This table also explores whether associations are 
present between primary election information type and the dependent variable. There is 
no significant relationship between primary source of information and CV. 62.1% of all 
respondents primarily rely on the internet for election information (n = 118). Those who 
changed their vote due to media influence are represented highest within the internet 
information category (n = 22, 52.4%). These internet sources do not include social media 
platforms18. Only 1.58% of respondents primarily depend on printed newspapers for their 
election data (n = 3). Social media is the second most utilized source (n = 41) as 21.6% 
 
18 Non-social media internet sources typically include online news articles, party websites, and 
opinion editorials. 
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of respondents identified that social media platforms are where they primarily consume 
election-related information. 
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for Primary Source of Election Information 





Changed χ2 (p) Phi Cramer's V 
Primary Source of Information   .27 .23 
Television 10 (83.3%) 2 (16.7%)     
Social Media 27 (65.9%) 14 (34.1%)     
Internet (not including social 
media platforms) 96 (81.4%) 22 (18.6%)     
Radio 2 (66.7%) 1 (18.6%)     
Newspaper (printed) 2 (66.7%) 1 (18.6%)     
Magazine 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
Family and Friends 2 (40.0%) 3 (60.0%)     
Brochures in Mail 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
Emails Sent on Behalf of 
Political Party 5 (83.3%) 1 (16.7%)     
Telephone Callers 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
DV: Change of Vote 
Media Usage Habits and the Influence of Media on Political Decisions 
Table 3.6 represents descriptive information for social media usage habit 
variables. The platforms examined are Twitter (n = 190, SD = .85, Mean = .76), 
Facebook (n = 190, SD = 1.05, Mean = 1.16), Reddit (n = 190, SD = 1.20, Mean = 1.88), 
Tumblr (n = 190, SD = .47, Mean = .13) and Instagram (n = 190, SD = 1.05, Mean = 
.98). A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the use of Facebook significantly affects whether a 
participant will decide to change their vote, H(1) = 6.30, p = .01. Of all 42 participants 
who changed their vote, 81% of them fall within the Facebook users group (n = 34). The 
majority of Facebook users who changed their vote, are online for less than 1 hour per 
day (n = 14) or for 1 to 2 hours per day (n = 13). This may suggest that the longer the 
participant spends online, the more likely they are to be exposed to more information 
which confirms their current electoral decision. The strength of association between 
these two variables is moderate. There are 8 participants who are not Facebook users 
that have still ultimately changed their mind due to other media influences. Given that a 
large majority of users who have changed their vote due to media influence and are 
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active Facebook suggests that Facebook can be a powerful tool to disseminate election-
related information. 
Another significant relationship is found between Instagram usage and CV. A 
Kruskal-Wallis test shows that Instagram has a significant relationship with the decision 
to change one’s voting preference based on media influence, H(1) = 16.33, p = .001. 
The strength of association between these variables is strong. 37.4% of the entire 
sample use Instagram for less than one hour per day (n = 71). Of the participants who 
are active on Instagram for one hour or less, 16 users belong to the group that changed 
their voting decision. This accounts for 8.4% of the entire sample and 13.8% of all 
Instagram users (n = 116). 39% of participants are non-Instagram users (n = 74). Of the 
non-Instagram users, 10.8% of participants changed their vote based on media influence 
viewed elsewhere (n = 8).  
The most frequently used social media platform is Reddit (n = 155). This is a 
likely result of the sampling procedure used during the data collection process which 
saw 87.7% of survey responses to be collected through Reddit survey advertisement 
URLs (n = 270). Tumblr is the least frequently used form of social media. Only 10% of 
the sample identified as being active on this platform (n = 10). After Reddit, Facebook is 
the most frequent platform used by all participants (n = 133). 70% of all respondents 
report to spend a specified amount of time daily on this platform. Instagram is the third 
most popular among participants (n = 116); however, it has the most significant 
association with the change of vote variable. 29.3% of users who are active on 
Instagram ultimately changed their election decision (n = 34). Similarly, 25.6% of all 
active Facebook users changed their voting outcome as well (n = 34). Both Facebook 
and Instagram have the highest frequency of participants who fall within the CV group; 
further, they both show a statistically significant association with CV. A participant who 
changed their vote and is active on Facebook and Instagram is likely to be reported 
within both categories. The bivariate matrix (Table 3.9) will illustrate potential 
relationships between social media platform usage to provide enhanced interpretation of 
this finding. 
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Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics for Media Usage Habits 







n SD χ2 (p) 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Time Spent on Twitter   .76 .85 .88 .03 
None 68 (78.2%) 19 (21.8%)     
Less than 1 hour 54 (76.1%) 17 (23.9%)     
1 to 2 hours 19 (79.2%) 5 (20.8%)     
2 to 3 hours 6 85.7%) 1 (14.3%)     
3 to 4 hours 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
More than 4 hours 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
Time Spent on Facebook   1.16 1.05 .01* 6.30 
None 49 (86.0%) 8 (14.0%)     
Less than 1 hour 60 (81.1%) 14 (18.9%)     
1 to 2 hours 22 (62.9%) 13 (37.1%)     
2 to 3 hours 16 (80.0%) 4 (20.0%)     
3 to 4 hours 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)     
More than 4 hours 0 (0.0%) 1 (100.0%)     
Time Spent on Reddit   1.88 1.20 .58 .31 
None 22 (62.9%) 13 (37.1%)     
Less than 1 hour 24 (82.8%) 5 (17.2%)     
1 to 2 hours 55 (87.3%) 8 (12.7%)     
2 to 3 hours 38 (77.6%) 11 (22.4%)     
3 to 4 hours 9 (64.3%) 5 (35.7%)     
More than 4 hours 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
Time Spent on Tumblr   .13 .47 .10 2.80 
None 136 (79.5%) 35 (20.5%)     
Less than 1 hour 6 (46.2%) 7 (53.8%)     
1 to 2 hours 4 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
2 to 3 hours 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
3 to 4 hours 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
More than 4 hours 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
Time Spent on Instagram   .98 1.05 .00** 16.33 
None 66 (89.2%) 8 (10.8%)     
Less than 1 hour 55 (77.5%) 16 (22.5%)     
1 to 2 hours 19 (79.2%) 5 (20.8%)     
2 to 3 hours 8 (50.0%) 8 (50.0%)     
3 to 4 hours 0 (0.0%) 5 (100.0%)     
More than 4 hours 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)     
DV: Change of Vote. 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001. 
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Real News and Fake News Headlines and the Influence of Media on Political 
Decisions 
Table 3.7 reveals the descriptive information of the headline variables and their 
association to the decision to make a change in the final election voting decision. Fake 
news headlines appear to have a more significant relationship with the dependent 
variable19 20. A significant relationship is seen within fake news headline 3 (Phi = .18, p < 
.01) and fake news headline 4 (Phi = .24, p < .001). None of the real news headlines 
have a significant relationship with CV. Fake news headlines 1 and 2 appear to have no 
association with the decision to change one’s voting outcome during the election. The 
most common headline that was seen by survey respondents during the time of the 
election was real news 1 (n = 119) as 62.6% of all participants recalled seeing this news 
item reported21. The least common headline recalled by survey respondents during the 
time of the election is fake news 3 (n = 32) as only 16.8% of all participants remember 
coming across this headline. Interestingly, despite being the least commonly recalled 
headline, it shows a significant relationship with CV. 
Of all confirmed news headline recalls22 (n = 476), real news headlines account 
for 59.5% of respondent confirmed recalls and fake news headlines account for 40.5% of 
all respondent confirmed recalls. This suggests that the real news headlines included in 
this survey were seen more frequently or in a larger-scale circulation than the fake news 
headlines. Fake news 2 was seen by 38.4% of the sample (n = 73). Of the participants 
who recall seeing this headline, 27.4% of them belong to the CV group (n = 20). While 
this headline shows to have no significant association to CV, fake news 2 shows the 
highest frequency of changed votes across all fake news headlines23.  
 
19 Fake news 3 states, “RCMP source says ‘security risk’ against Trudeau was contrived by PMO 
staffers” – The Buffalo Chronicle (Oct 15, 2019) 
20 Fake news 4 states, “Elections Canada attempts to combat huge number of non-Canadians on 
voting register” – The Post Millennial (Oct 6, 2019) 
21 Real news 1 states, “Singh says NDP would form coalition with the Liberals to stop Tories” – 
CTV News (Oct 13, 2019) 
22 Participants are likely to have viewed multiple headlines which is demonstrated in this frequency 
of reported headline recalls. 
23 Fake news 2 states, ““RCMP plans to charge Trudeau with obstruction in SNC Lavalin affair, 
following federal elections” – The Buffalo Chronicle (Oct 17, 2019) 
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Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics for Headline Variables 
 Change of Vote Status    
 




Real News 1   .33 .07 
No 58 (81.7%) 13 (18.3%)   
Yes 90 (75.6%) 29 (23.4%)   
Real News 2   .35 .07 
No 112 (79.4%) 29 (20.6)   
Yes 35 (73.0%) 13 (27.0%)   
Real News 3   .88 -.01 
No 92 (78%) 26 (22%)   
Yes 56 (78.9%) 15 (21.1%)   
Real News 4   .67 .03 
No 114 (78.6%) 31 (21.4%)    
Yes 34 (75.6%) 11 (24.4%)    
Fake News 1   .19 .10 
No 104 (80.6%) 25 (19.4%)   
Yes 44 (72.1%) 17 (27.9%)   
Fake News 2   .17 .10 
No 95 (81.2%) 22 (18.8%)   
Yes 53 (72.6%) 20 (27.4%)   
Fake News 3   .01* .18 
No 132 (81.0%) 31 (19.0%)   
Yes 16 (59.3%) 11 (40.7%)   
Fake News 4   .00** .24 
No 130 (82.3%) 28 (17.7%)    
Yes 18 (56.3%) 14 (43.7%)    
DV: Change of Vote. 
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001. 
The Perceived Truth of Real News and Fake News Headlines and the 
Influence of Media on Political Decisions 
Table 3.8 illustrates descriptive information for the perceived truth of headline 
variables and their association to the decision being made by the participant to change 
their vote based on media influence. A significant relationship can be found between the 
perceived truth of fake news 2 (Phi = .22, p < .01), fake news 3 (Phi = .28, p < .001), and 
fake news 4 (Phi = .24, p < .001). All perceived truth of real news variables shows to 
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have no significant association with CV. Within the fake news headlines, fake news 124 
observed the highest frequency and highest percentage of participants estimating that 
the headline was true. Of the 61 respondents who report to have observed seeing fake 
news 1, 45.9% (n = 28) of those participants believed it to be true; however, this variable 
shows no statistically significant relationship to CV. Fake news 4 represents the second 
highest percentage of truth belief among the fake news headline as 37.5% of 
participants who recall seeing the headline, believe that the headline is true (n = 12). 
The perceived truth of fake news 2 (n = 24, 32.9%) and fake news 3 (n = 6, 22.2%) rank 
third and fourth respectively in highest percentage of truth belief among the fake news 
headlines. 
In relation to CV, fake news 4 ranks first in the highest percentage of 
respondents who meet the criteria for believing in the fake news article and falling within 
the change of vote group (n = 8, 25%). At 18.5%, fake news 2 is ranked second highest 
within the CV and belief of truth group. The perceived truth of fake news 3 (n = 11, 
15.1%) and fake news 4 (n = 9, 14.6%) are ranked third and fourth respectively in 
highest percentage of those who believed the headlines to be true and belong within the 
CV group. 
While the perceived truth of real news headlines show no statistical significance 
in relation to CV, it is interesting to note that the average percentage of participants who 
do not believe that the real news headlines are true is 20.3%. This suggests that on 
average, approximately 20% of readers may be critical regarding the validity of 
legitimate news content. In comparison, the average percentage of those who 
disbelieved the fake news headlines is 65.6%; this appears to be drastically higher when 
compared to disbelief of real news articles. This may suggest that consumers who come 
across fictitious news media are on average 1.9 times more likely to conclude that the 




24 Fake news 1 states, ““Justin Trudeau is trying to rig the election through controlling the Canadian 
news media” – Canada Proud (Oct 12, 2019) 
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Table 3.8 Descriptive Statistics for the Perceived Truth of Headline Variables 












Perceived Truth of Real News 1   1.25 .66 .59 .08 
Did Not Believe 18 (78.3%) 5 (21.7%)     
Believed 72 (75.0%) 24 (25.0%)     
Did Not See 58 (81.7%) 13 (18.3%)     
Perceived Truth of Real News 2   1.72 .51 .58 .08 
Did Not Believe 4 (80.0%) 1 (20%)     
Believed 31 (72.1%) 12 (27.9%)     
Did Not See 113 (79.6%) 29 (20.4%)     
Perceived Truth of Real News 3   1.55 .63 .77 .05 
Did Not Believe 12 (85.7%) 2 (14.3%)     
Believed 44 (77.2%) 13 (22.8%)     
Did Not See 92 (77.3%) 27 (22.7%)     
Perceived Truth of Real News 4   1.69 .60 .44 .09 
Did Not Believe 12 (85.7%) 2 (14.3%)     
Believed 21 (70.0%) 9 (30.0%)     
Did Not See 115 (78.8%) 31 (21.2%)     
Perceived Truth of Fake News 1   1.51 .78 .32 .11 
Did Not Believe 25 (75.8%) 8 (24.2%)     
Believed 19 (67.9%) 9 (32.1%)     
Did Not See 104 (80.6%) 25 (19.4%)     
Perceived Truth of Fake News 2   1.36 .87 .01* .22 
Did Not Believe 40 (81.6) 9 (18.4%)     
Believed 13 (54.2%) 11 (45.8%)     
Did Not See 95 (81.2%) 22 (18.8%)     
Perceived Truth of Fake News 3   1.75 .64 .00** .28 
Did Not Believe 15 (71.4%) 6 (28.6%)     
Believed 1 (16.7%) 5 (83.3%)     
Did Not See 132 (81.0%) 31 (19.0%)     
Perceived Truth of Fake News 4   1.73 .64 .00** .24 
Did Not Believe 12 (60.0%) 8 (40.0%)     
Believed 6 (50.0%) 6 (50.0%)     
Did Not See 130 (82.3%) 28 (17.7%)     
DV: Change of Vote  
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001. 
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3.4. Bivariate Matrix Analysis 
3.4.1. Demographic Variables 
Table 3.9 displays measures of association between all the independent 
variables. Among the demographic variables, strong effect sizes were found between 
education and gender (Phi = .40, p < .001), and education and age (H(4) = 36.2, p = 
.001). The relationship between education and age is expected because as people get 
older, they are more likely to participate in further education opportunities. The 
relationship between education and gender may suggest that based on a participant’s 
identified gender (male, female, or gender queer/non-binary) there may be a relationship 
with the type and level of education they pursue. Another significant association is found 
between number of languages spoken and gender (Phi = .33, p < .001) and number of 
languages spoken and education (Phi = .25, p < .001). 
3.4.2. Political Affiliation 
Within political affiliation, strong effect sizes were found with the primary source 
of election information (Phi = .26, p < .01) and fake news 1 (Phi = .29, p < .01). Further, 
this may suggest that, based on the participant’s identified political affiliation, their 
affiliation may have contributed to their exposure to fake news 1. Additional strong 
associations within the political affiliation variable can be found between political 
affiliation and the perceived truth of fake news 1 (Phi = .36, p < .001), the perceived truth 
of fake news 2 (Phi = .27, p < .01), the perceived truth of fake news 3 (Phi = .23, p < 
.05), and the perceived truth of fake news 4 (Phi = .24, p < .01). This illustrates that 
those who indicate a certain political preference may be more likely to believe that fake 
news articles depict truthful facts. 
3.4.3. Social Media Usage 
Within the social media usage habit variables, there appears to be a strong 
association among all platforms. The strongest association is found between time spent 
of Facebook and time spent on Instagram (rs(20) = .28, p < .001). Given the strength of 
association, this suggests that those who are active on Facebook are also active on 
Instagram. Primary source of information also shares a significant relationship with both 
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the time spent on Facebook (H(8) = 15.64, p = .05)  and time the user spends on 
Instagram (H(8) = 20.03, p = .01). Additionally, strong effect sizes can be seen among 
time spent on Facebook and fake news 1 (H(1) = 7.99, p = .01), fake news 2 (H(1) = 
6.54, p = .01) and fake news 4 (H(1) = 7.63, p = .01) as well as the perceived truth of 
each those headlines. Fake news 3 did not appear to show any significant relationship 
with the amount of time users spend on Facebook. Similarly, Instagram indicates that it 
is strongly related with fake news 4 (H(1) = 12.54, p = .001) and the perceived truth of 
fake news 4 (H(2) = 12.86, p = .01).  
Given the relationships that exist among each of these variables, it is likely that 
within this sample, those who use Facebook are also likely to be active on Instagram. 
Further, as these platforms are positively associated with primary source of information, 
participants who use Facebook and Instagram are likely to rely on these platforms as 
their primary source for election-related information. Given the strong relationships 
between Facebook and Instagram with the fake news variables, there appears to be an 
association with exposure to fake news through these outlets. As demonstrated in Table 
3.6, the time spent on Facebook and the time spent on Instagram are related to the 
participant’s eventual change to their voting outcome. Given the association among all of 
the variables reported, it is plausible that time spent on Facebook and Instagram can 
increase exposure to disinformation which can be associated with an influence to 
change the voting outcome. 
As illustrated in Table 3.9, all fake news articles are strongly inter-related among 
each other and among the perceived truth of each fake news article. Real news 1 shows 
to have significant relationships with fake news 2 (Phi = .19, p < .01), fake news 3 (Phi = 
.22, p < .001), and fake news 4 (Phi = .14, p < .05). This suggests that media consumers 
are exposed to a variety of information which include legitimate media and fake news 
media. The factors involved in the consumer’s ability to infer what is accurate and what 
is misleading is unclear. 
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Table 3.9 Bivariate Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
1. Gender –                            
2. Age 1.26 –                           
3. Level of Education .40*** 36.2*** –                          
4. Household Income 4.41 .06 4.58 –                         
5. Number of Languages 
Spoken .33*** 2.35 .25*** 2.91 –                        
6. Political Affiliation .21 6.73 .19 2.10 .15 –                       
7. Time Spent on Twitter 4.24 -.06 5.19 -.05 .03 7.43 –                      
8. Time Spent on Facebook 2.30 .02 2.74 -.12 4.35 9.28 .17* –                     
9. Time Spent on Reddit 5.44 -.14 6.02 .11 2.55 5.21 .13 -.11 –                    
10. Time Spent on Tumblr 8.45* -.11 10.59* -.09 1.70 1.25 .20** .11 .03 –                   
11. Time Spent on 
Instagram 3.11 -.37 -.07 -.07 1.76 7.54 .25*** .28*** .04 .07 –                  
12. Primary Source of 
Information .20 17.64* .22 8.39 .17 .26** 9.71 15.64* 10.98 6.71 20.03** –                 
13. Real News 1 .24 .43 .11 2.93 .19 .18 .57 1.23 1.25 4.88* .71 .20 –                
14. Real News 2 .12 .29 .09 .67 .06 .16 .01 .90 3.93* .12 1.32 .14 .10 –               
15. Real News 3 .28*** .65 .14 .00 .10 .19 1.90 .56 5.54* 5.90* .06 .16 .11 .12 –              
16. Real News 4 .05 .08 .05 .31 .17 .14 .88 2.24 2.55 .55 4.56* .19 .08 .37*** .05 –             
17. Fake News 1 .18* 1.31 .07 1.17 .11 .29** .20 7.99** 1.35 .93 3.01 .14 .11 .15* .40*** .02 –            
18. Fake News 2 .01 2.04 .06 1.04 .18 .20 .48 6.54** 6.33** .37 1.00 .16 .19** .06 .13 .04 .31*** –           
19. Fake News 3 .07 1.95 .20 .34 .11 .10 2.42 3.04 2.85 .15 3.51 .15 .22*** .14* .28*** .01 .37*** .33*** –          
20. Fake News 4 .08 1.74 .05 .19 .07 .19 .02 7.63** .96 1.44 12.54*** .26 .14* .10 .19** .05 .41*** .38*** .34*** –         
21. Perceived Truth of Real 
News 1 .17* .61 .09 2.30 .14 .16 3.61 1.34 1.28 4.94 1.85 .20 1.00*** .10 .11 .15 .11 .19* .22** .15 –        
22. Perceived Truth of Real 
News 2 .08 .47 .11 .67 .10 .21 .06 2.76 4.02 .55 1.15 .12 .21* 1.00*** .13 .41*** .17 .07 .18* .14 .15 –       
23. Perceived Truth of Real 
News 3 .21 4.52 .11 1.81 .20* .22 2.65 .67 5.77 8.32* .24 .18 .19* .18 1.00*** .13 .40*** .14 .30*** .20* .15 .16 –      
24. Perceived Truth of Real 
News 4 .08 1.51 .12 .73 .21** .14 1.47 3.37 1.91 1.58 5.57 .16 .25** .35*** .04 1.00*** .07 .07 .13 .07 .21*** .33*** .17* –     
25. Perceived Truth of Fake 
News 1 .14 1.34 .06 1.43 .10 .36*** .67 8.36* 2.31 1.87 .10 .18 .13 .15 .40*** .05 1.00*** .31*** .37*** .41*** .15 .13 .30 .06 –    
26. Perceived Truth of Fake 
News 2 .11 2.24 .10 1.15 .13 .27** 4.46 10.77** 6.55* 8.82** 1.71 .16 .19* .18* .13 .09 .35*** 1.00*** .33*** .43*** .19** .13 .10 .13 .32*** –   
27. Perceived Truth of Fake 
News 3 .05 2.47 .16 .57 .14 .23* 2.77 3.14 11.57** .34 5.58 .17 .23** .15 .27*** .30 .38*** .33*** 1.00*** .35*** .19** .13 .31*** .09 .40*** .32*** –  
28. Perceived Truth of Fake 
News 4 .70 1.93 .12 .45 .12 .24** 1.38 9.11** 1.61 8.01* 12.86** .26 .15 .15 .19* .40 .42*** .37*** .37*** 1.00*** .14 .13 .16* .08 .37*** .36*** .39*** – 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Continuous x continuous contains Kruskal-Wallis H. Continous x categorical contains Spearman's rank correlation coefficient. Categorical x categorical contains Phi or Cramer's V 
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3.5. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis 
3.5.1. Sub-Research Question 1 
Sub-Research Question 1: Do social media platforms effect whether a 
participant will decide to change their vote? 
Hypothesis 1: It is predicted that the use of social media will influence 
political decisions. As social media becomes more readily available and 
enables users to engage with news and informational content with 
increased speed and efficiency, it is hypothesized that exposure to social 
media will contribute to a participant’s change of mind about the original 
party they intended to vote for. 
To determine whether the usage of social media platforms has an effect on if a 
participant decides to change their voting decision, a binary logistic regression was used 
to analyze whether time spent on Reddit has an effect on the likelihood that a participant 
will decide to change their vote. As all social media time usage variables are not 
regularly distributed, time was manipulated to be categorical through dummy coding. All 
time dummy codes of time spent on Reddit are included in the model as predictor 
variables and gender is used as a control variable. Binary logistic regression analysis for 
the time spent on Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, and Instagram could not be conducted as 
there were too few observations where the participant was active on the social media 
platform and satisfied the dependent variable. 
The full logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ2(5) =11.19, p < 
.05, and correctly predicted 77.9% of cases. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test 
is insignificant suggesting the model is a good fit. A minimal effect size was found 
(Nagelkerke R2 = .36). A significant result was found among those who spend 1 to 2 
hours on Reddit (B = -1.43, p < .05). This suggests that participants who spend 1 to 2 
hours on Reddit have a decreased chance that they will change their vote based on 
media influence by a factor of .24. Simply stated, Reddit users who spend 1 to 2 hours 
daily on Reddit are less likely to change their voting decision. This suggests that social 
media usage may affect whether a participant decides to change their vote or not to 
change their vote. As Reddit requires that users subscribe to sub-Reddits which interest 
them, there is the possibility that Reddit users are experiencing the results of social 
media created echo chambers which further validate their current perspectives and 
ideologies (Kumar & Krishna, 2014). The null hypothesis is rejected as the usage of 
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social media can be a predictor for the chance that a participant will decide to change 
their vote; however, a larger sample would allow further analysis into social media usage 
on other platforms and how it may influence political decisions. 
Table 3.10  Binary Logistic Regression: Social Media Usage Predicting Change 
of Vote  
  Social Media Usage 
 Reddit 
  B (OR) 
Gender (Man) -.50 (.60) 
None -.16 (.86) 
Less than 1 hour -1.06 (.35) 
1 to 2 hours -1.43 (.24)* 
2 to 3 hours -.77 (.47) 
3 to 4 hours – 
More than 4 hours – 
Constant -.17 (.85) 
Overall % predicted 77.9 
χ2 11.19* 
Pseudo-R2 .08 
*p < .05  
 Reference category for gender is all others. Reference for time is yes (1). 
3.5.2. Sub-Research Question 2 
Sub-Research Question 2: Does real news have an effect on whether a 
participant will change their vote? 
Hypothesis 2: It is predicted that exposure to real news will increase the 
probability that a participant will change their mind about their election 
decision. Articles that depict accurate information are likely to provide 
information regarding the election that consumers rely on to remain 
informed regarding election issues of interest. It is likely that reading 
reliable new articles will affect their voting decision. 
To answer the question whether real news will predict the likelihood that a 
participant will change their vote, a binary logistic regression was conducted. The model 
includes all real news headlines as predictor variables and the control variable is gender. 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic is insignificant which supports this model’s fit. There are 
no statistically significant findings within any of the real news predictors. The null 
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hypothesis is accepted. The real news predictors in this study do not increase or 
decrease the chance that a participant will be influenced to change their voting decision. 
Inclusion of more real news variables may prove valuable for further analysis. 
Table 3.11 Binary Logistic Regression: Exposure to Real News Predicting 
Change of Vote 
  Real News 
  B (OR) 
Gender (Man) -.71 (.49) 
Real News 1 .40 (1.50) 
Real News 2 .28 (1.32) 
Real News 3 .07 (1.07) 
Real News 4 .11 (1.12) 
Constant -1.23 (.29) 
Overall % predicted 78.2 
χ2 5.18 
Pseudo-R2 .04 
Reference category for gender is all other.  
Reference category for real news variables is yes. 
3.5.3. Sub-Research Question 3  
Sub-Research Question 3: Does reading fake news have an effect on 
whether a participant will change their vote? 
Hypothesis 3: It is hypothesized that exposure to fake news will influence 
change voter’s political decisions. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) note that 
fake news articles are becoming increasingly wide-spread. Fake news 
items are a cheaper alternative to reliable information media. As more 
people become exposed to misinformation and disinformation, this may 
influence their decision. 
To explore whether exposure to fake news may be used as a predictor to 
determine the chance that a participant may change their vote based on media 
influence, a binary logistic regression was conducted where change of vote is the 
dependent variable, all fake news headlines are used as predictor variables, and gender 
is included as a control variable.  
The full logistic regression model is statistically significant, χ2(5) =15.13, p < .01, 
and correctly predicts 80% of cases. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test is 
insignificant suggesting the model is a good fit. A minimal effect size was found 
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(Nagelkerke R2 = .12). A significant result was found among those who recall reading 
fake news 4 (B = 1.20, p < .05). This finding could suggest that participants who recall 
reading fake news 4 are more likely to change their vote than participants who did not 
see fake news 4 by a factor of 3.31. Neither of the other fake news headlines report any 
effect on the ability to predict the outcome of the DV. Based on this finding, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed as, depending on the article, fake news 
headlines may influence readers to change their election decisions. 
Table 3.12 Binary Logistic Regression: Exposure to Fake News Predicting 
Change of Vote 
  Fake News 
  B (OR) 
Gender (Man) -.73 (.48) 
Fake News 1 -.04 (.96) 
Fake News 2 -.09 (.92) 
Fake News 3 .76 (2.15) 
Fake News 4 1.20 (3.31)* 
Constant -1.15 (.32) 
Overall % predicted 80% 
χ2 15.13** 
Pseudo-R2 .12 
*p < .05 , **p < .01 
Reference category for gender is all other.  
Reference for fake news is yes (1). 
3.5.4. Sub-Research Question 4  
Sub-Research Question 4: Does believing fake news have an effect on 
whether a participant will change their vote? 
Hypothesis 4: It is hypothesized that those who believe fake news articles 
to be true are more likely to be influenced politically. Consumers are 
exposed to an increased number of fake news articles which makes it more 
difficult to infer what information is accurate and what is misleading or 
untrue (Carlson, 2018). It is predicted that those who believe the truth of 
deceptive media are likely to be persuaded to vote differently. 
To understand whether believing fake news headlines can used be as a predictor 
to determine the chance that a participant may change their vote based on media 
influence, a binary logistic regression was conducted. In this regression, change of vote 
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is the dependent variable, all perceived truth of fake news variables are used as 
predictor variables, and gender is included as a control variable.  
The full logistic regression model is statistically significant, χ2(9) = 22.66, p < .01, 
and correctly predicts 77.9% of cases (Table 3.13). The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of 
fit test is insignificant suggesting that the model is a good fit. A minimal effect size was 
found (Nagelkerke R2 = .17). A significant result was found among those who believed 
that fake news 3 is true (B = 2.89, p < .01). This finding could suggest that participants 
who believe that fake news 3 is true are more likely to change their vote than 
participants who do not interpret the headline as true by a factor of 17.9. Based on this 
finding, the null hypothesis is rejected. Believing that fictitious news is accurate can 
predict whether a participant may change their vote due to the influence of the media. 
Table 3.13  Binary Logistic Regression: The Perceived Truth of Fake News 
Predicting Change of Vote 
  
Perceived Truth of 
Fake News 
  B (OR) 
Gender (Man) -.66 (.51) 
Perceived Truth of Fake News 1 (No) -.07 (.93) 
Perceived Truth of Fake News 1 (Yes) -.46 (.50) 
Perceived Truth of Fake News 2 (No) -.39 (.44) 
Perceived Truth of Fake News 2 (Yes) .59 (1.81) 
Perceived Truth of Fake News 3 (No) .47 (1.59) 
Perceived Truth of Fake News 3 (Yes) 2.89 (17.90)* 
Perceived Truth of Fake News 4 (No) .94 (2.56) 
Perceived Truth of Fake News 4 (Yes) 1.13 (3.09) 
Constant -1.14 (3.09) 
Overall % predicted 77.9 
χ2 22.66* 
Pseudo-R2 .17 
*p < .01 
Reference category for gender is all othr. Reference category for fake news is yes. 
 Study 1 has provided evidence that fake news headlines can have a significant 
influence on how a participant decides to vote. Sub-research question 3 has illustrated 
that being exposed to certain fake news headlines can affect whether a participant will 
decide to change their voting decision. Sub-research question 4 has shown that 
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believing in certain fake news headlines can also influence whether a participant will 
change their voting outcome. Based on the relationships which exist between political 
affiliation and the exposure to fake news headlines, there is evidence that may suggest 
that those who indicate a certain political preference may be more likely to believe in the 
authenticity of fake news articles. As there are further strong relationships to be 
observed between Facebook and the fake news articles, Facebook is likely to be a 
significant provider of false information media. Algorithms used by Facebook generate 
the content that a user will see and engage with on their newsfeed (Bakir and McStay, 
201). As Facebook appears to be associated with the exposure to fake news, the 
algorithms responsible for generating the content that the user is exposed to may play a 
significant role in the propagation of fake news materials. 
3.6. Limitations 
Due to the small sample size, there are a variety of limitations which may result. 
One of the main disadvantages is the increased chance for a type II error. A type II error 
occurs when the null hypothesis is false, but it has failed to be rejected. This could 
suggest that due to a small sample size, an effect exists but the ability for the sample to 
capture that effect is limited by the number of participants. Further, as the sample was 
recruited through social media, with the majority of respondents being recruited from 
Reddit, the sample may not be representative of the overall Canadian voting population. 
It may also not be representative of the overall population of Canadian voters who use 
social media. Including more real news and fake news articles may have been beneficial 
for improving the quality of the findings. By including more options for articles that 
respondents may have been exposed to, there may have been an article present that 
was viewed by more survey respondents which would have contributed to more 
significant findings. Another issue faced is related to the classification of news items. 
The news items could have been classified inaccurately; this is to say that, there may be 
news which was coded as real that may not be fully accurate. Further, there may also be 
news items which were coded as fake, but there may be undiscovered truth behind 
them. 
Another limitation of this research relates to the generalizability of this research’s 
findings. Due to the small sample size and as a result of not following a randomized 
sampling method, the ability to generalize outside of this sample is extremely limited. 
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This research is effective in showing that within the sample, participants did change their 
voting decision based on fake news articles observed; however, this effect cannot be 
generalized to the broader population. Additionally, there are likely confounding 
variables at play. It is unlikely that participants changed their voting decision based on 
the one article they were exposed to alone. Additional factors such as a person’s 
upbringing, their family unit, the influence of friends or role models, their school or 
working environment, and additional psychological factors are also likely to influence a 
change of decision. This research does show that fake news can influence a 
participant’s voting decision, but the generalizability of this statement is limited by 
sample size, sampling method, and the consideration of confounding variables. 
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Chapter 4.  
 
Study 2 – Qualitative Analysis 
4.1. Content Analysis of Fake News Articles 
4.1.1. Data Collection – Web Crawling 
A content analysis was implemented to analyze 596 fake news pieces. The fake 
news articles were collected through a web crawler application. The goal of a web 
crawling program is to automate the collection of data and resources that are hosted on 
the internet (Grega, Glowacz, Anzel, Lach, & Musia, 2014). If a researcher were to 
collect each available post, website, article, image, video, link, and so forth without the 
use of an automated tool to assist in their data collection process, they may spend 
hours, days, months, or years collecting the data necessary for their research. Web 
crawler applications enable large amounts of data to be withdrawn from internet sources 
and stored for later use. Web crawler architecture consists of several components 
(Grega, et al., 2011). Website crawlers, which are the central feature of the program, are 
composed of the crawling engine and the crawlers. Crawlers are responsible for the 
actual collection of the data. They analyze and interpret website coding, detect links, 
detect media, and then they take that information and report back to the crawling engine. 
The crawling engine serves as the crawler’s director. The engine directs the crawlers on 
which domains to focus on and which domains to avoid. They also instruct the crawlers 
about what type of data they should collect or not to collect. Once an item of interest is 
found by the crawling engine, it is downloaded to a plugin. The system operator asks 
these plugins to perform various tasks based on the goals of the data collection (Grega, 
et al., 2014). The web crawling program used in this research is The Dark Crawler. 
The Dark Crawler program was instructed to collect data from websites that have 
been known to generate misinformation and disinformation about issues in the Canadian 
political climate. The headline of the article or title of the post was collected by the 
application. The crawler did not collect the full text body of each article as the full article 
was often included as a referenced link which the crawler was not tasked to include. A 
web search engine was used to locate the full article by inputting the headline captured 
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by the crawling engine into the search engine. The article where the headline was used 
came up as the first item for each search. Once a dataset was generated by The Dark 
Crawler program, the researcher went through the data set to determine which cases 
were relevant to the research. To be included for analysis, the researcher examined 
whether the date the article was within the specified date range. The Canadian Federal 
election took place on October 21st, 2019. Any post that occurred during the 6-month 
period from April 21st, 2019 to October 21st, 2019 were included for further analysis. 
Posts generated from two main sources of false information were analyzed. These 
sources are The Buffalo Chronicle and Canada Proud. 20 headlines from The Buffalo 
Chronicle were examined. 596 title posts were examined from the Canada Proud 
Facebook page25. The Buffalo Chronicle analysis included all headlines that were 
collected by The Dark Crawler. The crawler generated 975 Canada Proud posts. The 
researcher removed 399 cases that were posted before or after the 6-month period from 
the analysis.  
4.1.2. Analytic Strategy 
The file containing the raw fake news dataset was imported into Microsoft Excel. 
Once the data was cleaned into a workable set (removing unrecognizable characters, 
blank cases, and unnecessary columns), the file was then imported into NVivo.  
Content analysis is beneficial for this study as it enables to researcher to identify 
intentions, focus, or communication trends within the content data provided by 
individuals, groups, or institutions. As this research is an exploratory study, this 
qualitative research method is advantageous as it enables the researcher the ability to 
describe the attitudinal or behavioural responses that occur within the communication 
method, reveal patterns and trends, and assist to uncover the emotional and 
psychological states that occur within the groups of interest (Columbia University, 2019). 
In exploring the content found within texts, researchers are able to draw inferences 
about the message that is being conveyed, the audience it may intend to attract, and the 
culture that may be connected to the content (Columbia University, 2019). 
 
25 As Facebook posts are far more abundant than online journal articles, this is why only 20 Buffalo 
Chronicle articles were analyzed in comparison to 596 Canada Proud Facebook posts 
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Content analysis requires the researcher to analyze language and word usage 
within text. Themes which occur in the data are then attached to the texts through 
consistency and connection (Neuendorf, 2016). The primary goal of content analysis is 
to take large amounts of texts and transform them into a concise summary of thematic 
results (Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017). The qualitative content analysis follows the data 
abstraction process as outlined by Erlingsson and Brysiewicz (2017). The researcher 
first read over the first 50 texts to become familiar with the type of information conveyed 
in the posts. Once basic-level familiarity was established, condensed meaning units 
were created. Meaning units condense the text into more workable pieces while still 
preserving the meaning found within the text. As the messages became more concise, 
the researcher was able to assign them a code. Codes serve as labels which help to 
organize texts into their related subgroups. Codes were then organized into categories; 
codes were grouped together into overarching categories based on their similarities to 
each other through related content. From these categories, themes were extracted 
based on the deep interpretation of the data. 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. The Buffalo Chronicle Findings 
596 fake news pieces were qualitatively analyzed using content analysis. 20 of 
the pieces captured by the crawling engine were created by The Buffalo Chronicle. As 
the text captured by the crawler was not the article’s headline but rather a sentence 
which can be found later in the article, the content analysis included analyzing the entire 
body of each article rather than simply the sentence of text captured in the dataset to 
create a more detailed analysis. 
The Buffalo Chronicle is an independent journalism platform based in Buffalo, 
New York. The Buffalo Chronicle Media Group has attracted considerable negative 
attention as they are considered to have, “frequently published false and 
unsubstantiated conspiracy theories, often aimed at left-leaning politicians” (News Guard 
Tech, 2020, pp. 1). Through qualitative analysis of all 2019 Canadian Federal election-
related posts, which were captured by the crawling engine and posted during the 6-
month period from April 21st, 2019 to October 21st, 2019, various themes emerge. The 
first major theme uncovered involves the use of trigger topics as an attention grabber 
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and mechanism to deliver the intended narrative. The second major theme relates to the 
tendency to use accurate and verified information combined with opinion, speculation, 
and unverifiable facts to further provide additional substance to their message. 
Finding 1: Trigger Topics 
Within the 20 pieces of fake news content analyzed, each article utilized a 
controversial topic to be the basis of the article’s foundation. Once the trigger topic is 
established as the article’s main foundation, the remainder of the piece develops the 
further story, often using speculation and unverified information (although not in all 
cases) to extend the story’s commentary. The foundational topics discussed tend to be 
centred around issues that are often sensitive or emotionable. The main trigger topics 
embedded in the articles are the SNC Lavalin Scandal, the treatment of Indigenous 
peoples in Canada, and sexual misconduct.  
The SNC Lavalin Scandal 
In a Buffalo Chronicle article called, “‘Deep and penetrating’ relationship may 
taint Butts’ testimony” (The Buffalo Chronicle, 2019, March 6)26 an examination of 
Trudeau’s friendship with Gerald Butts27 is conducted. Besides the implied sexual 
relationship between Trudeau and Butts as depicted in the headline, the remainder of 
the article continues to illustrate a picture of corruption within the Liberal government, 
without naming it as such. An unnamed source from McGill allegedly states that,  
“Justin Trudeau and Gerald Butts had the kind of ‘deep and penetrating’ 
relationship that is common among privileged young men in their late teens 
and early twenties: lofty in their aspirations, pedestrian in their work ethic, 
and, at times, ambiguous in their orientation” (para 2).  
The information conveyed by the unnamed source begins to bring into question 
the credibility and work ethic of the two political actors through describing the details of 
their friendship during young adulthood while attending university. In considering the 
sexual innuendo contained in the headline, the mention of ‘ambiguous in their 
orientation’ can be interpreted to suggest that the unnamed source of is inferring a 
 
26 While this article falls outside of the 6-month period, the headline was reposted on the Buffalo 
Chronicle’s social media platform during the 6-month window. This may illustrate an attempt to 
amplify the message of the article during the election period. 
27 Gerald Butts is a political consultant. He served as the Principal Secretary to Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau. 
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sexual relationship between the two young men. It is also interesting to explore the 
words used by the source. The sexual innuendo implied in the headline is further 
integrated and amplified within the comment included by the unnamed source. This 
snippet of dialogue appears to further push the idea on the reader about the idea of 
sexual relationship between Trudeau and Butts. 
The article further includes a suggestion related to deep-seeded corruption within 
the Liberal government through implying that the two men have long been working 
together to develop political schemes to get themselves ahead. A caption on a picture in 
the article where Trudeau and Butts can be seen in a park in exercise gear states that, 
“Trudeau and Butts are long-time friends who work together, who exercise 
together, and who hatch political plans together.” 
This excerpt indicates that the two ‘hatch’ political plans together. After the 
depiction of the two men, who are suggested to have a sexual relationship, is painted as 
having a close-knit bond characterized by minimal work ethic and high aspirations, this 
section of the article further implies that the two manifest political schemes together. The 
article further states without reference to a source that, 
“Both undergraduates in the liberal arts, the two young men’s friendship 
grew from a shared a jovial disposition, left-leaning political views, and an 
occasional fondness for pairing the music of early-90s grunge with their 
favored varieties of marijuana” (para. 7). 
In further characterization of both political figures, the article now references their 
left-wing political affiliations and engagement with marijuana culture while painting them 
as irresponsible young men. Following this illustrated characterization, the article begins 
to discuss their roles in the SNC Lavalin scandal. The news piece appears to bring into 
question the credibility of both men while inferring collusion through their roles in the 
SNC Lavalin. In describing their purported behaviours of their early 20s while relating it 
to a current day issue, their perceived political integrity as people in positions of authority 
decreases in the reader’s mind. Regardless of whether corruption has existed or does 
exist at the Federal level, the news piece is an effective psychological piece. Through 
the inclusion of information that is unverifiable, this article persuades the reader to 
accept a constructed reality which depicts the narrative of two young, reckless, and 
irresponsible young men who are now involved in large-scale corruption.  
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The Mistreatment of Indigenous Peoples 
An article titled, “Federal spending on foreign abortions increased to $700m, 
infuriating Canada’s Indigenous people” (The Buffalo Chronicle, 2019, Sept 3) depicts a 
sensitive topic which remains to be an issue of concern for many Canadians across the 
country. While the federal spending announcement for foreign-aid spending for sexual, 
reproductive, maternal, and child health in countries where women’s rights are under 
attack is fact (Carber & Woo, 2019, June 19), the remainder of the article frames the 
issue in a partisan manner. The article mentions that, “according to a First Nations 
activist, Canada is paying $700 million to kill the babies of Indigenous people around the 
world” (para. 2). The tone of this message appears to take on a pro-life stance on 
women’s reproductive rights while framing the issue within the topic of the mistreatment 
of Indigenous peoples in Canada. However, following this, the article takes a more 
factual turn as it progresses by noting that many Indigenous communities in Canada still 
do not have access to clean drinking water. In spending $700 million in foreign aid, it is 
argued that the money could instead be spent locally to increase access to drinkable 
water among remote Indigenous communities. 
Interestingly, all articles which are based on the mistreatment of Indigenous 
peoples in Canada use accurate information to convey the intended message. All 
articles which cover the other trigger topics contain far more opinion, speculation, and 
unverified facts. The common theme that appears within the articles which are based on 
the lived experiences of Indigenous peoples are that they take the experiences and 
concerns of Indigenous communities and then further relate that information to a broader 
political message. Rather than direct coverage about the issue in question, a political 
perspective is influenced within the overarching message that is delivered. For example, 
in the article referenced above, rather than exploring the alarming number of Indigenous 
communities who do not have access to clean drinking water, the support for the 
international reproductive rights of women become under scrutiny which further 
implicates the Liberal government to be the primary concern of the article. This then 
overpowers the coverage of the challenges that Indigenous communities experience by 
directing focus away from the systemic problems associated with the marginalization of 
Indigenous peoples. Through forcing the reader’s attention towards a separate issue 
where the message is politically motivated, a desired conclusion is manipulated. The 
factual information about the marginalization of such communities may be used to attract 
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the reader to gain their trust, then through manipulation, a political leaning is influenced 
among the audience. 
The respect for Indigenous communities within the articles created by The 
Buffalo Chronicle appears to be superficial. While coverage of the issues faced by 
Indigenous communities across Canada remains high, their terminology used shows an 
apparent lack of respect and consideration for the communities they are covering. One 
of the articles which focuses on the mistreatment of Indigenous peoples in Canada is 
titled, “Ontario judge riles an Indian community, as Rez Fox fleeces a revered civic 
leader” (The Buffalo Chronicle, 2018, Jan 2)28. The headline uses the term ‘Indian’ in 
describing an Indigenous community. The use of the word “Indian” to describe all 
Indigenous cultures and communities across North America was dubbed by early 
European colonizers. The term ‘Indian’ is oppressive as colonizers labelled all 
Indigenous peoples as one racial group while ignoring existing and individualized tribal 
identities, cultures, traditions, and languages. Reducing all Indigenous cultures and 
communities to one monolithic label imposes oppression and subordination on 
Indigenous communities and upholds the notion that Western identities are superior 
(Yellow Bird, 1999). The Buffalo Chronicle article continues to further use the label 
‘Indian’ as a descriptor within the article by referring to lawyers who are versed in 
Indigenous legal issues as “indian lawyers” (para. 3) and by again referring to 
Indigenous communities as “indian communities” (para. 3). While the independent 
journal does highlight important issues that are experienced by Indigenous communities 
across Canada, their attention to these concerns appear superficial and are used to 
push a personal agenda. 
Sexual Misconduct 
Sexual misconduct appears to be a theme which emerges from the nature of the 
Buffalo Chronicle articles which are explored. One article titled, “Costumes, roleplay 
whet a young Trudeau’s sexual appetite” (The Buffalo Chronicle, 2019, Oct 12) states 
that, 
 
28 While this article falls outside of the 6-month period, the headline was reposted on the Buffalo 
Chronicle’s social media platform during the 6-month window. This may illustrate an attempt to 
amplify the message of the article during the election period. 
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 “In his early to late-20s, Justin Trudeau had a robust and wide-ranging 
sexual appetite — most especially for costumes and role play, a former 
classmate tells The Chronicle” (para. 1).  
In this quote, the unnamed source divulges into the alleged sexual interests of 
Trudeau through discussing his enjoyment of roleplay and costumes. Just one month 
before the 2019 Canadian Federal election, images surfaced of Trudeau from 2001 
where the Prime Minister can be seen wearing an Aladdinesque style costume, with a 
turban, and with the inclusion of his face darkened with black paint while surrounded by 
four women (CBC News, 2019, Sept 20). Due to the disrespectful and racist nature of 
this costume, this understandably sparked considerable outrage across the country and 
became a significant source of media attention as Trudeau campaigned for re-election. 
The Buffalo Chronicle article discussed Trudeau’s sexual interest in costumes and 
roleplay. Following the widespread story of Trudeau’s previous controversial choice of 
costume, this article likely builds off the negative image that many readers already 
associate with Trudeau’s costumes. This article then takes this story a step further 
through suggesting that there are sexual motivations behind his dress-up choices. 
As the article progresses, Trudeau is painted as a sex-crazy, marijuana smoking, 
mischief maker. Much like the article explored in the SNC Lavalin example, this article 
further emphasizes the narrative of Trudeau’s apparently reckless youth while 
progressing the anecdote to include tales of Trudeau’s sexual escapades. According to 
an unnamed former classmate, Trudeau is, 
“…one of the coolest dudes you could ever party with, always the first to 
whip his dick out, so to speak (para. 8).” 
The article later describes an alleged contest where Trudeau made it his mission 
to ejaculate on as many campus chalkboards as possible. The article uses the trigger 
topic of sexual misconduct to further develop a narrative where Trudeau is depicted as 
an irresponsible teenager. This is likely to invoke a sense of disgust and mistrust from 
the reader which may be used to discredit Trudeau as a reputable public figure. During 
election time, small inferences such as this can have significant consequences. 
Finding 2: The Use of True Facts in Combination with Unverifiable or False Facts 
Another common theme which emerged from the analysis of articles published 
by The Buffalo Chronicle was the inclusion of legitimate and verifiable facts combined 
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with opinion, facts that are not verifiable, and/or pure speculation. An article titled, 
“‘Political grandmaster’ Frank Iacobucci is at the center of SNC Lavalin, Kinder Morgan 
scandals” (The Buffalo Chronicle, 2019, March 11), includes both factual information in 
combination with unverifiable fact and speculation as a means of message delivery. The 
article begins by including true facts regarding Iacobucci’s career including his service as 
a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada until his retirement in 2004 (Peter A. Allard 
School of Law, 2020). The article continues on to state that, 
“Suddenly, this week, nearly everyone in Ottawa wants him to testify before 
the House of Commons’ justice committee regarding his involvement in the 
SNC Lavalin scandal, following widespread rumors that it was Iacobucci 
who first insisted that Jody Wilson-Raybould be removed as Attorney 
General (para. 2).” 
It can be confirmed that Wilson-Raybould, former Attorney General, was 
removed from her position and moved into the position of veteran’s affairs minister. 
Further, much speculation exists on the rationale behind Wilson-Raybould’s removal 
from her previous position (Zimonjic, 2019, Jan 14). Wilson-Raybould testified in the 
House of Commons on February 27th, 2019 regarding the SNC Lavalin scandal and her 
understanding about the corruption and bribery which occurred on behalf of the Liberal 
Government in their handling of SNC Lavalin. She noted in her testimony that, as 
Attorney General, she was included in discussions regarding the affair. She stated that 
during these discussions, she made it very clear that she would not participate in 
Trudeau’s backdoor motion to prevent SNC Lavalin from being prosecuted. She further 
included her concerns that she was being removed from the justice department for her 
decision to remain neutral (Thomson, 2019, Feb 28).  
There is evidence to support corruption within the Liberal government; however, 
the Buffalo Chronicle article from March 11th, 2019 takes facts and dilutes it with 
speculation to progress the narrative further. The article even notes that through 
‘widespread’ rumours, it was former Supreme Court Justice Iacobucci who insisted that 
Wilson-Raybould be removed as Attorney General. The headline further attempts to 
connect Iacobucci as a master political manipulator who is behind all Liberal government 
scandals without any significant evidence to support the claim. The article also mentions 
that, “a source close to the talks suspects that Trudeau had tasked Iacobucci with 
‘essentially bribing’ every Indigenous community along the pipeline’s route, in order to 
secure approvals as quickly as possible” (para. 3). Based on the account from the 
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unnamed source, who has a feeling that Trudeau has asked Iacobucci to bribe 
Indigenous communities, the suggestion of wide-spread corruption becomes more 
encompassing.  
Readers who have heard of the legitimate coverage of alleged corruption within 
the Federal government may be inclined to search for more information that is publicly 
available. As reliable public information is limited on this subject, they may resort to 
finding less reputable sources to satisfy their desire for further information. The Buffalo 
Chronicle appears to fill the gap of wanting more information about a sensationalized 
topic where reliable reporting is limited; however, the additional information used to 
provide supplementary coverage is heavily speculation-based while being presented as 
fact. This seems to be a common pattern within the Buffalo Chronicle articles. Within the 
articles explored, there are real and verifiable facts, typically involving a story that is 
highly sensationalized. These facts are then embellished with speculation in a way which 
appears to present the information as factually legitimate. It is of further interest to note 
that no authors of The Buffalo Chronicle articles are directly named. Instead, the writer 
remains anonymous. The coverage appears to highly target the Liberal government and 
are posted and re-posted during the time leading up to the election. Each article 
commonly links to one overarching message which is delivered through various tactics: 
The Liberal government is corrupt/ill-suited to be re-elected as Federal government. 
4.2.2.  Canada Proud Findings 
Canada Proud, has previously been criticized over their controversial tactics of 
message delivery during the election. During the 2019 Canadian Federal Election, 
Elections Canada received reports of robocalls which directed the call recipient to vote 
on October 22, 2019. The date provided by the robocall is one day after the election 
ended and the calls were later linked to the Canada Proud group (Bellemare & Rogers, 
2019, Oct 21). Ontario Proud, which is a localized affiliation of the Canada Strong and 
Proud group, reportedly received nearly $460,000 in corporate donations to fund their 
campaign to vote the Liberals out of office in the 2019 election. Common tactics used by 
this group involves sharing viral memes and social media content to attract a large 
audience and generate support for their campaign (Rogers, 2019, Aug 6). Due to their 
history of questionable information relaying tactics and the considerable funding they 
have received to create a campaign to remove the Liberals from office, it becomes 
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worthwhile to examine their social media posts during the 6-month period leading up to 
the election.  
576 posts from the Canada Proud Facebook group were qualitatively explored 
through content analysis. Overall, there are very few fictitious facts included. 
Interestingly, there are also very few true facts included within the dataset. The majority 
of posts are opinion-based without the inclusion of any fact. 90.7% of all posts captured 
are centred on opinion and do not include any false nor confirmed facts. The main 
themes which emerge from this analysis include the inclusion of trigger topics, the 
inclusion of language to stimulate negative emotions from the audience, and the use of 
hashtags. Appendix B includes screenshots of all posts used in this analysis. 
Finding 1: Trigger Topics 
Similar to the themes which emerged through analysis of the article from The 
Buffalo Chronicle, a considerable theme found throughout all Canada Proud posts are 
that they are based on a trigger topic. The topics are largely controversial in nature and 
are divisive in that people tend to have vastly different opinions on where they stand 
when confronted with the topic. The primary topics covered within the Canada Proud 
group fall within the realm of corruption, global affairs, veteran affairs.   
Corruption  
Corruption appears to be a strong theme within the posts analyzed. Many posts 
directly state that corruption exists within the Federal government, while other posts 
allude to its existence. Within the 596 Canada Proud posts examined, posts which 
identified corruption occurred 93 times. The following examples provided are posts 
where the primary topic of issue is government corruption: 
Corruption Post 1: Next week, expect Justin Trudeau to sink to new lows 
and sleazy backroom deals in a desperate attempt to cling on as prime 
minister in a minority government. But Canadians shouldn’t forget Justin 
Trudeau’s double speak on who has the right to form government. 
Corruption Post 2: Good. Canadians deserve answers about Justin 
Trudeau's rampant corruption. 
Corruption Post 3: Get ready for backroom deals to keep Trudeau and his 
corruption in power.  
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Corruption Post 4: Elections are tough, but they're tougher when you're a 
corrupt moron like Justin Trudeau. 
As illustrated through the corruption examples above, the target of all corruption 
posts is either Justin Trudeau directly, or the Liberal government in general. Each post 
includes a strongly negative stance on current political affairs. Terms such as ‘sleazy’ 
and ‘moron’ are used a descriptive terms to further insight and encourage a negative 
opinion of the Prime Minister among each of the post’s audiences. Corruption posts 1, 2, 
and 3 depict Justin Trudeau corruption through the citing a lack of rules and 
accountability mechanisms in place to uphold the legitimacy of democratic decisions.  
Corruption post 1 states that Trudeau engages in corruption through participating 
in backroom deals without accountability mechanisms in place. As seen in the post 
(Appendix B), the user is directed to a video link. When clicking the link, a video is 
presented where the Prime Minister is being interviewed by a CBC reporter where they 
are discussing the electoral system. The caption of this video reads, “JUSTIN TRUDEAU 
IS TOO STUPID TO UNDERSTAND HOW PARLIAMENT WORKS”. Within the video, it 
appears that Trudeau is originally speaking for simplicity’s sake, but the reporter is trying 
to engage in a more ideal discussion on how the electoral system ought to function. The 
interview is then cut short in this clip and the audience does not see the remainder of the 
interview. The video clip embedded within the post invites users to question Trudeau’s 
intellect. Interestingly, the original claim made by this post relates to government 
corruption; however, the external resources provided do not substantiate or relate to the 
original post claim. Instead the inclusion of the video distracts the reader from exploring 
the corruption claim further and encourages readers to follow a secondary narrative. 
This diverts their attention away from collecting further information and instead they 
assess where they personally stand on the claim based on the narratives provided. 
Corruption post 2 discusses corruption further; specifically, in relation to the SNC 
Lavalin scandal. Within the post, a link can be seen (Appendix B) which directs the 
reader to an article is titled, “Andrew Scheer promises Conservative government would 
launch inquiry into SNC-Lavalin” (Canadian Press, 2019, Sep 26). The article primarily 
discusses the Conservative Party of Canada’s leader, Andrew Scheer, and his election 
promises and platform. He discusses his concerns of corruption within the Liberal 
government and announces his promise, if voted as Prime Minister, to further investigate 
corruption related to the SNC Lavalin scandal. It becomes clear through this post that 
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Canada Proud serves to generate support for the Conservative Party of Canada. 
Canada Proud was registered as an official third party during the 2019 Canadian Federal 
election (Paas-Lang, 2019, July 25) and have been known to use common tactics which 
involve sharing viral memes and social media content to attract a large audience and 
generate support for their campaign (Rogers, 2019, Aug 6). Due to their support for the 
Conservative party, it is likely that through delegitimizing Trudeau as a political candidate 
for re-election, the group is actively working to encourage more votes to be earned for 
the Conservatives. Many posts are primarily focused on denunciating Trudeau’s 
behaviours without suggesting a chosen alternative. Following the creation of a narrative 
which portrays Trudeau as largely corrupt and dishonest, the linked article provided in 
this post is very straight-forward in suggesting to their audience who they should vote for  
Corruption post 3, similar to corruption post 1, discusses the idea of Liberal 
corruption as taking place behind closed-door, backroom deals. The post can be seen 
(Appendix B) to provide a link to a Globe and Mail article titled, “Andrew Scheer calls for 
majority to head off an anti-Conservative coalition“ which discusses Scheer’s 
dissatisfaction with possible talks of the Liberals forming a coalition government with the 
New Democratic Party (NDP) if the Liberals were to win a minority government. (Walsh, 
Carbet, Dickson & Kirkup, 2019, Oct 14). Scheer noted that only a Conservative majority 
government could prevent a Liberal-NDP coalition. In relation to the original post’s 
message, this implies to readers that corruption can only be stopped if a Conservative 
majority is formed as corruption will ensue if the Liberals and NDP form a coalition. This 
sends the signal to the reader that in order to prevent government corruption, they must 
vote Conservative. 
Corruption post 4 uses the term ‘corrupt moron’ to describe Trudeau. The post 
then shows a link to a video (Appendix B). In following the provided link, users are 
brought to a video of Trudeau during a press conference. The clip is twenty-three 
seconds long and provides little context regarding the nature of the press conference. A 
reporter then asks Trudeau an accusatory question and Trudeau blinks while leaving the 
question unanswered and someone else cuts in. Much like the example provided in 
corruption post 1, the video has little to do with the claim of corruption and instead 
distracts attention away from the claim towards a video intended to decrease the public’s 
confidence in Trudeau’s intelligence. 
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Global Affairs 
Global affairs shows to be another significant topic of concern within the Canada 
Proud posts collected during the time of the election. Overall, the social media posts 
generally depict Justin Trudeau as being an embarrassment to Canada on the global 
stage. Of the 596 Canada Proud posts analyzed, 37 posts included the trigger topic of 
global affairs. Below are examples which illustrate the nature of the global affairs related 
posts. 
Global Affairs Post 1: How desperate is Trudeau? It seems he's calling in 
international favours. 
Global Affairs Post 2: FACT: If Justin Trudeau is somehow re-elected, his 
meetings with international leaders aren't going to make Canada look good. 
Global Affairs Post 3: Stop the international embarrassment 
Global Affairs Post 4: Yep, Justin Trudeau admitted he's the leader of a 
country actively committing genocide. This isn't going to end well. 
Global affairs post 1, suggests that Trudeau is desperate for support during his 
campaign for re-election and that he needs to garner support from international figures in 
order to win a spot in parliament. The post advertises a link (Appendix B) which directs 
users to an article published by The Post Millennial29 (Johnson, 2019, Oct 16). In 
following the link, readers are directed to an opinion piece which holds the position that it 
is not morally acceptable for Barack Obama to endorse Trudeau for re-election as it 
constitutes foreign interference. A tweet is captured within the article (Appendix C) which 
shows Obama’s political endorsement. The remainder of the opinion article goes on to 
make allegations of attempting to secure money from elite entities such as Obama to 
further his campaign interests through holding a fundraiser in New York city among elite 
American-Canadians while pleading for donations. In verifying whether a campaign 
fundraiser held in another country asking for donations from elite foreign entities 
occurred, no information could be uncovered verifying this allegation30; however, 
Trudeau was a guest-speaker at a political fundraiser hosted by president of the Chinese 
Business Chamber of Commerce in Toronto (Austen, 2016, Nov 24). Shortly after this 
 
29 According to mediabiasfactcheck.com, The Post Millennial is mostly factual and right-wing 
biased. 
30 In attempt to verify this claim, key words “New York Fundraiser Trudeau”, “Trudeau Fundraiser”, 
“Trudeau New York” were entered as search terms in duckduckgo.com 
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fundraiser, a guest of the fundraiser donated $1 million to Pierre Elliott Trudeau 
Foundation which funds academic research within the disciplines of social sciences and 
humanities. Trudeau removed all connections he had to the foundation when he entered 
his political career. Following the fundraiser becoming public knowledge, the 
independent conflict of interest and ethics commissioner reviewed the matter and 
determined that no laws nor regulations were broken in this instance (Austen, 2016, 
Nov 24).  
The original post discusses Trudeau’s implied desperation for re-election through 
providing a link to an opinion article that makes substantial claims without evidence to 
support the claims being made in the article. The reader is taken away from the claim 
and their attention is directed into reading an article that supports the narrative 
constructed by Canada Proud. This can lead readers to develop a lack of confidence in 
the Liberal government. The picture of a desperate Trudeau who is corruptly accepting 
foreign funding and asking for favours from foreign influences with elite power in a 
scramble to maintain power is painted. This article further highlights an issue that is 
highly relevant to the overall research. Does Obama’s tweet advertising his personal 
endorsement for Trudeau constitute as foreign interference? This will be discussed and 
explored in depth within the discussion section of this research. 
Global affairs post 2 begins immediately by capturing the attention of readers 
through stating, ‘FACT’. The claim then follows that if Trudeau is re-elected, global 
leaders will not think well of Canada. The post can be seen to provide a link to a related 
video (Appendix B). In watching the video, users are prompted to watch Trudeau 
speaking in a public forum and taking questions from the public. An audience member 
asks whether Trudeau has reached out to leaders from African or Middle Eastern 
countries to apologize for his costume where we wore blackface and was dressed in 
Aladdin-style attire while wearing a turban. In Trudeau’s response, a direct answer to the 
question is avoided and Trudeau relays his commitment to engaging with world leaders 
and by standing up for human rights. The audience member then re-prompts Trudeau to 
the question asked, and again, no direct answer is provided, and the topic is changed to 
another question from the audience. This video is used to bring into question the Prime 
Minister’s ability to connect with world leaders and maintain a positive image on behalf of 
Canada. As the blackface scandal was a significant event during the time of the election, 
it is clear that this issue would be used to bring into question the Prime Minister’s ability 
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to engage in diplomacy among African and Middle Eastern countries. However, the 
original claim made by the post which states that global leaders will not think well of 
Canada is not a ‘FACT’ but rather a prediction or speculation based on previous events. 
Global affairs post 3 further exemplifies the issue of how Trudeau is perceived on 
an international level. The post contains a link to a meme31 which includes a picture of 
Justin Trudeau who appears to be dancing in traditional south Asian attire. The caption 
reads, “VOTE OUT TRUDEAU. BECAUSE DIPLOMACY DOESN’T RUN ON THE 
POWER OF DANCE”. The post captures Trudeau in way that suggests his cultural 
connections with other country’s leaders is subject to mockery and he does not 
understand the seriousness of engaging in another culture’s traditions respectfully. The 
post infers that, Trudeau will embarrass Canada during quests for diplomacy, thus he 
should not be voted into a second term of power. The message delivery system utilizes 
easily consumable and concisely written texts accompanied by a humorous picture to 
send the intended signal to media consumers. 
Global affairs post 4 begins with a very attention-grabbing headline as it notes 
that Trudeau, the leader of Canada, admits that Canada is currently engaging in 
genocide. The connation associated with this headline depicts a very nonchalant way to 
discuss the rather serious topic of genocide. The post then shows to provide a link 
(Appendix B) to an article in The Post Millennial. The article is titled, “Trudeau 
government supports international probe into allegations that Canada is committing 
genocide” (Taghva, 2019, June 9). The focus of this article is to add to the discussion 
about an international probe by the Organization of American States into an allegation of 
genocide cited by Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls inquiry 
(MMIWG)32. The conclusion of findings highlighted by the MMIWG inquiry determined 
that Canada is and has actively engaged in genocide of Indigenous peoples due to the 
historical mistreatment of Indigenous peoples and the ongoing inaction to protect the 
well-being of Indigenous peoples. Further, the inquiry notes that the, “Canadian state 
deliberately and systematically violated racial, gender, human and Indigenous rights, 
with its actions amounting to genocide“, (Stueck & Woo, 2019, June 5, para. 7). Canada 
 
31 A meme is: an amusing or interesting item (such as a captioned picture or video) or genre of 
items that is spread widely online especially through social media (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
2020a). 
32 This fact has been cross-checked with a variety of other legitimate sources and is true. 
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Proud seems appears to not support Trudeau’s acceptance of responsibility on behalf of 
Canada’s role in the mistreatment of Indigenous which has contributed to the deaths of 
many Indigenous people. The impression delivered by this post suggests that Trudeau’s 
admission of genocide to an international organization will negatively impact the 
country’s image. The Post Millennial article linked to in this post provides very little 
context in relation to the overall issue of what was uncovered in the MMIWG inquiry. 
Readers who come across the post and read the article provided are likely to come to 
the conclusion that admitting to genocide is unwarranted. With more inclusive 
information encompassing the whole issue, readers would be able to make their 
personal position assessments with greater conclusive confidence. 
Veteran Affairs 
Veteran affairs appeared to be a common trigger topic within the Canada Proud 
posts collected within the period of the 2019 Canadian Federal election. As veterans are 
a symbol of respect and admiration for many Canadians, this is considered to be a 
significant topic of concern. Within the 596 Canada Proud posts analyzed, 54 posts 
included veteran affairs as a trigger topic. The posts below include information about the 
nature of the posts where veteran affairs was the primary topic of concern. 
Veteran Post 1: NEW SURVEY: Justin Trudeau claims wounded veterans 
are asking for more than we can give. Do you agree? 
Veteran Post 2: The Liberals don’t care about our armed force and sure 
don’t care about our armed veterans. 
Veteran Post 3: …and done. Exhibit #1: Trudeau telling veterans they’re 
asking for more than we can give while giving free hotel rooms to illegal 
border crossers. 
Veteran Post 4: Remember when Trudeau said wounded veterans were 
asking for more than we could afford? 
The primary message being delivered amongst all veteran-related posts is that 
the government is mistreating veterans through not providing the resources needed or 
respect warranted. Veteran post 1 includes a link to a survey which appears to ask 
audience members about their opinion on veteran funding33 (Appendix B). The question 
posed by the survey appears to be very leading. It states a claim which has a negative 
 
33 In following the provided link, the page cannot be found at this time (error code 404). 
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connotation and then asks survey respondents to participate in the survey by stating 
their stance on the issue. As a perspective is already suggested, the survey is likely to 
further capture people who also experience a negative perception on this issue and 
those who may have an alternative view may be less inclined to participate.  
Veteran post 2 makes a very strong statement. The post implies that the 
government has zero care about veteran affairs. In using terms such as ‘our’ this seems 
to divide the general Canadian public from the Liberal government. Further, the post 
uses ‘wounded’ as a descriptive statement to encourage a stronger emotional response 
in the discussion of veteran treatment in Canada. The post (Appendix B) then provides a 
link to a news article by a Canadian newspaper called The Hill. The article is titled, 
“‘Veterans probably won’t vote Liberal for a very long time’: Norman case reflects Grits’ 
failed promises to vets, say advocates” (Moss, 2019, May 15) and is suggested to 
provide a factual basis to support the post’s statement34. Interestingly, in following the 
link to the article, the audience member cannot have free access to read the article as 
this article is an “exclusive subscriber-only story”. While the post, which links users to 
what appears to be a source that provides substantiation to the claims being made by 
Canada Proud, the actual article cannot be read without a paid subscription which is 
likely to deter readers from exploring this issue any further decreasing their opportunity 
to engage with further information to develop their conclusion. 
Veteran post 3 constructs a divisive issue. Unlike the previous posts where 
veteran funding was the primary concern, this social media post suggests the lack of 
funding available for veterans is a direct biproduct of the Liberal government’s 
immigration spending. This post is likely to be referring to the Canadian government’s 
assistance for incoming refugees who are seeking asylum in Canada due to violent 
conflict in their home countries. Considerable funding was allocated to assist refugees 
during Trudeau’s time as Prime Minister (Forrest, 2018, Nov 22). The post refers to 
those who are entering Canada as ‘illegal border crossers’ rather than the more 
empathetic and humane term of ‘refugee’. This further creates a negative stigma 
regarding people who are entering Canada fleeing violent conflict. This promotes the 
reader of the post to develop a negative association with asylum seekers and associate 
their presence in Canada as a liability to the well-being of home-grown Canadian 
 
34 According to mediabiasfactcheck.com, The Hill is mostly factual and least biased. 
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veterans. This post can be seen (Appendix B) to not contain a link to any external 
sources to verify the claims made. Rather, a picture was created by the group with a 
picture of Trudeau and their claim in large, uppercase font.  
Veteran Post 4 includes a link to an article by The Post Millennial. In clicking the 
link, the reader is prompted to an article titled, “NATIONAL EMBARRASSMENT: 
Thousands of Canadian veterans are homeless” (Wakerell-Cruz, 2019, June 6). The 
majority of the article consists of a human-interest piece interviewing a homeless veteran 
named Diane Claveau and explores her experiences living in poverty following her 
military career which has contributed to her having a permanent disability. Claveau notes 
in the article that she does receive funding and assistance from Veterans Affairs Canada 
and Ontario Works. However, the funding assistance received is not substantial enough 
to allow her the opportunity to afford housing. The inclusion of this external source to the 
claim made by Canada Proud provides substantiation to the post’s message. The 
headline of the article encourages a strongly negative emotional reaction through 
labelling Canada’s response to the well-being of veterans as a ‘NATIONAL 
EMBARASSMENT’. As this issue is sensitive within the hearts of many Canadians, the 
incitement of increased negative response to this trigger topic is likely to amplify this 
specific issue which may overpower other election-related information. 
Finding 2: The Inclusion of Language to Stimulate Negative Emotions 
A common theme that was uncovered throughout the data was the propensity for 
the authors of the Canada Proud posts to include specific words that encourage a 
negative emotional response in the reader. The carefully chosen choice of words used in 
each post deliver the intended message and promote negative feelings about the 
subject(s) of the conveyed message. Within the 596 Canada Proud posts examined, 227 
of these posts include negative affective language. Below are examples of posts which 
include affective language. While the words used in each post vary, the underlying 
common theme appears to relate to the desire to stimulate negative emotions within the 
reader. 
Negative Affective Post 1: ISIS terrorists supported genocide and the mass 
rape of women and little girls. These monsters don't belong on Canadian 
streets, no matter what Justin Trudeau says. 
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Negative Affective Post 2: Spoiled brats like Justin Trudeau will never 
understand what it’s like growing up in the middle class. Trudeau inherited 
his wealth and never had to work for anything. Scheer’s humble upbringing 
is nothing to be ashamed of – he should be proud of his roots. 
Negative Affective Post 3: Trudeau says he's a Feminist, but he throws 
women who disagree with him under the bus. 
Negative Affective Post 4: The fall campaign is almost upon us. Get ready 
for Trudeau to start calling everyone who disagrees with him a racist and a 
bigot. This is what Liberals do when they can’t win an argument 
Rape, Terrorism, and Young Girls 
Negative affective post 1 includes a variety of words that instill adverse emotions 
related to the message. Such words in this example include, ‘terrorists’, ‘genocide’, 
‘mass rape of women’, and ‘mass rape of little girls’. In describing the horrific nature of 
ISIS terrorists, Justin Trudeau is then injected into the same sentence. After encouraging 
people to feel pain and disgust through affective language, they then read about Justin 
Trudeau while still experiencing the manipulated negative emotion. The post shows to 
include a link to an article published by the CBC (Appendix B). The linked article 
discusses Canada’s strategy in handling ISIS members who are Canadian citizens and 
request to return home (Baksh & Draghici, 2019, Sept 30). The article makes no mention 
of Justin Trudeau or the Liberal government in any fashion. Following the use of a 
strongly horrifying description of the acts ISIS engages in, the message in negative 
affective post 1 implies that Justin Trudeau supports Canadian ISIS fighters returning to 
Canada. Yet, the linked article has zero connection to any actions of the Prime Minister. 
It is plausible to conclude that by using forceful words which create a strong emotional 
response in the reader, by then associating these emotions with a specific individual, the 
reader may be inclined to experience negative feelings about the individual. 
Spoiled Brat 
Negative affective post 2 promotes negative emotions through creating a sense 
of marginalization among the middle class and by demarcating the boundaries of 
privilege between the middle-class and the upper-class elites. The post suggests that 
due to Trudeau’s upbringing, he is a ‘spoiled brat’ who does not care about middle-class 
Canadians. Instead, Scheer will care about middle-class Canadians as he has been 
raised more ‘humbly’ and has publicly discussed his poverty-stricken childhood. The 
essence of the post becomes negatively divisive and creates a narrative which divides 
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the middle-class ‘us’ from the upper-class ‘them’. This may negatively impact one’s 
feeling of financial security and perceived level access to opportunities which could 
influence their personal assessments of their political standing.  
The Facebook post is linked to a meme (Appendix B) where it is suggested that 
Liberal MPs have been openly bullying Scheer about his ‘humble’ upbringing. According 
to an article in The Post Millennial (Wakerell-Cruz, 2019, Sept 9), a hashtag on Twitter 
began to rise in popularity prompting the Twitterverse to mock Scheer’s upbringing. The 
hashtag, #ScheerWasSoPoorThat, is noted to have been a large contributor to online 
trolling. Many people took to participation and engagement with this hashtag as it was 
determined that Scheer had greatly exaggerated his experience growing up in poverty. 
In an article published by Maclean’s (Geddes, 2019 Feb 8), it becomes evident that 
Scheer’s account of his childhood was a carefully fabricated narrative which idealizes 
Scheer’s attractiveness as a Prime Minister. Scheer’s childhood is evidenced to be 
solidly middle-class.  
The context of the #ScheerWasSoPoorThat hashtag was less about bullying on 
the basis of being poor, and more about trolling the embellished narrative. However, it is 
accurate that one Liberal MP did engage with the hashtag over Twitter. Liberal MP, 
Gagan Sikand, tweeted, “#ScheerWasSoPoorThat he had to buy his Conservative 
values second-hand from Stephen Harper” (Wakerell-Cruz, 2019, Sept 9). The Wakerall-
Cruz (2019, Sept 9) article provides other screenshots of tweets by public figures; 
however, these figures have no current or direct tie to actively serving as an MP for the 
Liberal government. The claim made that Liberal MPs (pluralized) are mocking Scheer 
for growing up poor is accurate but an exaggeration as only one Liberal MP (singular) 
did engage. Further, the context was not provided to the reader that Scheer’s 
embellished poverty claim was the basis for the online ‘mockery’.   
Throws Women Under the Bus 
Negative affective post 3 describes Trudeau in a manner which inflicts negative 
emotions in readers due to the implication that Trudeau mistreats women. The post 
states that Trudeau “throws women who disagree with him under the bus”. The term, to 
throw someone under the bus, is a metaphorical figure of speech which alludes to the 
notion of causing someone else to suffer by betraying them for the sake of one’s own 
personal benefit (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2020b). While the phrase is metaphorical, 
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the essence of the statement holds a perception of violence. Readers of this post may 
begin to feel that Trudeau mistreats women while experiencing the feeling of violence 
emanated by the term. This term is not directly implying that Trudeau engages in 
violence against women; however, the sentence structure of this may influence that idea 
in the audience’s mind. The post shows a link to an article by The Post Millennial. The 
article states that the Liberal government allegedly forced a female Liberal MP to resign 
as she would not publicly support Trudeau as a feminist (Taghva, 2019, Sept 25). In 
responding to this allegation, “Trudeau says Vimy MP Eva Nassif wasn't "red lit" to run 
again because of her failure to laud his feminism. Says there was a different reason but 
won't say what that was” (The Canadian Press, 2019, Sept 25, para.10). The truth 
behind the allegation is difficult to determine, but the message of the article is intended 
to support the original claim made by Canada Proud. The message being conveyed here 
is that Trudeau does not value the women on his team and will “throw them under the 
bus” if they fail to support him. This appears to invalidate Trudeau’s claim that he 
supports feminism and suggest a more misogynistic approach to political power. The 
tactic seen in this post seems to take an unverified claim and present it as truth without 
caveats and then use that claim as evidence for a larger unsubstantiated claim.  
Racists and Bigots 
Negative affective post 4 promotes anger in the readers by suggesting that 
Trudeau thinks that if people do not support him, they are ‘racists’ and ‘bigots’. In 
reading this claim, the audience member is likely to feel angry and attacked which 
further promotes an overall negative feeling towards Trudeau. The post includes a 
clickable icon which takes the user to a meme (Appendix B). The meme illustrates 
Trudeau holding a Liberal-red card with his name on it titled, “THE RACIST CARD”. The 
description located on the card reads, “TO BE USED WHEN BADLY LOSING A 
DEBATE WTH INTELLIGENT CANADIANS”. No further information is attached to this 
post which would substantiate their allegation that Trudeau thinks all non-Liberal 
supporters are racist bigots. The method of encouraging a strongly negative emotional 
response where the reader feels personally attacked in combination with a meme which 
conveys a very strong message is likely to encourage increased anger. When combined 
with other posts which do include evidence for claims being made, the level of negative 
emotion is likely to be amplified.  
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Finding 3: The Inclusion of Hashtags 
Hashtags are a label that are used to categorize information. Once a hashtag is 
created and used, this enables social media users to have more simplified access to 
information related to the hashtag’s overall theme (Taylor, 2015). Generally, hashtags 
present a topic or issue, and allow users to engage with the topic through social media 
posts or to access this information in a more accessible fashion. Hashtags are most 
used on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Of the 596 Canada Proud posts analyzed, 
31 posts included a hashtag. There were a variety of hashtags found within this data set. 
The following is a list of the most commonly used hashtags found within Canada Proud 








A similarity across all posts which included hashtags was the connection of 
further claims and visual aids to support an anti-Liberal standpoint. Additionally, unlike in 
the posts analyzed in previous findings, the posts which include hashtags tend to not link 
to further materials or external sources. For the most part, they are posts which 
encourage active audience participation and include easily consumable imagery to 
compliment the post text.  
#TrudeauMustGo and #TrudeauisBananas 
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of the context where hashtags, 
#TrudeauMustGo and #TrudeauisBananas, are used (Canada Proud, 2019a, Aug 26). 
This post encourages a very participatory and engaged audience. Audience members 
are requested to complete given social media actions as a demonstration of support. 
The meme within the post instructs users to like the post if they never voted for Justin 
Trudeau in the previous election and to share the post on their personal Facebook page 
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if they never will vote for Trudeau. The highlighted example in Figure 4.1 demonstrates 
the encouragement for the participation among social media audiences. In sharing the 
posts authored through Canada Proud to their own account, they are increasing the 
broadcast level of the post and increasing the number of Facebook users who will be 
exposed to the group’s messages and content.  
The hashtag, #TrudeauMustGo, became extremely popular on Twitter; however, 
a significant percentage of the tweeted hashtags were not posted by humans. In an 
investigation conducted by the National Observer, numerous Twitter bots were 
discovered to be commanding automated Twitter accounts to share the hashtag 31,600 
times within a two-day period; many accounts tweeted the hashtag more than 100 times 
per day (CTV News, 2019, July 18). The article notes that the user responsible for most 
of the automated #TrudeauMustGo tweets was @CanadaProud10. This account 
tweeted the hashtag a total of 119 times and was later suspended by Twitter. While it 
may be complete coincidence that the automated account contains ‘Canada Proud’ in its 
name; in the amplification of this hashtag, a link between the Canada Proud Facebook 
posts and the pervasive automated Twitter account posts can be deduced. 
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Figure 4.1 The Inclusion of Hashtags – #TrudeauMustGo and 
#TrudeauisBananas 
#SpreadTheWord 
Figure 4.2 provides an example of a post where the hashtag, #SpreadTheWord, 
was used (Canada Proud, 2019, July 5). The Facebook user is provided with a meme 
which is used to add weight to the claim through imagery. The meme provides 
information about the rate of job loss in Canada during June 2019 and provides a 
reference for readers to show where the information was retrieved from. In reading the 
cited article, the post fails to mention that, “despite the weak showing last month, 
over the past 12 months, Canada's economy has cranked out 421,000 new jobs” 
(Evans, 2019, July 5). Further, there is no comparison information within the article 
which provides insight on how many jobs were created in the United States during June 
2019. However, this number can be confirmed through an additional source which notes 
that the United States has added 224,000 jobs to the economy in June 2019 (Cox, 2019, 
July 5). An important thing to consider that would lend further context within the 
comparison of these numbers would be to consider the extraordinary difference between 
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the population sizes of both countries. Similar to previous findings, the post provides 
accurate information to verify the original claim but selects specific pieces of information, 
while ignoring other information which would provide a more comprehensive 
understanding about the topic of concern. 
 
Figure 4.2 The Inclusion of Hashtags – #SpreadTheWord 
#SaveCanada 
Figure 4.3 provides an example of where the hashtag, #SaveCanada, is used 
(Canada Proud, 2019, Sept 19). The post uses humour as a mechanism to grab user’s 
attention and to deliver the intended message. The meme uses emojis where the option 
is presented on the interface to select various Trudeau emojis which occupy a spectrum 
of lighter to darker skin options. This meme is in reference to the blackface scandal. The 
hashtag, #SaveCanada, is used to imply that Canada is in danger if Trudeau is re-
elected. Through using a humourous meme, a message can be delivered in a way which 




Figure 4.3 The Inclusion of Hashtags – #SaveCanada 
#BREAKING, #FACT, and #EXPOSED 
Figure 4.4 shows an instance where the hashtag, #EXPOSED, was used. Each 
hashtag which used uppercase letters (#BREAKING, #FACT, and #EXPOSED) appear 
to utilize the hashtags in a similar fashion (Canada Proud, 2019b, Aug 26). The hashtag 
is included prior to a fact or event is disclosed. The example below shows the hashtag 
being used to capture the attention of readers which follows with a brief claim. The 
meme then provides further information about the claim. In exploring this ‘fact’ regarding 
the carbon tax further, the claims included in the image can be found in a statement 
made by Andrew Scheer. In a fact check by the CBC about Scheer’s carbon tax claim, 
they note that there are significant fallacies within the logic used to reach the 30 cents 
per litre increase conclusion. Realistically, the Liberal tax increase would, “cost the 
average Canadian household about $5 per month in 2030” (Powers, 2019, Sept 27). 
This post relies on a claim made by Scheer which is contingent on inflated numbers to 
further increase outrage among audience member about the unaffordability of another 
Liberal government. In using the hashtags, #EXPOSED, #BREAKING, and #FACT, the 
reader infers a sense of urgency in relation to the content of the post. Further, as these 
hashtags are not exclusive to Canadian political issues, those who follow these hashtags 
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are also likely to become an audience member of these posts regardless of whether they 
follow the Canada Proud page or not. 
 
Figure 4.4 The Inclusion of Hashtags – #EXPOSED 
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Chapter 5.  
 
Study 3 – Qualitative Analysis of Election Related 
Robocalls 
5.1. Content Analysis of Robocall Survey Responses 
To explore the role of robocalls during the 2019 Canadian Federal election, the 
survey outlined in Chapter 3 included a section which asked respondents to share their 
experiences with election-related robocalls (ERRCs). For information on the sampling 
procedure and data collection process of this survey, please refer to Chapter 3.  
The survey (Appendix A) first asked respondents whether they received a 
robocall during the time leading up to the 2019 Canadian Federal election. If they did, 
they were then asked if the robocall was in any way election related. If their robocall 
experience was election related, they were provided a text box to describe the nature of 
the call they received. 46 survey respondents shared their experiences with ERRCs 
through their written answers in the text box provided. The researcher conducted a 
content analysis of these responses to understand the major themes which emerged 
from the respondent’s experiences with these robocalls. The steps of this analysis follow 
the same qualitative process as outlined in the analytic strategy located in Chapter 4. 
5.2. Results 
5.2.1. Finding 1: Robocall Sender Information 
Table 5.1 reveals descriptive information about the nature of the robocalls 
received by survey participants. Of the 190 survey responses, 28.9% of participants 
report having received an election-related robocall (n = 55). More than half (52.8%) of 
ERRCs were affiliated with the Conservative Party of Canada (n = 29). Of these 29 calls, 
28 participants note that they did not believe the message that was delivered by the 
robocall sent on behalf of the Conservative Party of Canada. Calls sent from the Liberal 
Party of Canada comprises of 18.2% of all ERRCs with 3 respondents believing in the 
truth of the call’s message and 7 people who did not believe in the accuracy of the call’s 
content. 12.7% of all ERRCs were delivered on behalf of the New Democratic Party of 
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Canada with 4 people who believed that the message was truthful and 3 people who did 
not believe the truth of the content. Both of the Green Party of Canada ERRCs (n = 2) 
were determined by the call recipients to be truthful while both of the People’s Party of 
Canada ERRCs (n = 2) were identified by the respondents who received the call to not 
be truthful. 
Table 5.1 Robocall Frequencies Based on Political Party and Belief of Truth of 
Call Content 
  
Believed Truth of 
Robocall Content 
 
Election Related Robocall 
Received (%) No Yes 
Liberal Party of Canada 10 (18.2) 7 3 
Conservative Party of Canada 29 (52.8) 28 1 
New Democratic Party of Canada 7 (12.7) 3 4 
Green Party of Canada 2 (3.6) 0 2 
People's Party of Canada 2 (3.6) 2 0 
Non-Identified Affiliation 4 (7.3) 3 1 
Prefer Not to Say 1 (1.8) 1 0 
Total 55 (100.0) 44 11 
 
Of the 55 respondents who reported to have received an ERRC, 46 participants 
opted to provide further information regarding the nature of the call. Through qualitative 
content analysis, the messages delivered through ERRCs during the 2019 Canadian 
Federal election can be assessed to further provide insight into whether criminal 
interference was at play. From the qualitative assessment of each respondent’s account 
of their experience in answering the ERRC, four themes can be uncovered which 
provide understanding regarding the common response of the call recipient and the 
goals of the message delivered through ERRCs. 
5.2.2. Finding 2: A Common Call Recipient Response 
Automated telephone calls which deliver a pre-recorded message to the call 
recipient are generally unsolicited. A person may include their phone number on a given 
phone list for a corporation or political party and consent to opt-in to future telephone 
marketing initiatives, or their phone number may have been selected through less 
consent-driven means. When a robocall is answered, there are two courses of 
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immediate action that the call-taker can take; they can choose to hang up or they may 
listen to the robocall’s message. 26.1% of ERRC recipients (n = 12) in this survey chose 
to hang up immediately upon answering or briefly after hearing the beginning of the call. 
One call recipient noted that, 
“We received multiple calls from multiple parties. By and large they are 
garbage. I usually hang up regardless of who is phoning because I find 
robocalls disrespectful of my time.” 
This participant’s experience with ERRCs capture the annoyance that many 
people feel when they become the subject of an unsolicited robocall delivered to their 
home or personal cell number. Due to previous experiences, they may have already 
concluded that the messages delivered through the call are akin to ‘garbage’ and are not 
deserving of their time or energy. If a robocall is depicting false information, the held 
belief that robocalls are dishonest and are not worthy of the call recipient’s time can 
serve as a protective factor in diminishing the effect of false information delivered 
through ERRCs on altering one’s political opinion. Another participant mentioned that, 
“I hung as soon as I realized it was a robocall, less than 30 seconds into 
the call.” 
This echoes the sentiment of the previous participant’s view on automated 
telephone calls. Once a recipient realizes that they have become another victim of an 
impersonal marketing scheme, they opt to no longer participate in the call which results 
in the message delivery becoming unsuccessful. 
5.2.3. Finding 3: Regular Support Generating Election-Related 
Robocalls 
While 26.1% of recipients who answer an ERRC choose to end participation at 
the forefront, 73.9% of survey respondents continue to take part in the phone call. The 
most common type of ERRC delivered to call recipients were calls which were aimed to 
generate regular support from their audience. 50% of all ERRCs (n = 23) consisted of a 
message where the sole aim was to educate the potential voter about the party’s 
platform, to generate party support, or to simply to remind them to vote on or before 
October 21st, 2019. In describing the nature of a support generating call a respondent 
noted that, 
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“What I remember was a brief, factual call about who was running (David 
Merner) and not much else. Don't remember much more because I'd long 
since decided to vote Green and most information failed to change that.” 
This call receiver describes the nature of the call which provided accurate 
information about the Green Party candidate who was running in their area. The 
intention of the call was aimed to educate the caller and to generate voter support. In 
this case, the person who received the call had already made the decision to vote for the 
Green Party of Canada and this call further supported their voting decision. Another 
participant’s positive experience with the robocall they were subject to is reflected here: 
“They just wanted to tell me their platform, although I already knew it and 
was happy to vote for them.” 
Within this ERRC encounter, the phone call that was received by the message 
target was accepted positively and reconfirmed their voting intentions. Call recipients 
who answer calls from political parties they favour are more likely to have a positive 
experience in answering the call. In contrast, when a call recipient is the subject of an 
ERRC from a party they are not aligned with, their experience may be less positive. This 
is depicted by a survey respondent who noted that, 
“I just remember them spouting off the normal conservative bull. I don't 
think I listened to the whole thing.” 
While the exact nature of the call is unknown, the participant receives the ERRC 
more negatively. It appears as though this call being discussed by the participant is a 
support generating call on behalf of the Conservative Party of Canada. The call was not 
received well by the participant as they do not affiliate with the party’s ideals. Thus, they 
ended the call early and did not receive the entire message delivery. Calls which are 
specifically targeted towards supporters are generally received well and the call content 
is listened to in its entirety which allows the complete message to be sent and accepted. 
When ERRCs are delivered to non-supporters, it is likely that they are received with 
more of a negative reaction causing the recipient to end the call early and not be 
exposed to the complete message. Much like social media, message delivery through 
telecommunications may create information silos which further perpetuate specific ideals 
among a distinct population based on the information receiver’s inclination to accept or 
reject message delivery. 
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5.2.4. Finding 4: Election-Related Robocalls as a Platform to Attack 
Other Parties 
Attack advertisements at election time are not a new phenomenon. Based on the 
analysis of survey respondent’s reports regarding the nature of ERRCs, 
telecommunication platforms are another option utilized by political parties to circulate 
negative information about their opponents. 17.4% of respondents (n = 8) noted that the 
primary purpose of the robocall they received was to attack political opponents. One 
participant explains that,  
“It was basically a fear mongering call. Like "oh noes! The carbon tax will 
be the end of days!” but less dramatic. It resulted in a hang up and an 
eyeroll.’ 
This example of an ERRC, as discussed by the survey respondent, illustrates the 
use of fear tactics to promote an emotional response and propagate the party’s 
message. The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (2018), colloquially referred to as 
the ‘carbon tax’, came into effect on June 21st, 2018 (Government of Canada, 2019). 
During this time, Canada’s Federal government was elected as a majority Liberal 
government and the ‘carbon tax’ became an increasingly controversial issue. This ERRC 
exemplifies an attack on the Liberal Party of Canada by constructing a fear narrative that 
voting for the Liberals and their policies will be ‘the end of days’. Another participant 
shares their experience with an ERRC which illustrates the use attacks on opponents to 
perpetuate their message. They state that, 
“I've received multiple. Neither identified as the parties themselves but one 
was clearly from the Conservative party talking about Trudeau's spending. 
Another was from the PPC talking about Trudeau and the Roxham Road 
"illegal immigrants".35 
The survey respondent identifies two calls which involved an attack on an 
opposing party through deliberation with contentious and divisive issues. Both ERRCs 
were an attack on the Liberal Party of Canada delivered by the Conservative Party of 
Canada and the People’s Party of Canada. The Conservative’s attack-focused ERRC 
focused on denouncing Prime Minster Justin Trudeau’s government spending. The 
 
35 Roxham Road is in Quebec and has become a common unauthorized border entry point into 
Canada for asylum seekers as they migrate from countries with a history of violent conflict. It 
became a controversial issue and the Liberal government was under scrutiny for not doing more to 
dissuade unauthorized immigration from this entry point (Ormiston, 2019, Sept 29) 
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People’s Party attack focuses on the construction of a fear narrative which suggests 
illegal immigration as fundamental concern for Canadians. Notably, the respondent does 
not note that the party provided the call recipient with any information specific to their 
party platform that would bolster their own image, the calls appear to be contingent on 
assaulting the image of their opponent.  
5.2.5. Finding 5: Deceitful or Unlawful Conduct 
Election Day Party Advertisement 
Section 323.1 of the Canada Elections Act (2000) states that, 
“No person shall transmit election advertising to the public in an electoral 
district on polling day before the close of all of the polling stations in the 
electoral district.” 
This is considered the blackout period in which no political party or third party 
may advertise election materials on polling day before the polls close in all polling 
stations across Canada. The exceptions which apply to this rule include the 
advertisement of political information on the internet that was transmitted prior to the 
blackout period, as well as the already in-place messages conveyed on signs, banners, 
posters, and pamphlets. In following statement, a survey participant describes an ERRC 
that they received on election day: 
“It was on the day of the election and was to inform me of my polling place, 
but it also went on about the evils of immigration and the PPC party 
platform. I reported it to Elections Canada.” 
While reminders to vote and information regarding a voter’s polling location are 
permitted on election day, advertising party platforms during the blackout period is 
prohibited. This reported call from the People’s Party of Canada is in direct violation of 
section 323.1 of Canada Elections Act (2000). Along with propagating party platform 
information on the day of the election, this highlighted example illustrates the use of fear 
to persuade an emotional response. Within this example, the call recipient is exposed to 
an anti-immigration narrative which may cause the consumer to feel alarmed and 
uneasy and rethink their voting decision. Another participant reported a similar 
occurrence: 
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“It was on the day of the election and it was promoting PPC platform points 
which I thought was against the rules so I reported it to Elections Canada.” 
The second report of election advertising during the blackout period follows the 
same pattern as described in the previous participant statement. Section 495.5 of the 
Canada Elections Act (2000) notes that an offence that is in violation of section 323.1 is 
to be considered a summary conviction offence which is considered to require intent. To 
satisfy a guilty conviction section, it must be determined that the person who 
orchestrated advertisements on election day knowingly conducted advertisements 
during the blackout period and they are a member of a registered party, registered 
association, or are a registered 3rd party. From this finding, it can be concluded that there 
is evidence to support that there was unlawful interference in a democratic election as 
the criteria set out under section 495.5 of the Canada Elections Act (2000) are satisfied. 
Voter Suppression 
Out of the 46 respondents who chose to share their experiences, one respondent 
identified that they received a robocall which told them to vote on the wrong date. Voter 
suppression is recognized under section 282.6 of the Canada Elections Act (2000). This 
section states that, “no person shall prevent or attempt to prevent an elector from voting 
at an election”. During the 2019 Canadian Federal election, there were reports made to 
Elections Canada regarding voters in Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia 
receiving robocalls which directed the call recipient to vote on October 22, 2019 
(Bellemare & Rogers, 2019, Oct 21). As election was held the day prior, if callers were to 
have listened to the advice of the robocall, they would have missed the opportunity to 
exercise their democratic right to vote. The one participant in this study who recalls 
receiving the voter suppression robocall states simply that, 
“Told me the wrong election date.” 
While no further details were provided by the participant, the message appears 
clear. They received a call which was made with the intention to prevent the voter from 
casting their ballot. In recalling previous similar incidents, the 2011 Pierre Poutine voter 
suppression scandal saw Michael Sona sentenced to a 9-month term of imprisonment 
and a 12-month period of probation for his role in orchestrating robocalls directed 
towards non-Conservative party voters in an attempt to suppress their votes (R. v. Sona, 
2014). Within the context of the 2019 election, in an investigation by CBC News, the 
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reported misleading robocalls calls were traced to the Canada Strong and Proud36 group 
(Bellemare & Rogers, 2019, Oct 21). While the group may not be responsible for all 
voter suppression robocalls delivered across Canada during the 2019 pre-election 
period, given the findings of Study 2, the motivation to prevent non-Conservative voters 
from casting their ballot may be present. The Facebook posts analyzed do not suggest 
any criminal action involved; however, if the group is responsible for the robocalls 
delivered to Canadian citizens providing them with false information about the election 
date, this action would confirm that the group engages in illegal activity threatening the 
integrity of the democratic process. 
 
36 ‘Canada Strong and Proud’ is the same group as ‘Canada Proud’. If you search Canada Strong 
and Proud on Facebook, you are automatically connected to the Canada Proud Facebook page. 
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Chapter 6.  
 
Discussion 
Through examining the results of the three studies employed by this thesis, 
significant information has surfaced in relation to the main research questions. The first 
aim of this thesis is to answer whether the fake news pieces which circulated during the 
2019 Canadian Federal election had any impact on the election’s outcome. The second 
aim of this thesis is to determine whether there was any degree of criminal interference 
involved during the election. I contend that the narratives that were constructed and 
delivered through fake news media likely influenced many voter’s election decision. 
Further, I also argue that there was criminal interference involved in Canadian 
democracy during the time of the election. This discussion will explore these statements 
in more depth through linking the theoretical perspective of social constructionism with 
this thesis’ findings. Further, a legal analysis will be employed to determine the extent to 
which criminal interference was at play during the 2019 Canadian Federal election and 
the available means of investigation and prosecution. 
6.1. Influence on Voting Outcomes 
The qualitative examination of survey data provides valuable insight into whether 
exposure to misinformation on social media can influence how people decide to vote. As 
fake news becomes more widespread and available, there is significant concern about 
how the information presented to consumers by non-legitimized media sources, which is 
often heavily biased and inconsistent with fact, may influence democratic outcomes. 
Often, news media consumers desire more information about a specific topic or event 
that is of interest to them; however, legitimized news media may be unable to satiate the 
public’s craving for further details as the information available to them may be limited 
and legitimate news content is bound by ethical integrity making quality material 
significantly more expensive to produce (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Fake news content 
often fills the void that is created when reliable news media is inaccessible or 
unavailable. Reliance on fake news channels can be detrimental in elections. For 
democracy to be functional, citizens need to be well-informed about the current political 
landscape to enable them to make fully informed voting decisions (Bakir & McStay, 
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2018). As fake news content becomes more heavily relied on by consumers for election-
related information, the user runs the risk of entering into a cyber ghetto (Kumar & 
Krishna, 2014). As their choice of fake news outlet is likely chosen based on their 
political affiliation, the opinions, narratives, and ideas generated by their choice of fake 
news facilitator are likely to reflect their current political outlook while precluding their 
exposure to counter-perspectives. They then become enveloped into an echo chamber 
where their current perspective becomes reiterated and amplified. Their information 
wealth is characterized as living within a cyber ghetto where they are impoverished by 
the absence of alternate ideology (Kumar & Krishna, 2014). 
6.1.1. Influencing Voting Decisions – Misleading Information 
Study 1 found a statistically significant effect between fake news headline 4 and 
the decision to change one’s vote. This finding suggests that within this study, 
participants who were exposed to fake news headline 4 were more likely to change their 
voting decision than those who did not recall seeing the headline. Fake news headline 4 
reads, “Elections Canada attempts to combat huge number of non-Canadians on voting 
register” (Gibbons, 2019, Oct 6). Interestingly, unlike the fake news headlines 1 to 3 
which were determined to be fake based on containing facts that were both fictious and 
unverifiable, fake news headline 4 was determined to be fake news as it is misleading. 
The article notes that,  
“Elections Canada needed to eliminate an estimated 103,000 people from 
their voters’ register because they aren’t Canadian, but nonetheless were 
registered to vote This number was later revised to 85,000, of which 74,000 
were removed, according to Elections Canada.” (para. 1). 
It is factual that 74,000 people were removed from the voter registration list prior 
to the election, however; the people who were removed from the list were removed as 
they did not respond to Elections Canada’s letter informing the letter recipient that they 
will be removed from voter registration unless they reply to confirm that they are qualified 
to vote (Elections Canada, 2019). To state that all 74,000 people were non-Canadians 
misrepresents the nature of the situation and falsely exaggerates the message conveyed 
by the headline. Exposure to this headline appeared to have a significant effect on 
changing one’s voting outcome. The other headlines did not observe any significant 
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effect. This may suggest that a misleading headline can be far more effective in 
influencing readers than a headline which conveys a completely false story.  
In considering the parallels between the information media system and the 
computer system, data flow within both systems are essential for the system to make an 
appropriate decision with consideration of all relevant factors (Libicki, 2007). Signals are 
sent by an information source which relay requested information to the intended 
destination. When the information contained in the signal is accurate and high quality, 
the system is able to determine an effective decision based on all available data. 
However, when the quality of the signal is diminished, the capacity to make an efficient 
decision becomes obstructed. When signals containing misleading information are sent 
by the information source to the destination, the decision made based on the information 
is likely to be misguided and deviate away from the decision that would have been made 
had an accurate information signal been sent. If a signal were to be sent from the source 
which was flagged by the system as being an untrusted source, or if the data was 
completely unrelated to the system’s request, this information would likely be excluded 
from analysis. Within the context of information warfare, information delivered to 
intended targets containing misleading information is likely to permeate the target with 
more efficiency than completely inaccurate information which may be more 
recognizable. Fake news 4 is effective in relaying a distorted signal to the media 
consumer through the inclusion of misleading information. 
6.1.2. Influencing Voting Decisions – False Information 
It is important to note that simply because a participant is exposed to fake news, 
this does not mean that they believe that the news item is true. Study 1 found that there 
is a difference in outcomes between situations when someone is exposed to fake news 
and situations when someone believes in the truth of fake news. The findings suggest 
that those who believed that fake news 3 was true were more likely to change their vote 
than people who do not interpret the headline as true. There were no significant effects 
found within the other fake news headlines. This suggests that when a participant reads  
fake news, and they infer that the message is accurate, this can be an effective predictor 
that they may change how they decide to vote. It appears that fake news 3 may have 
been the most effective fake news article analyzed by this study to persuade the reader 
to concede the article’s authenticity.  
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Fake news headline 3 reads, “RCMP source says ‘security risk’ against Trudeau 
was contrived by PMO staffers” (The Buffalo Chronicle, 2019, Oct 15). Given the severe 
nature of potential threats against the life of the country’s Prime Minster, the RCMP 
would never divulge sensitive and classified information to an independent journal. The 
article suggests that the threat was manufactured by Liberal staffers to elicit sympathy 
for Trudeau. While this article is factually inaccurate, the message suggested by the 
headline infiltrated enough minds to obtain a significant finding in answering the question 
of whether believing in fake news may influence political decision making. As people 
who believed that this item was true were seen to be more likely to change their election 
decision, this illustrates the risk associated with the advancement of fake news avenues 
into the media information system.  
Pennycook, Cannon, and Rand (2018) note that the problem with the public’s 
capacity to identify real information from fake information is much larger than simply the 
ability to make the distinction between the two. Instead, the problem appears to arise 
when headlines or statements are presented which sound true but are not. This may 
assist to explain why the participants who believed fake news headlines 3 were more 
likely to change their vote than the participants who did not interpret the headline as 
honest. Fake news 3 illustrated the idea that the Trudeau fabricated a false security 
threat essentially for added attention. Given the ongoing narrative that was being 
developed by both The Buffalo Chronicle and Canada Proud which encouraged a view 
of the current government as being corrupted and manipulative, those who subscribed to 
this narrative may be more likely to find that this headline sounded true and therefore 
believed in the validity of the statement. 
Information trolls construct fake news content and inject the manufactured 
narratives into public discourse. Through utilizing various techniques, the fabricated 
information is manufactured for the purpose of pushing a pre-determined agenda (Guo & 
Vargo, 2018). As was seen within the 2016 U.S Presidential election, information trolls 
employed by the Russian IRA carried out information warfare against American voters 
which likely had a significant impact on the election’s outcome (Berghel, 2017). Through 
first constructing information by engagement with various psychological techniques, 
followed by thrusting those information narratives to specific user groups, with a distinct 
attraction to partisan passions, the IRA’s weaponized information signals infiltrated the 
targeted population (Berghel, 2017). Russian IRA created social media groups and 
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pages were centered on deception. They appeared to the consumer to be authored by 
U.S citizens to advocate for their political ideologies and encourage like-minded users to 
connect and engage. Based on a fraudulent agreement between social media users and 
the façade of kindred partisan social media cliques, the IRA became an accepted social 
structure among the online community for political information resources.  
The Buffalo Chronicle, much like the Russian IRA during the 2016 U.S 
Presidential election, became socially accepted by many Canadians as a resource for 
election information. Canadian election-related stories published by the Buffalo 
Chronicle were shared through their Facebook page and accumulated over 200,000 post 
shares when combined; further, their page had attracted over 4.4 million fans during the 
election period (Oved, Lytvynenko, & Silverman, 2019, Oct 18). While it is plausible that 
the number of shares and fans are greatly inflated due to likely activity of bot-controlled 
false accounts, the numbers allude to a significant level of consent by the public to grant 
their approval to the Buffalo Chronicle allowing them to dispense their constructed 
narratives into user’s personal newsfeeds. Given the social acceptance among the 
public regarding to the perceived legitimacy of the website, which was gained through 
insincerity and through the website’s ability to satisfy the public’s demand for auxiliary 
information, the propensity for many members of the public to believe the fictitious 
headlines projected by the web page is comprehensible. As the findings have suggested 
that the belief in fake news headlines can impact the participant’s political election 
decision, information trolls can be seen as a significant threat to the democratic process. 
The findings of Study 1 suggest that fake news pieces are relevant to the 
information collection mechanisms practiced by consumers to gather the information 
needed to assess how to exercise their democratic right to vote. The findings of Studies 
2 and 3 provide further insight into the nature of false information communication. Study 
1 has confirmed that exposure to and the belief in misleading or falsified headlines can 
have an influence on how a citizen chooses to vote. Study 2 and 3 will illustrate the 
mechanisms, systems, tactics, and techniques utilized by information trolls in their 
expedition to compel their audience to accept their constructed narrative uncorrelated 
with the truth (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).  
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6.2. Affective Content 
Through analyzing the content created by The Buffalo Chronicle and the social 
media posts shared by the Canada Proud Facebook page, engagement with affective 
materials appears to be a highly useful technique to encourage a user reaction. Trigger 
topics between both organizations included political scandals, the mistreatment of 
Indigenous peoples, sexual misconduct, political corruption, global affairs and veteran 
affairs. A common feature among information trolls is the use of noise to distract the 
reader or to amplify attention towards an already heavily sensationalized topic (Guo and 
Vargo, 2018). The SNC Lavalin scandal was a significant story throughout the election 
period. This topic has provided the external public a peep into the possibility of internal 
corruption within the Federal government. Due to the significant weight on the 
allegations made in relation to the scandal, a lot of questions remained unanswered. 
Leaving a void to be filled, information trolls were able to inoculate their supplementary 
materials into the media information system. In doing this, fake news communicators 
used the opportunity to amplify the message about to the possibility of corruption. 
Amplifying one issue is an effective tactic to capture the reader’s concentration and 
block out other information signals. This can greatly reduce the ability for the democratic 
population to collect and assess all of the available information that is included in their 
personal political affiliation analysis (Carlson, 2018).  
In addition to affective topics to poach audience attention, affective words are 
also used when crafting fake information materials. Study 2 finds that a significant 
number of posts contained specific words which encourage a strong negative emotional 
reaction in the reader. The objective of negative affective words embedded within fake 
news text is to perform reader manipulation by inciting anger. The primary subject of 
each post which contained affective words were all divisive in nature. In the examples 
explored, the subject matter related to refugees, middle-class vs. elitism, feminism, and 
racial tensions. Based on a person’s ideology, their position on these issues can be at 
ends with people who occupy a different ideology. Through the incitement of anger, the 
reader is directed to feel strongly negative emotions towards those who stand on the 
other end of the issue. This can expand the divide between people who have different 
political perspectives and eliminate the common ground while pushing both parties to 
polarized ends of the issue. Divisive dialogue through inciting anger is effective in 
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manipulating voter’s values and beliefs. This can be used to compel a person to stand 
firmly on one extreme end of the political spectrum while condemning the perspectives 
of those who reside on the other side (Berghel, 2017; Haataja, 2019). 
6.3. Engaging the Information Consumer 
6.3.1. Hashtags 
Study 2 provided valuable findings related to the methods used by fake news 
media to encourage audience engagement. Hashtags were a common feature within the 
Canada Proud posts analyzed. All hashtags were associated to anti-Liberal content and 
encouraged users to participate through commenting, liking, and sharing the posts. An 
engaged audience is beneficial to encourage virality of posts. As more people like, 
comment, or share a post, the post becomes more popular. The primary priority in 
Facebook algorithms are to keep users active and engaged through providing attractive 
content on their newsfeed (Cooper, 2020). In determining which posts a user would most 
enjoy engaging with, popular and viral posts are considered by the algorithm combined 
with other factors such as, browsing history, purchases made, and the types of content 
they typically engage with (Bakir and McStay, 2018). Through encouraging social 
engagement with posts, Canada Proud can increase their broadcast abilities and have 
their messages sent to an increased number of consumers.  
Hashtags are further valuable in propagating political messages. Social media 
platforms organize information based on the hashtag used in the respective post. In 
including the hashtag ‘#TrudeauisBananas’ in a post, any person who follows that 
hashtag can access other posts which also utilize the same hashtag allowing them to 
engage with that content. By using more generic hashtags in their politically charged 
posts such as, #SpreadTheWord, any person who is searching for information by using 
this hashtag as an indicator, they are at an increased chance of becoming exposed to 
the constructed messages conveyed the Canada Proud posts. This enables an 
expanded reach to recruit audience members. While bot accounts often play a 
significant role in the virality of certain posts, Gabielkov, Ramachandran, Chaintreau, 
and Legout (2016) note that some users may re-tweet, re-post, and upvote content 
without giving full consideration to the content they are sharing. This is another 
explanation for the virality of false information content which, when considered in 
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combination with automated bot accounts, may provide further insight into why fictitious 
information available online can become so far-reaching. 
Twitter observed a significant amplification of the hashtag, #TrudeauMustGo. 
Automated Twitter accounts were responsible for tweeting the hashtags 31,600 times 
within 48 hours. The account @CanadaProud10 was suspended for tweeting the 
hashtag over 100 times per day (CTV News, 2019, July 18). While it cannot be stated 
with complete certainty that this Twitter account is associated with the Canada Proud 
Facebook group, based on the hashtag used and the name associated with the Twitter 
account, it is likely that the group was broadening their message’s reach across 
platforms to engage with an audience on a larger scale.  
By sending the same signal consistently and frequently across multiple networks, 
information systems can experience decreased efficiency (Libicki, 2007). When the 
same signal is sent repeatedly to the destination, the data flow within the system 
decelerates as the system becomes overwhelmed with an influx of data to process. As 
the system collects the information required to infer an appropriate decision based on 
the data received, the amplification of one message may override other data received. 
This can cause the system to overlook other information that is relevant in processing an 
output. Similarly, through employing Twitter bots to command automated Twitter 
accounts to tweet the same signal thousands of times per day, the ability for users to 
collect and process election-related information via Twitter is hindered due to being 
inundated by one message while alternate messages become buried deep within the 
Twitter feed. 
6.3.2. Network Reach and Echo Chambers 
As the scope of communication technology and social media platforms increase, 
so too do the available avenues of communication to proliferate fake news content. In 
exploring social media, there are a variety of platforms and tools which can be used to 
facilitate the dissemination of false information to large audiences. As many social media 
communication tools are interconnected across platforms, the signals sent by the source 
are able to reach multiple destinations. Within Study 2, many Canada Proud posts 
included links to other content created on platforms external to Facebook. Hashtags 
used by the group on Facebook were further used on Twitter. Through expanding 
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network reach to connect to a multitude of agencies, the opportunity for the signal to 
reach an expanded audience increases.  
Study 1 examined the relationships between social media usage across 
platforms. Significant relationships were found across nearly all platforms suggesting 
that a substantial number of people are active on more than one social media platform. 
By cross-posting messages on more than one platform, the signal not only reaches more 
audience members, but it can reach the same audience member multiple times. Due to 
newsfeed algorithms, the content on a user’s newsfeed typically caters to their personal 
preferences. As most fake news content is premised on partisan passions (Berghel, 
2017), the content is likely to be received well by the user. In seeing the same 
information on more than on platform, the user is likely to further internalize the 
perceived validity of the information being provided. Due to newsfeed algorithms and the 
amplification of frequent signals sent from partisan sources, the user is also at an 
increased risk to experience the effects of information echo chambers. As the user 
navigates the echo chamber, information which substantiates what they already know 
and believe promotes confirmation bias. The same information is being re-circulated to 
them and their newsfeed algorithm continues to provide content that aligns with their 
current beliefs ultimately limiting their exposure to counter-information (Bakir & McStay, 
2018). 
A significant danger associated with echo chambers is not only the lack of 
exposure to information that explores other perspectives, but also the danger associated 
with incorrect information being accepted but never corrected (Bakir & McStay, 2018). 
As counterevidence to a false fact cannot permeate the information silo, the ill-informed 
citizen remains misguided by illegitimate information as credible evidence to enlighten to 
individual is out of reach.  
Study 1 provided interesting insight into the use of social media and its potential 
to create echo chambers. The finding of interest here relates to the time spent on Reddit 
and the likelihood that the user would change their vote. A significant effect was found 
among people who spend 1 to 2 hours on Reddit daily. They were less likely to change 
their voting decision than those who do not spend any time on Reddit and those who 
spend more time on the platform. While navigating the world of Reddit, users subscribe 
to various sub-Reddits which appeal to them. This enables users to have a significant 
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amount of control over the content they engage with. The structure of Reddit is 
significantly different than Facebook. The Reddit newsfeed consists of top stories within 
the sub-Reddits the user has consented to subscribe to. The Facebook newsfeeds 
consist of material that is filtered through an algorithm that considers a multitude of 
factors to predict the material the consumer wishes to view (Bakir & McStay, 2018). 
Often the content may be a posted from a page or group that the user is not following 
but is aligned with based on personal interests. While Facebook algorithms still 
contribute to echo chambers, they do expose the user to content created by groups that 
they do not currently follow. Reddit is likely to be a stronger contributor to echo 
chambers as newsfeeds are projected based on specific sub-Reddits of interest 
specified in advance by the user.  
6.4. Criminal Interference in Canadian Democracy 
6.4.1. Foreign Interference  
When foreign entities become involved in the democratic process of a country 
they do not belong to, the ability for the democracy to function as it should with external 
influence becomes crippled. Foreign bodies may inject their influence into the political 
affairs of another country to encourage a result which may be beneficial to foreign 
interests. Section 282.4 of the Canada Elections Act (2000) states that no person who is 
not a Canadian citizen or permanent resident can influence an elector to vote or not 
vote, or to unduly influence them to vote or not vote for a particular candidate or party. 
This means that parties external to Canada who are determined to be influencing a 
voter’s election decision are in violation of this section.  
Throughout the research, the findings indicated that foreign interference in the 
2019 Canadian Federal election was at play during the pre-election period. Study 2 
explored the fake news content delivered to Canadian media consumers containing false 
information about the Canadian political landscape. As 8 out of the 10 most popular 
stories published by The Buffalo Chronicle were related to Canadian politics and were all 
published within an 8 month window leading up to the election (Oved, Lytvynenko, & 
Silverman, 2019, Oct 18), the non-Canadian based online independent journal fits the 
definition of foreign interference.   
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Application of Section 282.4 (Canada Elections Act) 
In considering the application of section 282.4 of the Canada Elections Act 
(2000), it becomes necessary to consider whether the fake news materials created by 
the online journal had ‘unduly’ influence on voters to vote or not vote for a particular 
party. 
The interpretation of “unduly” is defined by an influence that, “deprives a person 
of freedom of choice or substitutes another's choice or desire for the person's own” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2020c). The influence is considered to be unduly when it is 
conceived in an undue manner and to an excessive degree. Within Canadian common 
law ‘unduly’ is a vague concept; there is no precise interpretation which can be applied 
to determine a purely technical meaning, instead it often denotes the seriousness of the 
act (R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, 1992). There are three questions which 
arise in the application of this section to the content delivered by The Buffalo Chronicle’s 
coverage of Canadian politics during the pre-election period: 
1. Is there any evidence to suggest that The Buffalo Chronicle influenced 
Canadian voters to vote or not vote for a particular party of candidate? 
2. If such evidence exists, was the influence on Canadian voters unduly? 
3. If an unduly influence is confirmed, are Canadian legal responses to 
the Buffalo Chronicle’s foreign interference actionable? 
Question 1 – Evidence of Influence 
The findings of Study 1 suggested that those who believed in fake news 
headlines were more likely to change their vote than those who did not believe the fake 
news headline. Of all four fake news headlines examined in this study, one headline did 
appear to have a significant effect on whether someone will change their vote. This 
headline was fake news 3 published by The Buffalo Chronicle. Within the sample of 190 
survey respondents, 5 participants who read and believed in the truth of the headline 
changed their voting outcome suggesting that this article was influential on voting 
decisions. In considering the scope of this influence, it is worthwhile to consider the 
number of Facebook profiles who identified being fans of the Buffalo Chronicle 
Facebook page during the pre-election period. During the time of the election, the 
Buffalo Chronicle Facebook page had accumulated 4.4 million Facebook fans (Oved, 
Lytvynenko, & Silverman, 2019, Oct 18). While the entire following is not likely to consist 
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entirely of eligible Canadian voters, and there is likely to be the presence of bot 
controlled fake accounts, the social media page for the independent online journal had 
attracted a significant following during the time of election. Interestingly, when looking at 
the page at present day, the same Facebook page only observes 2,412 followers (The 
Buffalo Chronicle Facebook Page, 2020, Sept 21).  
The findings of Study 1 supports that there is evidence to suggest that The 
Buffalo Chronicle did have an influence on at least a few Canadian voters. The 
significant following the page had recruited around the time of the election promotes 
suspicion that there were likely significantly more than a select handful of Canadian 
citizens who were persuaded by the false information pieces. In considering these 
findings, The Buffalo Chronicle did influence Canadian voters through spreading 
disinformation. However, to meet the criteria for the application of section 282.4, can this 
influence be considered unduly?  
Question 2 – Unduly Influence 
In the current age of information media, consumers are exposed to informational 
messages every time they open their personal electronic device to engage with their 
social media accounts. Given the constant stream of signals targeted at individuals, 
there are a few conclusions which may be drawn by the user as they sort through each 
information piece. The user may simply choose to scroll past the information piece, they 
may read and disbelieve it, or they may read and believe it. When it comes to 
disinformation constructed by information trolls to achieve a pre-determined result, for 
the people who do find honesty in a fictious story, it does not initially appear that the 
definition of ‘unduly’ can be applied. The person who chose to believe the story was not 
deprived of their own freedom of choice. Although, due to the seriousness of an external 
body becoming involved in the democratic affairs of a country they do not belong to, the 
seriousness of the act can be inferred. This suggests that common law perspective of 
unduly, which denotes a level of seriousness of the act, may be applicable (R. v. Nova 
Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, 1992). In analyzing the influence of fake news creators 
and their influence on the sub-population of people who believe the fake news headline 
they were exposed to, another question surfaces. Did the person choose to believe the 
false information through exercising their freedom of choice, or was there willful deceit 
which manipulated them into believing the fake information? 
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Psychological Manipulation: Curated Content 
When considering Facebook algorithms, many factors are considered when 
tasked to predict what content the user would most likely want to engage with. Collecting 
data about the user proves to be valuable in providing the user with social media content 
that will keep the user engaged for long periods of time. Information including the groups 
they are in, the pages they like, the content they look at for certain periods of time, the 
profiles of their friends and followers, their browsing history, their purchase history, and 
the time of day they are active on social media are all collected and entered into the 
algorithm to provide a personalized output onto each user’s newsfeed (Bakir & McStay, 
2018). As the material becomes more specifically curated to suit the unique profile of the 
user, the information presented to them becomes more psychologically filtered to amuse 
their personality. In considering the findings of Study 1 which found relationships 
between political affiliation, the primary source of information people depend on for 
election-related news, the exposure to certain fake news articles, and the belief in 
specific fake news articles, there is evidence to suggest that fake information is targeted 
among specific user types. Algorithms personalize the specific materials that a person 
will read, and minimize content not suited to the user’s data-informed user profile; it is 
likely that higher proportions of the population who fit a certain user archetype are being 
selectively exposed to fake news articles at a higher rate than other user groups who do 
not match the same criteria. When a significant level of psychological control is allocated 
to social media consumption, how much level of personal choice can be exerted in 
believing fake news content that is curated to one’s unique user profile? 
In Study 2, many findings seemed to suggest that information trolls carefully 
consider how they craft their fake news media pieces to best persuade their readers to 
subscribe to the underlying message contained in the post. The Buffalo Chronicle 
findings appeared to suggest that a real and concrete issue was used while adding false 
information to cushion the delivery of their anti-Liberal messages. The findings of the 
Canada Proud group illustrate that it can be effective to utilize affective content to attract 
the reader’s attention and encourage them to become emotionally invested in the 
problem being presented, and then pad their involvement with misleading external 
sources. In considering the level of psychological manipulation used in the construction 
of the fake news piece combined with the role of algorithms to directly target the content 
towards certain consumers, it can be argued that the information attacks explored in this 
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thesis do meet the unduly threshold. The non-legal definition of ‘unduly’ is met; given 
that the specific nature of the fake information was targeted towards a specific consumer 
based on their psychological profile. This removes a degree of free choice in accepting 
the validity of disinformation material; the content has been deliberately delivered to the 
person due to them fitting a profile that is likely to engage with the material and support 
it. The legal definition of ‘unduly’ is also met; weaponizing information to serve a specific 
purpose is seen as informational violence which is a form of non-material cyber attack 
that holds the potential to threaten an entire democratic system (Haataja, 2019). This 
suggests a significant degree of seriousness. 
Question 3 – Actionable Legal Reponses 
As questions 1 and 2 have been explored and the criteria of each question have 
been satisfied, it is now important to establish whether Canadian legal responses would 
be actionable to the circumstances explored. Section 3.7 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada (1985), determines Canadian legal jurisdiction. This section states that any 
person outside of Canada who commits an act (that would constitute a criminal offence if 
it were to be committed within Canada) against a Canadian citizen, is deemed to have 
committed that act within Canada and are subject to legal punishment within the 
Canadian justice system. It has been established that the foreign interference which took 
place is in violation of section 282.4 of the Canada Elections Act. Section 491.2 (1)(q) of 
the same act notes that in order for guilt to be found guilty of collusion under 282.4, 
intent must be proven. The alleged man behind the website, Matthew Ricciazzi’s, has a 
history of offering his services to publish positive or negative coverage of political 
candidates for a fee; further, he and The Buffalo Chronicle both received funding from a 
committee which was formed to advocate for the election of Joel Giambra as Governor 
of New York (Oved, Lytvynenko, & Silverman, 2019, Oct 18). If an investigation were to 
uncover evidence that a transaction was involved in the disinformation attack against the 
Liberal party, intent would be established, and a guilty verdict may be reached. The 
issue now relates to the realism of carrying out an investigation against a foreign entity.  
In establishing guilt, it is important to know who was responsible for the act. 
Would the guilty party be the man behind the site, or the person(s) who crafted the 
disinformation article? To answer these questions, an investigation would be required to 
understand the nature of the circumstances associated with the crime. The capacity for 
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police to conduct complex investigations within the intricate bounds of technology may 
be limited by tools and technological expertise (Brown, 2015). It is currently unknown 
whether Ricciazzi also authored each piece of disinformation, or whether he simply 
approved and uploaded each article. The authors of the articles in question remain 
anonymous; this would necessitate considerable methods of investigation. Complex 
investigations into cyber crime are often not within the abilities of the police. They require 
a high level of sophisticated expert knowledge and significant resource allocation. For 
example, an investigation may yield information about an IP address of interest which 
may assist the identification of the suspect. However, the IP address alone is not 
sufficient evidence as a user with technological know-how can simply circumvent 
detection through manipulating their IP details. This makes identifying the suspect 
behind the computer increasingly more difficult without an expert understanding of cyber 
investigative methods (Kao & Wang, 2009).  
If an investigation were to be successfully carried out and a suspect, or suspects, 
were identified, the next step would be extraditing the person(s) from the host country to 
Canada to participate in the adversarial process. This requires the cooperation of the 
country where the suspect is located. The Buffalo Chronicle is said to be located in 
Buffalo, New York; however, there is evidence to suggest that this simply may not be 
true (News Guard Tech, 2020). If the U.S location is true and the suspects responsible 
are also residing in the U.S, then the plausibility of extraditing the suspects to Canada 
for prosecution is feasible given the existence of an extradition treaty. In the 
circumstance where those responsible are found to not be located in the U.S and 
instead currently reside in another country where an extradition treaty does not exist, the 
likelihood for conviction of the crime significantly decreases due to a likely absence of 
international cooperation with a Canadian investigation. Investigations which transcend 
borders require the country of interest to allocate their resources to a crime which was 
not committed against their own citizens. Unless the crime also affects their own 
citizens, requesting law enforcement assistance can be a tough sell.  
The criteria set forth through questions 1 and 2, which related to the legal 
application of the offence of foreign interference, were met. Question 3 is contingent on 
the ability to conduct an investigation within the scope of international jurisdiction. An 
investigation to be completed successfully is contingent on a variety of factors. The 
technological expertise of the investigators, resource allocation, the existence of an 
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extradition treaty, and the cooperation of international actors. While it may be legally 
proven that foreign interference was an issue in the 2019 Canadian Federal election, 
there are barriers that may prevent a successful investigation into the issue. 
Obama on Twitter – Is This Foreign Interference? 
In Study 2, an opinion article by The Post Millennial (Johnson, 2019, Oct 16) was 
discussed which included a tweet captured within the article (Appendix C) which shows 
Obama’s political endorsement for Trudeau’s re-election. The author of the article 
suggests that it is not acceptable for Obama to endorse Trudeau as this would constitute 
foreign interference. Given the criteria set out by section 282.4 of Canada Elections Act 
(2000), it is unlikely that this tweet would constitute an ‘unduly’ influence on the readers. 
As the tweet does not contain any further information, such as false information or 
affective content to psychologically manipulate the reader into engaging with the post, 
there are no factors present to suggest that his act of endorsement is a serious criminal 
act, nor does it remove the ability for a person to exercise their own freedom of choice. 
6.4.2. Robocall Interference 
Findings from Study 3 found evidence to support that there was an attempt to 
prevent voters from casting their ballot in the 2019 Canadian Federal election. While the 
majority of the election-related robocalls (ERRCs) received by survey respondents 
seemed to be regular support generating calls, there also appears to be two Canadian 
laws broken through the robocalls delivered to Canadian voters. Political interference 
was at play through violating section 323.1 of the Canada Elections Act (2000). This 
section relates to the prohibition of advertising a party or candidate on polling day. 
Campaign advertisements on the day of election can cloud the minds of the voters 
through eliminating a free environment to finalize their voting decision. Additionally, as 
set out by section 282.6 of the same act, there is evidence to suggest that voter 
suppression was attempted by delivering robocalls which informed the call recipient of 
the wrong date to vote. Canada Proud was found to be responsible for delivering 
robocalls on the day of the election informing the voter to vote “tomorrow”; they have 
claimed it was accident as some of the calls were meant to be sent out the day prior to 
the election (Paas-Lang, 2019, July 25. Interestingly, some callers report that the call 
they received had explicitly stated that election day was to occur on October 22nd, 2019. 
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As the election occurred on October 21st, if call recipients were to have depended on the 
information contained in the robocall, they would have missed their opportunity to 
provide their vote. In exploring these two political infringements, the nature and scope of 
criminal interference can be assessed. 
Section 323.1 - Canada Elections Act 
In one participant’s account of the People’s Party of Canada robocall they 
received on election day, they noted that rather than simply informing the recipient about 
their polling location and providing their party’s platform, they went further a provided an 
anti-immigration narrative. There is no prohibition placed on providing the voter with 
information about their polling place, assuming the information is correct. However, to 
provide the party’s platform and include a politically charged anti-immigration narrative, 
this can considerably cloud the mind of the voter during the blackout period. Study 2 has 
provided information regarding the use of affective content to deliver an intended 
message. The nature of the robocall described by the participant illustrates the use of 
affective content through referencing the “evils of immigration”. While this may be 
permissible under the freedom of speech on any other day, delivering this message to a 
voter’s phone on the day of election can be seen as unlawful interference in a 
democratic election.  
Section 282.6 - Canada Elections Act 
Numerous accounts of robocalls informing the call recipient about the wrong 
election date surfaced during the 2019 Canadian Federal election. Voter suppression 
robocalls have occurred during Canadian elections in the past. The most prominent case 
in previous elections which resulted in a conviction was Michael Sona’s involvement in 
the Pierre Poutine voter suppression scandal in 2011. Sona worked on the Conservative 
Party campaign throughout the pre-election period. During the Canadian Federal 
election in 2011, approximately 6,000 voters received a robocalls falsely informing the 
voter that their polling location had changed (Maher and McGregor, 2012, Aug 10). 
Along with the deceitful robocalls, there were 17 other ridings across Canada where 
robocalls were reported which were harassing or provided them false information about 
the upcoming election. These ERRCs appeared as an active effort to prevent Liberal 
supporters from voting in the election (Maher and McGregor, 2012, Feb 23a). In being 
able to determine which phone numbers belong to non-Conservative voters, the ability to 
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orchestrate a targeted disinformation attack to prevent those voters from casting their 
ballots would seek to decrease the number of votes received by opposing parties. 
Within the context of the 2019 Federal election, a considerable number of 
deceitful robocalls were linked to the Canada Proud group. Earlier during the pre-
election period, the group delivered a series of robocalls asking the call recipient about 
how they intended to vote in the upcoming election (Paas-Lang, 2019, July 25). Study 2 
has illustrated that the group strongly supports the Conservative Party of Canada 
through the anti-Liberal content shared supplemented with pro-Conservative materials. 
Further, Canada Proud was officially registered as a third-party in the federal election in 
July 2019 (Paas-Lang, 2019, July 25). Through creating a list which provides information 
about non-Conservative supporters, the group would have had the information 
necessary to equip them to deploy a disinformation attack against voters who did not 
intend to vote Conservative in the election. 
Canada Proud appears to employ diverse tactics which seem to all share the 
same goal: to remove the Liberals from office by preventing their re-election in the 2019 
Canadian Federal election. Study 1 has illustrated that fake news headline 1, which is a 
post headline created by Canada Proud, shows to have a significant relationship with 
Facebook use, identified political affiliation, and all other fake news headlines. Given the 
relationships that exist between these variables, this finding further provides evidence for 
the group’s prolific reach on social media which may target people with specific political 
affiliations and may generate support for other fake news sources that are heavily 
focused on anti-Liberal content. Study 2 has provided insight into specific strategies 
used in delivering the constructed messages. Through basing their narrative in 
sensationalized topics, including affective content, and encouraging user engagement 
which extends across social media platforms, the messages delivered by the group 
appear to have significant power of influence on their audience. Study 3 evidences the 
existence of disinformation robocalls during the time of the election. Although the case 
discussed by the survey participant cannot prove that Canada Proud was responsible for 
this specific case, the external evidence about the nature of the calls and the group 
responsible can be used to provide insight. While the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 did 
not depict any criminal activity, what is known about the deceitful election-related 
robocalls delivered by Canada Proud does navigate into the jurisdiction of unlawful 
conduct. 
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Ontario Proud, which is a localized affiliation of the Canada Strong and Proud 
group, reportedly received nearly $460,000 in corporate donations to fund their 
campaign to vote the Liberals out of office in the 2019 election (Rogers, 2019, Aug 6). 
The Buffalo Chronicle too has a history of receiving payments from partisan advocate 
groups and the person who runs the website has a history of advertising to publish 
positive or negative coverage for political candidates for a fee (Oved, Lytvynenko, & 
Silverman, 2019, Oct 18). Based on the findings across studies, both groups are heavily 
focused on propagating anti-Liberal, pro-Conservative content. While the financial 
information relating to a history of receiving donations from partisan interest groups 
cannot directly evidence a deliberate and funded disinformation campaign, the donations 
received and the actions of both entities do suggest a high level of suspicion in relation 
to the motives of the content created and posted. The findings do support that 
information trolls were responsible in constructing both disinformation and 
misinformation attacks on Canadian democracy through the content delivered by both 
The Buffalo Chronicle and Canada Proud. 
6.4.3. Social Construction Theory and Information Trolls 
What we perceive as knowledge is subject to an elaborate network of social 
interaction which influences how we understand the social and natural world (Lindgren, 
2005). It is through social interactions that reality is constructed. The ability to construct 
knowledge and reality relies in the legitimacy of the social structure that is being 
engaged with. When the structure is perceived as holding a legitimate role in the 
dissemination of information, the power to create knowledge is permitted. Issues arise 
when knowledge creation structures misrepresent their qualifications. Through 
deception, claims makers who engineer false information while presenting it as real 
knowledge have come to be socially accepted among their audience and have 
accumulated considerable power. Through establishing power, fake news creators are 
able to interject their “distorted signals uncorrelated with the truth” into social reality 
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 212). The more the signal becomes accepted by the social 
body, the more power of influence it possesses.  
Information trolls construct a false depiction of reality through manipulating their 
perceived legitimacy to produce knowledge. Authors of the content delivered by both 
Canada Proud and The Buffalo Chronicle are exemplary of the disingenuous process of 
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socially constructed knowledge. In encouraging user engagement, expanding operations 
over multiple social media platforms, and amplifying their messages, they may achieve a 
sense of enhanced legitimacy. In carefully crafting knowledge pieces to include affective 
content focused on contentious issues, they are effective in encouraging moral panics to 
ensue. By inducing a moral panic through a disinformation campaign, social unrest is 
manufactured, and a threat is assumed towards an issue that may not be relevant to the 
overall picture (Carlson, 2018). In establishing trust among the social body in their role to 
produce knowledge, information trolls can be effective in forcing social discourse to 
place attention to constructed threats unassociated to genuine reality. 
Disinformation campaigns weaponize information and are a form of non-material 
cyber attack which can pose a threat to an entire democratic system (Haataja, 2019). 
This research has provided evidence for the existence of information warfare within the 
2019 Canadian Federal election which has been characterized by foreign interference 
and voter suppression strategies. While this research cannot provide context into the 
scope of the criminal interference, it does illustrate the nature of the informational 
violence that transpired. This research has examined what has happened; however, it is 
far outside the scope of this research to examine what could have been if information 
trolls were not involved in democratic interference. Given the significant number of 
followers and supporters accumulated by the two main fake news perpetrators examined 
within this thesis, it may be possible that the outcome of the election could have been 
different without the involvement of active disinformation campaigns. It remains that 
weaponizing information can have catastrophic outcomes on the democratic process; 
information warfare was a factor in the 2019 Canadian Federal election and information 
trolls had successfully negotiated legitimized access into the media information system 
and permeated their narratives into social discourse. 
 
109 
Chapter 7.  
 
Conclusion 
7.1. Current Research 
This exploratory research has aimed to answer two main questions. The central 
questions for this research were: 
Research Question 1: Was fake news delivered during the election and if 
so, could it have had an effect the outcome of the 2019 Canadian Federal 
election results? 
Research Question 2: Was there any criminal interference involved during 
the time of the 2019 Canadian Federal election in relation to delivering false 
information through social media, news outlets, or robocalls? 
Both research question 1 and 2 were answered through the employment of three 
separate studies. In combining the findings of each study, each question is answered 
with greater detail. Study 1 was significant in providing evidence that fake news 
headlines can have a significant impact on how a participant decides to vote. Through 
using headlines which were disseminated to the public during the pre-election period, 
quantitative analysis of the survey results provided a model that was significant in 
illustrating that those who were exposed to certain fake news headlines and those who 
believed certain headlines were more likely to change their voting decision than those 
who were not exposed or those who did not believe in the headline. Study 2 and 3 also 
provided insight into the first question. Social media posts and news articles containing 
false information were published and targeted to the public audience. These posts 
typically included divisive materials and affective language which appeared to encourage 
the incitement of anger and outrage among its readers. Study 3 further provided 
evidence in spreading false information through the use of robocalls. 
Studies 2 and 3 played a significant role in answering the second question. The 
Buffalo Chronicle, which published false stories that were heavily focused on the 
Canadian election, is not a Canadian publication. While the exact origin of the source is 
unverified, they are noted to be based in the U.S. This was proven in the examination to 
constitute foreign interference which is prohibited under Canadian election law. Further, 
110 
study 3 has provided evidence to illustrate that the robocalls received by survey 
respondents violate the rule prohibiting election advertising during the blackout period of 
an election. Of more serious concern, voter suppression was also evident in this 
research. Voter suppression was evident in one participant’s robocall experience. It is 
unclear what group or party the called was delivered by, but the aim of the ERRC 
appeared to prevent the voter from casting their ballot by informing them of the wrong 
day to vote. 
7.2. Recommendations 
As social media becomes more engrained in culture, the ability for false 
information to use social media platforms as a method to deliver informational violence 
becomes more powerful threat. Information warfare can threaten the entire system of 
democracy through inoculating false narratives into the information news media while 
actively engaging in deception to encourage acceptance among their audience members 
(Haataja, 2019). In a world of addictive media consumption habits, the solutions to such 
an intricate issue are likely not simple themselves. When developing counterstrategies to 
prevent fake news circulation, Kumar and Krishna (2014) note that is much more 
advantageous to prevent fake news circulation rather than to try and address it after it 
has become infectious within the public domain. 
Routine activities theory (RAT) states that there are three essential elements 
which make it likely for a crime occur when these elements converge between time and 
space (Felson & Cohen, 1980). The elements are: 1) a motivated offender, 2) a suitable 
target, and 3) absence of a capable guardian. According to Felson and Cohen (1980), if 
there is a person who is motivated to commit a crime, and the opportunity to commit that 
crime is met by a target that is suitable to their motivation and it is unguarded by a 
capable person or thing, a crime is likely to occur. Typically, this theoretical framework is 
applied to crimes which occur in the physical domain; however, a parallel can be drawn 
between RAT and crimes which occur in the cyber domain. 
Within the context of this research, all elements of RAT can be identified and 
may help explain both the occurrence of disinformation campaigns, as well as, offer 
insight into potential solutions to prevent them. The motivated offender can be 
understood as the person, group, or institution responsible for orchestrating the 
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information attack. The motivations may potentially be money, political power, or 
notoriety. The suitable target is the information consumer. The goal of the motivated 
offender is to infiltrate the reader’s newsfeed with false information materials. In many 
social media platforms, there is an absence of a capable guardian. As most social media 
platforms are powered by user content without significant controls or filters, the content 
that is generated for public viewing does not involve a process of scrutiny and review, 
such as, publications in an academic journal or a legitimate newspaper would. To 
prevent disinformation from gaining public attention and affecting the reader’s mind, 
removing one of the three elements of RAT would reduce the likelihood of information 
violence (Felson & Cohen, 1980). 
Previous literature has made recommendations to prevent fake news from being 
widely circulated and accepted. Bakir and McStay (2018) suggest that there are 
significant changes that could be implemented by social media companies to make 
consumers aware that the information presented may not accurately reflect reality; these 
recommendations relate to creating the presence of a capable guardian. One of their 
recommendations include ensuring that only higher quality pieces from trusted 
journalistic sources appear on a user’s newsfeed. When a user clicks on an item and 
sees articles related to the content they just expressed interest in, it is suggested that 
tweaks could be made to the algorithm to encourage less reputable news pieces to 
appear lower in the item list. The authors further recommend that third-party fact 
checking processes be implemented. If a news piece is found to be less than honest, it 
is suggested that a red flag could appear on the item notifying the consumer that the 
information they are about to read did not pass the fact-verifying process. However, 
given that false information media may be frequently created and constantly infiltrating 
numerous newsfeeds, the ability to keep up with fact checking each item may be limited. 
Finally, the authors suggest that disrupting fake news economics would provide more 
transparency. This includes eliminating the ability for fake news sources to ‘spoof’ their 
domain. In spoofing their domain, they appear to the reader to be representative of a 
legitimate news organization while in fact their domain masquerades their real identity. 
There is no perfect solution to prevent the spread of information warfare. 
Consumers of all news media should stay vigilant and critical when reading news media 
pieces; however, this may be a lot to ask of consumers as the stream of information is 
constant. Information is administered to consumers every time they open their social 
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media pages, turn on the television, open up a magazine or catalogue, drive past a 
billboard, listen to the radio, or watch a movie. Due to the steady stream of information 
signal, it is unlikely that a consumer would be able to critically assess the validity of all 
messages. Fact checking websites and resources have become more popular and 
provide information about the source’s background which may be helpful in determining 
whether the information is being delivered by a trusted source. Information trolls use 
strategic deception to construct and disseminate disinformation, the onus is placed on 
the consumer and the source host to respond to and mitigate threats of information 
warfare. 
7.3. Implications 
This research has provided evidence to support that fake news can influence 
democratic minds. The integrity of Canadian democracy is threatened by information 
warfare. While this research cannot contend how large of an impact disinformation 
campaigns had on the 2019 Canadian Federal election, it does contend that at least for 
a number of participants in this study, their votes were influenced by fake news. This 
research has further provided insight into the techniques and mechanisms used by 
information trolls in their construction and propagation of false information. Future 
research would do well to collect a larger survey sample to enable more insight into the 
scope and severity of fake news attacks during elections. This research could be used to 
further the discourse on preventing information warfare. Through understanding and 
recognizing the techniques used by information trolls, those tasked to detect deliberately 
created fake news pieces are better equipped to flag deceitful messages and prevent 
them from infecting political public discourse.  
It should be noted that social media, fake news, and robocalls are only three 
individual nodes that can be utilized to inject disinformation to the public discourse and 
influence public thought. Within the social constructionist theoretical framework, what we 
understand as knowledge is subject to an elaborate network of social interaction 
(Lindgren, 2005). This research focuses on a limited number of factors which may help 
to explain the interaction between false information and a person’s change of beliefs or 
values; however, there are many other factors to consider within this interaction that are 
well beyond the scope of this study. A person’s upbringing, their family unit, the influence 
of friends or role models, their school or working environment, and additional 
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psychological factors are just a few of the many variables to consider in understanding 
how disinformation spreads, and why it may have an affect on the democratic voter’s 
mind. Future research should seek to examine these variables in more depth. 
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Appendix A.  
 
Fake News Survey 
The Canadian Fake News Survey 
Study Number: 2020s0038  
Research Purpose: This research focuses on misinformation delivered during the time 
leading up to the 2019 Canadian Federal election. Misinformation is false or inaccurate 
information, which is typically intended to deliberately deceive readers or viewers for a 
specific purpose. This research hopes to better understand how prolific fake news and 
misinformation have become within the Canadian political climate. More specifically, this 
research hopes to gain insight through the answers you provide to understand that 
extent to which misinformation may or may not have affected the results of the 2019 
Canadian Federal election. Another topic of interest in this research are robocalls related 
to election issues. A robocall is an automated telephone call which delivers a recorded 
message, typically on behalf of a political party or telemarketing company. We hope to 
explore how prevalent robocalls related to election issues were in the time leading up to 
the election. You will be asked some demographic information, your opinions about 
certain news pieces, and your experiences with robocalls (if you had any). As this study 
focuses on the spread of fake news and misinformation, it is important to reach out to 
social media users on different platforms to gather information in this area, which is why 
we are reaching out to you.     
 *To participate in this study, participants must be 18 years or older, a Canadian 
citizen, and you must have voted in the 2019 Canadian Federal election. 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. It is 
your choice whether you would like to participate or not. If you decide to participate, but 
change your mind later, you can stop participation at any point, by closing your 
browser.      
Type of Research Intervention: This research will involve your participation in an 
online survey that may take up to 15 - 20 minutes of your time. Risks: This study is 
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minimal risk. However, some participants may feel uncomfortable with some of the 
questions asked. If a question comes up that you do not feel comfortable in answering, 
you may skip the question by selecting the “prefer not to say” option. This option is made 
available for each question in this survey. Further, you can choose to withdraw from the 
study at any point by closing your web browser. In closing the web browser, your 
responses will be discarded. 
Benefits: There is no direct benefit to you in this study, but having you participate 
through providing your valuable input will allow research to be created that will develop 
knowledge about the spread of fake news and misinformation in the political climate. 
Further, it is important to develop an understanding about the nature of any robocalls 
received by Canadian voters to ensure they are in-line with Canadian election laws.      
Confidentiality/Anonymity: Participation in the survey is anonymous and every effort 
will be made to keep the information you provide confidential. Your name will never be 
connected to the data you provide. Only the principal investigator and co-investigator will 
have access to completed surveys and even then, will not have access to any 
information that identifies you. Further, online data collection methods will not be able to 
identify you (IP address and geodata collection elements are disabled). Only the 
principal investigator and co-investigator will have access to this data. Please note that 
posting to comments sections on social media or other forums about this study may 
identify you as a participant, we therefore suggest that if this study was made available 
to you via a social media site or other online forums, you refrain from posting comments 
to protect your anonymity.     The information collected from this study will be stored on 
Qualtrics servers located in North America and is subject to the U.S. CLOUD (Clarifying 
Lawful Overseas Use of Data) Act that allows federal law enforcement to compel U.S.-
based technology companies via subpoena to provide requested data stored on servers. 
However, your name will not be connected to the information you provide, so identifying 
you directly would be difficult. Data will also be stored indefinitely on an encrypted, 
password protected computer belonging to myself. This data may be used in future 
research projects. Results from this study will be disseminated via presentation, in 
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aggregate form only (grouped or summary statistics, so individual responses will never 
be identified), at research conferences and through publication in research journals. 
Contact Information: If you have questions about this study, please contact the 
principal investigator, Dr. Richard Frank; [ ... ] or co-investigator, Rachelle Louden; [ ... ]. 
Who can you contact if you have complaints or concerns about the study? If you 
have any concerns about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences 
while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, Director, Office of 
Research Ethics [ ... ] or [ ... ]. 
 
Important Notice: By proceeding to the next page, you are indicating that you 
understand this consent form – are 18 years or older, are a Canadian Citizen, and 




Q1. My gender is…  
o Man  (1)  
o Woman  (2)  
o Genderqueer/Non-Binary  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q2. What is your age?  
o 18 – 25 years old  (1)  
o 26 – 34 years old  (2)  
o 35 – 43 years old  (3)  
o 44 – 52 years old  (4)  
o 53 – 61 years old  (5)  
o 62 – 70 years old  (6)  
o 71+ years old  (7)  
o Prefer not to say  (8)  
 
Q3. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?  
o Some High School  (1)  
o High School  (2)  
o Bachelor's Degree  (3)  
o Master's Degree  (4)  
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o Ph.D. or higher  (5)  
o Trade School  (6)  
o Prefer not to say  (7)  
 
Q4. What is your annual household income?  
o Less than $24,999  (1)  
o $25,000 - $49,999  (2)  
o $50,000 - $99,999  (3)  
o $100,000 - $199,999  (4)  
o More than $200,000  (5)  
o Prefer not to say  (6)  
 
Q5. How many languages do you speak fluently?  
o 1  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3 or more  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q6. How would you describe your political view?  
o Very Liberal  (1)  
o Slightly Liberal  (2)  
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o Moderate  (3)  
o Slightly Conservative  (4)  
o Very Conservative  (5)  
o Other (please specify)  (6) ________________________________________________ 
o Prefer not to say  (7)  
 
Q7. Which of the following forms of media do you primarily depend on to keep you up to 
date on news, current events, and issues?  
▢    TV  (1)  
▢    Social Media  (2)  
▢    Internet (not including social media platforms)  (3)  
▢    Radio  (4)  
▢    Newspaper (printed)  (5)  
▢    Magazine  (6)  
▢    Other (please specify)  (7) 
________________________________________________ 
▢    Prefer not to say  (8)  
 
Q8. What was your primary source of information regarding party platforms in the 2019 
Canadian Federal election?  
o TV  (1)  
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o Social Media  (2)  
o Internet (not including social media platforms)  (3)  
o Radio  (4)  
o Newspaper (printed)  (5)  
o Door to door party representatives  (6)  
o Telephone callers  (7)  
o Brochures in mail  (8)  
o Emails sent on behalf of the political party  (9)  
o Other (please specify)  (10) ________________________________________________ 
o Prefer not to say  (11)  
 
Q9. How may social media sites do you have accounts with?  
o 1  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3  (3)  
o 4  (4)  
o 5  (5)  
o 6 or more  (6)  
o None  (7)  
o Prefer to not say  (8)  
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Q10. Which of the following social media platforms are you most active on?  
o Facebook  (1)  
o Twitter  (2)  
o Reddit  (3)  
o Instagram  (4)  
o Tumblr  (5)  
o Other (please specify)  (6) ________________________________________________ 
o None  (7)  
o Prefer not to say  (8)  
 
Q11. How much time do you estimate you spend on Facebook daily?  
o None  (0)  
o Less than one hour  (1)  
o 1 to 2 hours  (2)  
o 2 to 3 hours  (3)  
o 3 to 4 hours  (4)  
o More than 4 hours  (5)  
 
Q12. How much time do you estimate you spend on Twitter daily?  
o None  (0)  
o Less than one hour  (1)  
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o 1 to 2 hours  (2)  
o 2 to 3 hours  (3)  
o 3 to 4 hours  (4)  
o More than 4 hours  (5)  
 
Q13. How much time do you estimate you spend on Reddit daily?  
o None  (0)  
o Less than one hour  (1)  
o 1 to 2 hours  (2)  
o 2 to 3 hours  (3)  
o 3 to 4 hours  (4)  
o More than 4 hours  (5)  
 
Q14. How much time do you estimate you spend on Instagram daily?  
o None  (0)  
o Less than one hour  (1)  
o 1 to 2 hours  (2)  
o 2 to 3 hours  (3)  
o 3 to 4 hours  (4)  
o More than 4 hours  (5)  
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Q15. How much time do you estimate you spend on Tumblr daily?  
o None  (0)  
o Less than one hour  (1)  
o 1 to 2 hours  (2)  
o 2 to 3 hours  (3)  
o 3 to 4 hours  (4)  
o More than 4 hours  (5)  
 
Q16. Did you receive a robocall to your mobile or home phone in the 3 months leading 
up to the 2019 Canadian Federal election?      
A robocall is an automated telephone call which delivers a recorded message, typically 
on behalf of a political party or telemarketing company.    
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Did you receive a robocall to your mobile or home phone in the 3 months leading up to the 2019 
Ca... = Yes 
Q17. Was the robocall related in any way to the upcoming election?  
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
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o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Was the robocall related in any way to the upcoming election? = Yes 
Q18. Which political party did the robocall identify as being affiliated with?  
o Liberal Party of Canada  (1)  
o Conservative Party of Canada  (2)  
o New Democratic Party of Canada  (3)  
o Green Party of Canada  (4)  
o Bloc Québécois  (5)  
o Independent Party  (6)  
o Not sure  (7)  
o They did not identify as being affiliated with any specific party  (8)  
o Prefer not to say  (9)  
o People's Party of Canada  (10)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Was the robocall related in any way to the upcoming election? = Yes 
Q19. Would your best guess be that the information provided by the robocall was true?  
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
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Display This Question: 
If Was the robocall related in any way to the upcoming election? = Yes 
Q20. In the space below, please describe the nature of the robocall in as much detail as 
needed.  
 







Q21. Based on what you observed in the media regarding the election, did anything  
presented by the media change your decision to switch from one party to  another?  
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o I had not decided on a party beforehand  (3)  
o I did not observe any media related to the election  (4)  
o Prefer not to say  (5)  
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Display This Question: 
If Based on what you observed in the media regarding the election, did anything presented by the 
med... = Yes 
Q22. What party did you originally intend to vote for?  
o Liberal Party of Canada  (1)  
o Conservative Party of Canada  (2)  
o New Democratic Party of Canada  (3)  
o Green Party of Canada  (4)  
o Bloc Québécois  (5)  
o Independent Party  (6)  
o Prefer not to say  (7)  
o People's Party of Canada  (8)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Based on what you observed in the media regarding the election, did anything presented by the 
med... = Yes 
Q23. What party did you end up voting for?  
o Liberal Party of Canada  (1)  
o Conservative Party of Canada  (2)  
o New Democratic Party of Canada  (3)  
o Green Party of Canada  (4)  
o Bloc Québécois  (5)  
o Independent Party  (6)  
o Prefer not to say  (7)  
o People's Party of Canada  (8)  
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Q24. "Singh says NDP would form coalition with the Liberals to stop Tories”      
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Display This Question: 
If "Singh says NDP would form coalition with the Liberals to stop Tories”   Do you recall seeing thi... = 
Yes 
Q25. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: "Singh says NDP would form coalition with the Liberals to stop 
Tories” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q26. “Justin Trudeau is trying to rig the election through controlling the Canadian news 
media”   
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election? 
o Yes  (1)  
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o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Display This Question: 
If “Justin Trudeau is trying to rig the election through controlling the Canadian news media”   Do y... = 
Yes 
Q27. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: “Justin Trudeau is trying to rig the election through controlling the 
Canadian news media” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q28. “RCMP plans to charge Trudeau with obstruction in SNC Lavalin affair, following 
federal elections”   
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election?   
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
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Display This Question: 
If “RCMP plans to charge Trudeau with obstruction in SNC Lavalin affair, following federal elections... 
= Yes 
Q29. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: “RCMP plans to charge Trudeau with obstruction in SNC Lavalin 
affair, following federal elections” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q30. “RCMP source says ‘security risk’ against Trudeau was contrived by PMO 
staffers”. 
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
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Display This Question: 
If “RCMP source says ‘security risk’ against Trudeau was contrived by PMO staffers”   Do you recall... 
= Yes 
Q31. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: “RCMP source says ‘security risk’ against Trudeau was contrived by 
PMO staffers” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q32. “Elections Canada attempts to combat huge number of non-Canadians on voting 
register”      
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
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Display This Question: 
If “Elections Canada attempts to combat huge number of non-Canadians on voting register”   Do you 
re... = Yes 
Q33. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: “Elections Canada attempts to combat huge number of non-
Canadians on voting register” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q34. “NDP Brampton-Centre candidate apologizes for offensive tweet from 2012”      
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
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Display This Question: 
If “NDP Brampton-Centre candidate apologizes for offensive tweet from 2012”   Do you recall seeing 
t... = Yes 
Q35. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: “NDP Brampton-Centre candidate apologizes for offensive tweet 
from 2012” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q36. “Scheer won't say if Conservatives hired consultant to 'destroy' People's Party”.  
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  




Display This Question: 
If “Scheer won't say if Conservatives hired consultant to 'destroy' People's Party”   Do you recall... = 
Yes 
Q37. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: “Scheer won't say if Conservatives hired consultant to 'destroy' 
People's Party” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q38. “Edmonton Strathcona Green Party candidate drops out, asks supporters to vote 
NDP”   
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
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Display This Question: 
If “Edmonton Strathcona Green Party candidate drops out, asks supporters to vote NDP”   Do you 
recal... = Yes 
Q39. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: “Edmonton Strathcona Green Party candidate drops out, asks 
supporters to vote NDP” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q40. “Trudeau’s visit to Cuba – PM promises to provide financial aid to the country as 
US embargo discussions persist”      
Do you recall seeing this headline reported on any news media platform prior to the 
election? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
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Display This Question: 
If “Trudeau’s visit to Cuba – PM promises to provide financial aid to the country as US embargo disc... 
= Yes 
Q41. At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement 
was true?  
The statement was: “Trudeau’s visit to Cuba – PM promises to provide financial aid to 
the country as US embargo discussions persist” 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Not Sure  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q42. Thank you for your time in completing this survey. Do you wish to submit your 
survey responses?  
o Yes, submit  (1)  







Appendix B.  
 
Canada Proud Facebook Posts 
Corruption Post 1 
 
Corruption Post 2 
 
Corruption Post 3 
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Corruption Post 4 
 
Veteran Post 1 
 
Veteran Post 2 
 
Veteran Post 3 
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Veteran Post 4 
 
Global Affairs Post 1 
 
Global Affairs Post 2 
 
Global Affairs Post 3 
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Global Affairs Post 4 
 
Negative Affective Post 1 
 
Negative Affective Post 2 
 
Negative Affective Post 3 
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Negative Affective Post 4 
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Appendix C.  
 
Barack Obama Tweet 
 
 
